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USING THE "CONSUMER CHOICE" APPROACH
TO ANTITRUST LAW
NEIL

W. AVERITT
H. LANDE*

ROBERT

The current paradigms of antitrust law-price and efficiency-do not
work well enough. True, they were an immense improvement over their
predecessors, and they have served the field competently for a generation, producing reasonably accurate results in most circumstances. Accumulated experience has also revealed their shortcomings, however. The
price and efficiency paradigms are hard to fully understand and are not
particularly transparent in their application. Moreover, in a disturbingly
large number of circumstances they are unable to handle the important
issue of nonprice competition. In this article we suggest replacing the
older paradigms with the somewhat broader approach of "consumer
choice." 1 The choice framework has several advantages. It takes full
account of all the things that are actually important to consumersprice, of course, but also variety, innovation, quality, and other forms
of non price competition. It is also far more transparent, which is an
important administrative virtue even where, as in the great majority of
cases, it will reach the same result. And in some important real-world
situations it will lead to better substantive outcomes. There are a number
of variety-valuing industries and circumstances that can be assessed correctly only by including an effective analysis of non price factors. We
identify several of those in the article. To illustrate their importance we

* Respectively, Attorney in the Office of Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission; and Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law. The views expressed in this article are solely the authors' own and are not
necessarily those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. We
are grateful for valuable suggestions from Alden Abbott, Terry Calvani, Russell Damtoft,
Albert Foer, Paul Halpern, Caswell Hobbs, ElizabethJex, Paul Karlsson, William Kovacic,
Thomas Krattenmaker, Thomas Leary, Michael Moiseyev, James Mongoven, John Parisi,
Suzanne Patrick, Robert Skitol, Mary Lou Steptoe, Randolph Tritell, Oscar Voss, and Erika
Wodinsky. We are also grateful for helpful research assistance from Alice Arcieri, Fran
Cariaga, Benson Cohen, Sarah Duran, Joseph Pulver, J. Andrew Stevens, Andrea Tony,
and Thomas Werthman. Any errors remain our own.
I We refer to this as the "consumer choice," or sometimes, for linguistic ease, as simply
the "choice" model.
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go on to identifY eight noteworthy recent cases that would probably have
been decided differently under a choice approach. Throughout the
article the focus is on the practical issues of day-to-day management,
and we show how the choice approach can be made as predictable and
administrable as the other paradigms.
The current price and efficiency models can deal only awkwardly
with nonprice competition. At best, they try to help consumers achieve
nonprice objectives indirectly, by folding them into the price analysis in
the form of quality adjusted prices, or by assuming that markets that are
price competitive will also be competitive for non price preferences. That
surrogate analysis usually produces reasonable results, but it is not particularly intuitive. In some cases, moreover, it does not work properly. In
those cases the choice factors will have to be addressed directly if they
are to be considered at all.
Antitrust encounters at least three common situations in which a
simple price analysis is inadequate. First, in some markets there is little
or no price competition to begin with, as a result of regulation, joint
ventures, or third-party insurance payors. There is no good way to assess
consumer welfare in those markets without considering the nonprice
choice issues. Second, some conduct-such as horizontal agreements to
limit advertising-will increase consumers' search costs or otherwise
impair their decision-making ability. This will cause consumers to select
products that are less desirable or less well-suited to their particular
needs. A complete rule of reason analysis must take account of these
adverse effects on suitability and satisfaction as well as the adverse price
effects of the conduct. Finally, in some markets the firms compete not
primarily on price but rather through independent product development
or creativity. These efforts may involve areas, such as high-tech innovation, delivery of new patient-friendly hospital services, or editorial independence in the news media. Effective innovation in these markets may
sometimes require more providers than are required to ensure price
competition. Thus market concentration principles taken from a price
context may not ensure robust competition in the respects most relevant
to consumers of these kinds of products. In all three situations, the
explicit use of a choice approach to antitrust is likely to lead to enforcement decisions that better reflect consumer concerns and preferences.
Our proposal for dealing with these issues attempts to combine the
virtues of narrowness and breadth-to offer both relatively cautious
substantive reform and relatively broad conceptual change.
To begin with, the proposal accepts that the price and efficiency
models have brought some much-needed discipline and rigor into anti-
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trust analysis, and it advocates new consideration for choice in only a
limited number of cases on the margin. The choice model is anchored
in current practice in at least five different ways. First, in over 95 percent
of cases either the relevant choice is still going to be based on price, or
price competition will ensure effective non price competition. In these
circumstances enforcement will simply continue along familiar lines.
Second, even where the antitrust analysis should focus on nonprice
effects, we propose only a more explicit and rigorous consideration of
those factors than before, not a fundamental break with the past. Third,
our approach would not condemn practices that result in only trivial
reductions in the range of options. A reduction from ten to nine providers would not normally be an antitrust concern, even though there has
been, in principle, some loss of variety.2 Fourth, the choice approach
will not condemn practices that limit options through ordinary market
competition. It asks only whether a particular business practice has
resulted in some unreasonable and significant limitation on consumer
choice, un mediated by a marketplace test. And fifth, a choice approach
is not a return to the "social and political values" paradigm of the 1960s
and 1970s, which proved standardless and unduly hostile to business. 3
A consumer choice theory based on these principles can operate in
as disciplined and predictable a way as any other model of the antitrust
laws. At first glance, the choice approach may seem to have less scientific
objectivity and rigor than the efficiency or price models. Those older
models, however, are based not only on science, but also on long experience and seasoned judgment. In this article we will demonstrate that a
choice model, carefully developed through case-by-case analysis and
supplemented by retrospective case studies and experimental economics,
can build the same kind of empirical foundation for itself. Such a foundation will identify the relevant standards and thresholds, which can then
be expressed and applied in administrable and predictable ways. For
example, the enforcement agencies might announce that they will apply
the Herfindahl (HHI)4 figures in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines more

2 This is true by analogy to the price model, which does not condemn a practice likely
to result in only a trivial increase in price.
3 The social-political paradigm rested on an underlying suspicion of or even hostility
toward big business, and this animus is not present in an approach that merely tries to
factor consumers' nonprice desires into the analysis.
4 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration used
in the antitrust agencies' merger guidelines, calculated by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all the participants. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade
Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997),4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
~ 13,104 at n.17, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
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strictly in particular markets where choice is likely to be important, or
choice might be identified as an explicit additional factor for a rule of
reason analysis.
Although making only moderate changes in practice, our proposed
choice model is also broadly and essentially new in principle. It represents
nothing less than a new paradigm of the antitrust laws, one that will be
helpful throughout the antitrust field. The consumer choice approach
is fundamentally superior to the price and efficiency paradigms because
it asks the right question. It recognizes that consumers do not just want
competitive prices-they want options. 5 Framing the issue in this way
starts the analysis on the right foot, presents the questions in a desirably
transparent way, ensures that important long-term factors like innovation
receive their full due,6 and helps to guard against circumstances in which
enforcers inadvertently neglect important choice factors that are simply
hard to translate into terms of price. 7 Competitive prices will then become
just one of the choices that are relevant to consumers-the controlling
choice and the focus of analysis in the vast majority of cases, to be sure,
but conceptually still a subset of choice. s
Most important, use of the new paradigm should result in better
substantive outcomes in some important situations. A key section of the
article reviews eight recent cases that would probably have come out
differently under our proposed approach. Consider, for example, a
merger that efficiently combines the last two defense contractors making
air-to-air missiles-a product using cutting-edge technology. If the
merger were accompanied by circumstances guaranteeing lower prices,

5 Consumers want books that reflect their interests, not just cheap books; and they want
pharmaceuticals that will cure their illness, not just cheap pharmaceuticals.
6 Innovation is the key to having future choices. The choice formulation thus brings
to antitrust analysis an increased emphasis on two related elements: the short-term importance of non price options and the long-term importance of innovation. This can work
either for or against an enforcement action. Sometimes the greater emphasis on innovation
might make an innovation defense more likely to prevail, so that the new model could
result in certain cases not being brought. In any event, we would see a somewhat different
menu of cases.
7 This may be a more frequent shortcoming than is commonly realized. The price or
efficiency approach typically defines "price" as price that is adjusted, somehow, for quality,
variety, and innovation. See infra note 28. It is not clear how often these adjustments are
actually made in reality.
8 This would parallel the structure on the consumer protection side of the FTC Act,
where the largest single group of cases, involving deception, are conceptually a subset of
the broader authority over "unfair practices." See Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
1060 (1984).
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it might be acceptable under conventional analysis, but choice analysis
would call attention to the benefits of maintaining a variety of competitive
approaches in a high-tech product like this one, where the best path to
future improvements is inherently impossible to predict. 9 Or consider a
hospital merger that does not threaten price competition but that brings
all the hospitals in a market under the control of institutions that are
unwilling, on religious grounds, to provide certain reproductive services,
such as tubal ligations. Conventional price analysis might well permit
this merger, but a choice analysis would highlight the importance of
protecting the particular services that are at risk. 1O Or consider a set of
strong incentives to engage in exclusive dealing in a pharmaceutical
product. Conventional analysis might have seen the incentives as involving only benign or even beneficial price discounts, but choice analysis
would ask whether the excluded alternatives would have been therapeutically better for some patients or if they might have been a useful starting
point for future innovation. II
Approaching such cases in choice terms helps call attention to the
relevant kinds of market failures. The industries in which variety and
choice are most important tend also to be industries that are especially
susceptible to information-related market failures. Among producers, it
is sometimes hard to know what kinds of creative products a noveltycraving public or a rapidly evolving technology will demand. Among
consumers, it is hard to know what kinds of innovations their suppliers
could have offered but did not, and so it is hard for them to demand
corrections from the marketplace. For both these reasons it may be
important to have additional independent centers of innovation in
such markets.
In addition to its primary substantive advantages, the consumer choice
model also confers a number of practical administrative and managerial
benefits. These include its ability to communicate antitrust policy in
broadly acceptable terms to other governments in both the developed
and the developing worlds, and to explain that policy in intuitive terms
to important nonspecialist audiences, such as juries, Congress, and the

9 Cj Press Release, U.S. Dep't of justice, justice Department Requires Raytheon to Sell
Key Electronics Businesses in Order to Go FOlWard with Its Hughes Aircraft Deal (Oct. 2,
1997) [hereinafter Raytheon Press Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
1997/0ctobe~7/415at.html, discussed infra note 172.
10 Cf Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., 118 F.T.C. 382 (1994), discussed infra Part IV.C.
\I Cf J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., No. 01-00704, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11676
(S. D. Ohio 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-3988 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2005), discussed infra
Part IV.E.
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general public. The model may also help to highlight possible synergies
between antitrust and consumer protection theories in Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) activities. And it may help to rationalize the allocation
of cases between the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Because the consumer choice model can lead to better analysis and
results, and has no significant drawbacks, it deserves to be-and it is in
fact-emerging as the new paradigm of antitrust.
We elaborate this thesis in the remainder of this article, which is
divided into six principal sections. Part I introduces the idea of consumer
choice by defining the term, contrasting it with other plausible
approaches to antitrust, and showing how it is not merely consistent with
the decided body of antitrust case law, but actually the best way of
explaining it. Part II starts the process of operationalizing these concepts,
by reviewing the economics literature that sheds light on the optimal
level of consumer choice. Part III discusses the particular industries
and business circumstances for which an efficiency or price model is
inadequate. Part IV shows that the discussion in the previous section has
practical consequences, by identifying eight significant recent cases that
were handled one way under a price or efficiency theory, but probably
would have come out differently under a choice theory. Part V shows
that a consumer choice approach can be made at least as administrable
and predictable as any other. Part VI identifies some of the further
administrative and managerial advantages of the choice approach.
Finally, a brief conclusion explains why the shift to a new paradigm
would have many precedents and, far from disrupting day-to-day
administration of antitrust law, is instead the next logical step in its
evolution.
I. DEFINING THE CONSUMER CHOICE

APPROACH TO ANTITRUST
The concept of "choice" pervades trade regulation law, at both the
general and the particular levels. We begin with an introduction to the
broad "consumer choice theory" used to explain trade regulation law as
a whole-antitrust and consumer protection laws collectively-and then
from this we derive a narrower "choice" interpretation of antitrust law
in particular. We then explain how this choice-oriented approach to the
goals of antitrust is broadly consistent with case law and the existing
consensus on antitrust policy.12
12 We have addressed these background issues in a number of earlier theoretical
papers. See Neil Averitt & Robert Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory oj Antitrust
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NONPRICE COMPETITION AND THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF
CONSUMER CHOICE

The proposed choice paradigm of antitrust law arises from a long
experience with the operation and interpretation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. In particular, it arises from a general theory of
consumer choice that has been developed over the last 20 years as
a way of harmonizing the two functions of antitrust and consumer
protection, as they have been presented by the two halves of that
agency's statute.
This general consumer choice theory suggests that antitrust and consumer protection laws perform different but complementary taskS.13
Operating together, these two bodies of law ensure that consumers have
the two ingredients needed to exercise effective consumer choice 14_
options, and the ability to choose among them. Antitrust law protects a
competitive array of options in the marketplace, undiminished byartificial restrictions, such as price fixing or anticompetitive mergers. Consumer protection law then guards against other market failures by
ensuring that consumers are able to make a reasonably free and rational
selection from among those options, unimpeded by artificial constraints,

and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST LJ. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Consumer
Sovereignty]. For a more concise statement see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande,
Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 44 (1998). For a discussion of choice theory in an antitrust
context, see Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62
U. PITT. L. REv. 503 (2001) [hereinafter Choice as Ultimate Goal]. See also Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65, 124 (1982) [hereinafter Wealth Transfers]
(antitrust violation requires a market failure external to consumers that "restrict or
distort consumers' available options"); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or
Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 CEO. LJ. 225, 281-82 (1981)
[hereinafter Unfair Acts or Practices] (effective marketplace requires two elements: "a
reasonable number of options" and ability "to make a free and rational choice from
among those options"); Neil Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REv. 227 (1980) [hereinafter
Unfair Methods of Competition] (reviewing various theories by which marketplace options
can be protected).
13 For a full elaboration of this thesis, see Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra
note 12. Each of these bodies of law is aimed at, and limited to, correcting the consequences of market failures.
14 In our earlier writings we have sometimes referred to this type of consumer choice
as "consumer sovereignty." The two terms have the same meaning. See Int'l Harvester
Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1061 n.47 (1984) (referring collectively to "consumer choice or
consumer sovereignty").
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such as deception or the withholding of material information. 15 Together
the laws function to protect a free market economy.16
B.

THE PARADIGM OF ANTITRUST WITHIN THE CHOICE MODEL

Antitrust fits very comfortably within this framework. Its mission is to
protect the array of options in the marketplace. 17 The setting of antitrust
policy within the more general "choice" framework has several implications for its proper construction, however. It suggests that the role of
antitrust should be broadly conceived to protect all the types of options
that are significantly important to consumers. An antitrust violation can,
therefore, be understood as an activity that unreasonably restricts the
totality of price and non price choices that would otherwise have been
available.
15 This interpretation was not changed by the passage of 15 U.S.c. § 45(n), which
requires, among other things, that an unfair consumer practice be one that "is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves." Section 45(n) is an additional screen, not a
complete definition of unfairness. Consumers normally avoid injury through the exercise
of choice in the marketplace. This view underlay the Commission's 1980 Unfairness Policy
Statement, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,203 (1980). Section 45(n) was intended to
provide a rational, empirical means of determining when the conduct has impaired
consumers' ability to make choices. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354,
1365 & n.13 (11th Cir. 1988); Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Comm'n, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Consumer Protection
Policy, Remarks Before the Aspen Summit on Cyberspace and the American Dream at
n.29 (Aug. 19,2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.htm.
It is the effect on choices that is the ultimate test of legality. See infra note 16.
16 Thus the agency ultimately defines its mission in fairly specific economic terms:
Some commentators have interpreted our policy statement as involving essentially
a general balancing of interests, with all the imprecision of that course, rather
than a definable economic rule. In fact, however, the principal focus of our
unfairness policy is on the maintenance of consumer choice or consumer sovereignty, an economic concept that permits relatively specific identification of
conduct harmful to that objective.
International Haroester, 104 F.T.C. at 1061 n.47 (citing Averitt, Unfair Acts or Practices, supra
note 12). The FTC has elsewhere described the necessary conditions for consumer choice
in slightly more elaborate terms, making a further distinction between deception and
unfairness in its consumer protection function:
The various components of the statute form an integrated whole, allowing the
Commission to promote the diverse benefits of a free and open economy. Thus
the ban on unfair competition prevents exclusionary or anti-competitive behavior
and helps preserve a full variety of marketplace options for consumers to choose
among; the ban on deception helps ensure that consumers will not make that
choice on the basis of misleading information; and the ban on unfair practices
ensures that the choice is not distorted by coercion, the withholding of important
information, or similar practices. Safeguards at all three levels are needed to
ensure that substantial consumer injury is adequately addressed.
Companion Statement on the Commission's Consumer Unfairness jurisdiction, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,203 at 20,909-03 (1980).
17 For an elaboration of this thesis, see Lande, Choice as Ultimate Goal, supra note 12.
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Market power remains central to this analysis; antitrust conceived in
these terms will still focus on preventing firms from improperly acquiring
or exercising such power. However, the concept of "market power"
should now be specified in a way that ensures we are capturing all its
relevant aspects. Instead of just the power to cause a deviation from the
prices that would be set by competition,18 market power will mean the
power to significantly change the mix of price/quality/variety choices
that would arise from competition. 19 The power to produce adverse
changes in these respects could be improper even if it is not deliberately
sought or knowingly held by the firms involved. 20
Putting this concept into more operational terms will require answers
to two practical questions: What particular choices are protected by
choice-based antitrust law? How great must the reduction in choice be
in order to justify government intervention?
Identifying the protected options is relatively simple. Antitrust should
protect any type of choice that is of practical importance to consumers.
The "consumers" at issue are normally individual ultimate consumers,
but the model protects all entities engaged in purchase transactions,
including corporations buying intermediate industrial goods. 21 The
options that they value are identified by their preferences as expressed

18 This has traditionally been the focus of the definition. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) ("market power" is "the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market"); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (monopoly power is "the power to control prices or
exclude competition"). See generally Thomas C. Krattenmaker, Robert Lande & Steven
Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 CEO. LJ. 241 (1987).
19 Although market power in this expanded sense is a thoroughly conventional economic
concept, we do not recommend demonstrating it through conventional economic analysis
in all circumstances; often the calculations of quality-adjusted price will be too complicated
for that. In those cases variety will be better demonstrated through other means. In about
95% of cases, however, the standard approach to market power, focusing upon price,
and the choice-based approach, focusing on price/quality/variety options, will produce
identical results. For the European Union's treatment of this issue, see infra note 270.
20 Just as antitrust has always sought to prevent even an unexercised power to control
prices, it should equally be concerned about acquisition of a power to unreasonably restrict
non price options, even if the firms intend to compete vigorously. A firm possessing such
power might not always realize it. Its employees might be doing their best to satisfy
consumer demand, but may be unable to do so optimally because they are limited by the
uncertainties of high-tech research paths or by their firms' accustomed ways of doing
business. One may need to preserve one or two additional firms in certain markets in
order to ensure competition. See infra notes 92-102.
21 The vocabulary of trade regulation is not accustomed to thinking of corporations as
"consumers," perhaps because they are not usually subject to the same kinds of decisionmaking difficulties that can harm individual persons. Still, they are consumers for choice
purposes whenever they make a purchase. See infra note 281.
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. in the marketplace. Thus, a choice-based theory of antitrust is fundamentally just one that is fully attentive to empirical evidence on purchasers'
nonprice, as well as price, preferences. It will continue to protect price
competition and other activities likely to result in cost savings because
competitive prices are one of the options most highly valued by consumers. But it also recognizes and protects the main additional aspects of
nonprice competition, such as innovation, variety, quality, safety, and
other product attributes, because consumers base their decisions on
these features as well. 22
Identifying the degree of diminution in choice against which antitrust
will protect consumers is more subtle. Antitrust law does not require
that the number of options be maximized,23 and it does not affirmatively
require the creation of new options. 24 What choice theory does do is
prohibit business conduct that harmfully and significantly limits the
range of choices that the free market, absent the restraints being challenged, would have provided.
The actual importance to consumers of any particular non price attribute can be measured here as it is elsewhere in antitrust. For example,
it can be tested by predicting the response to a small but significant and
nontransitory falloff in that quality.25 If we can succeed in isolating one
particular attribute as a variable, then the number of consumers who
would switch to another supplier gives some indication of the importance
of the attribute and, therefore, of the strength of antitrust concerns.
However, certain free-market transactions, such as efficient joint ventures, might also result in some affirmative loss of variety but still be
permissible if the consumer benefits of the action appear to outweigh
22 These other attributes have become increasingly important as the economy has moved
away from producing and providing relatively simple goods at the lowest possible price
towards producing more complex and specialized items.
23 Maximum consumer choice is not necessarily good, because it may be accompanied
by production inefficiencies and higher prices. In extreme cases it can cause unduly high
consumer search costs and confusion. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
24 A policy aimed at affirmatively increasing choice goes beyond the requirements of
the antitrust statutes, which address conduct that results in a substantial reduction of
competition. See, e.g., 15 U .S.C. § 18 (forbidding acquisitions whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition"). Moreover, since nonprice product attributes are limited
only by entrepreneurs' imaginations, an infinite variety of options is potentially available,
and the law could not and should not require all of them to be created.
25 A test of some kind is important because antitrust has long been worried about the
risks of "false positives"-mistaken condemnations that will chill vigorous competition.
See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398,414 (2004) (quoting Matsushita Elee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
594 (1986)). We share that concern, although we also note that, with the increasing
concentration of many sectors, the risks associated with false positives and false negatives
may be converging.
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the costs. Applying the antitrust laws with this kind of awareness of
both costs and benefits will help ensure consumers a sufficient-but not
infinite-array of options from which to choose.
C. CONTRASTING THE CHOICE PARADIGM WITH
EARLIER ApPROACHES TO ANTITRUST

We can also define the choice-based concept of antitrust by contrasting
it with the earlier price and efficiency models. It does not differ too greatly
from those models, because they have generally served the economy well.
However, it does differ in that it includes, and is broader than, either
of them.

1. Contrast with the Price Paradigm
First, the consumer choice approach to antitrust includes, and goes
beyond, the considerations inherent in a price model. It agrees with the
price model that consumers should be able to choose from among the
price options that the competitive market would provide to them. Choicebased antitrust is, therefore, fully concerned about any activity (such
as cartel behavior) that artificially fixes prices, because this distorts or
eliminates certain price options that consumers value and it unfairly
transfers consumer wealth 26 to firms with market power. 27 However, the
choice model posits that consumers are also entitled to the mixed price/
quality and price/variety levels that the competitive market would provide. This represents not necessarily an advance in theory, but certainly
an advance in practice and realism over the price model.
In theory, a price model could still adequately encompass these factors
by working with "prices" that have been adjusted for quality, safety,
variety, service, and so on. 28 If two cars are mechanically identical and
are offered at the identical price, but one is painted in a popular color,
and the other in an unappealing color, we can, in theory, explain the
greater difficulty in selling the unattractive car on the grounds that it
has a higher quality-adjusted price.
26 This is usually called "consumer surplus." For a discussion, see sources cited infra
notes 43-44.
27 See generally Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 12.
28 Economists commonly say that when they use the term "price," it is a shorthand for
the relevant price/quality and price/variety combinations. See, e.g., GEORGE STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 22-23 (3d ed. 1966); see also European Union, DG Competition, Discussion
Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses ~ 24 (Dec. 2005),
available at h up:!/ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ antitrust/others/discpaper2005. pdf
("In this paper, the expression 'increase prices' is often used as a shorthand for the various
ways these parameters of competition [innovation, variety, etc.] can be influenced to the
harm of consumers.").
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In practice, however, non price attributes often are extremely difficult
to measure and translate into price equivalents. 29 As a result, the relatively
quantifiable price issues draw all of the attention at the expense of the
relatively un quantifiable non price issues. Price effects are discussed in
the text, while non price considerations are relegated, either figuratively
or literally, to the footnotes, which usually are forgotten. 3o A choice
model of antitrust does not attempt the difficult task of translating these
choices into price terms and, thus, is able to keep them squarely in the
analysis where they belong. 31

2. Contrast with the Efficiency Paradigm
A choice approach to antitrust also includes but goes beyond the
efficiency model. The efficiency model has three concerns: minimizing
allocative inefficiency, minimizing the costs of production, and encouraging innovation. 32 First of all, it looks at the harms to allocative efficiency
stemming from higher prices, as the flow of resources is distorted in
response to distorted price signals. The resulting deadweight welfare
loss is the reason the higher prices resulting from illegally acquired
market power-an anticompetitive effect in itself under the price
model-are generally condemned under an efficiency model as well.
Second, the efficiency model looks at productive efficiency, and it values
any cost savings associated with the practices at issue. Because efficiencies
that affect marginal cost of production also tend to affect ultimate price,33
many of the effects of productive efficiency will also feed back into
the consumer price analysis. 34 Third, the efficiency model considers
innovative efficiency, and it assesses the effects of the practices on future
product development.
The choice approach to antitrust furthers (and, thus, includes) all
three of these goals. First, because it is concerned with protecting price
29 Only rarely do economists make serious attempts to compare the value of existing
products to hypothetical products that might exist if firms were allowed to make innovations
optimally. For example, it is hard to know how much most consumers would pay for a
computer operating system that crashes only 20% as often as the best existing otherwise
equivalent system.
30 For illustrations from the history of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, see infra
notes 39-42.
31 In other words, rather than use the term "price" and then engage in long and complex
discussions to explain that this term really means "price and non price variety and quality,"
we propose that antitrust law choose a label that simply and directly takes account of choice.
32 See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 12, at 71-80.
33 See 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 106-07 (2000).
34 See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
71 CAL. L. REv. 1580, 1654-56 (1983); Alan Fisher, FrederickJohnson & Robert Lande,
Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REv. 777,809-10 (1989).
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options and price competition, the choice model necessarily shares the
efficiency modeJ's distaste for the allocative inefficiency that results from
supracompetitive pricing. 35 Second, the choice model cares about productive efficiency because it recognizes that cost savings can result in
lower consumer prices (or can prevent price increases that would otherwise occur), thus resulting in a wider and more desirable set of price
options. Among other consequences of this view, choice-based antitrust
would continue to recognize an efficiency defense to antitrust violations.
And third, a choice model is concerned with innovation at least as
much as the efficiency model because it recognizes that in the long run
innovation-in production techniques and services-is the source of
future 36 marketplace optionsY
Despite these many similarities, however, the choice model differs
from and goes beyond the efficiency paradigm in three other ways: in
its true emphasis on innovation, its focus on consumer effects, and its
more transparent methodology.
First of all, the choice model truly values innovation. The efficiency
model purports to value all three types of efficiencies. As a practical
matter, however, it gives only limited attention to the factor of innovation.
Efficiency defenses are almost always cast in terms of whether the practice
will lower costs. Whether the practice might raise or lower the rate of
innovation in products or services is usually only an afterthought. 38 For
35 Supracompetitive prices resulting from activities like price fixing are a problem under
the efficiency approach only insofar as they lead to allocative inefficiency, however. Under
the choice approach, on the other hand, they are undesirable in themselves. Prices fixed
at an artificial level rob consumers of the com peting price options to which they are en titled.
36 See Michael Porter, Competition and Antitrust: Toward a Productivity-Based Approach to
Evaluating Mergers and joint Ventures, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 919, 958 (2001) (the most
important issue involving a merger or joint venture is not static efficiency but its "impact
on productivity growth and on the health of competition").
37 Even though the choice model values innovation, innovation should not be considered
the ultimate goal, but only the means to the goal of providing optimal consumer choice.
Some have argued that recent antitrust has been too much focused on "innovation markets." See infra note 137. However, Landman shows that the purported innovation market
cases are really about future products and that the innovation market label is just a way
of focusing on expected future competition. See Lawrence B. Landman, Innovation and
the Structure oj Competition: Future Markets in European and American Law (pt. 3), 81 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 838, 850-51 (1999).
38 See Porter, supra note 36, at 933 ("The effect of mergers or competitive practices on
the overall rate of innovation is usually only paid lip service."); see also Timothy J. Muris,
The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 oj the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381, 420
(1980) (emphasizing cost savings with scant mention of innovation); Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18, 29 (1968)
(briefly touching on "technological progress" but stating that "it is at least arguable that
the prevailing uncertainties are too great to give any effect to ... [this factor]. They are,
nevertheless, potentially of such significance that to dismiss them may run the risk of
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example, in the 1982 Merger Guidelines there were four references to
cost-savings efficiencies and no references to non-cost efficiencies. 39 In
the 1984 Guidelines there were nine references to cost savings and,
again, none to non-cost. 40 The current Guidelines have an Efficiencies
section that expresses some concern for innovation, but its primary
concern is still with the cost and subsequent price effects of mergers. 41
The emphasis is similar in the 2006 agency commentaries on the
Guidelines. 42
The choice model also differs in that it focuses on the benefits and
consequences of conduct as they appear to consumers. Under the efficiency approach, a cost saving will count as a social benefit even if it is
retained by a firm with market power, and the additional money paid
by consumers as a result of supracompetitive prices does not count as
a negative factor. 43 By contrast, a choice model recognizes cost savings
or innovation as benefits only insofar as they lead to new marketplace
serious error"). See also Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 34. Sometimes, of course,
the effects on innovation do receive more extended discussion. See, e.g., FIC v. HJ.
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 722-24 (D.C. Cir 2001) (discounting alleged innovation in baby
food recipes).
39 The key passage is from Section V(A), note 53: "At a minimum, the Department will
require clear and convincing evidence that the merger will produce substantial cost savings
resulting from the realization of scale economies, integration of production facilities, or
multi-plant operations .... " U.S. Dep't of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1982),
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,102, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/
11248.htm.
40 The key passage is from Section 3.5: "Cognizable efficiencies include, but are not
limited to, achieving economies of scale, better integration of production facilities, plant
specialization, lower transportation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms. The Department may
also consider claimed efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and overhead expenses, or that otherwise do not relate to specific manufacturing,
servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms, although, as a practical matter,
these types of efficiencies may be difficult to demonstrate." U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (1984),4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,103, available at http://www.
usdoj .gov/ atr/hmerger/11249. pdf.
41 Section 4 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines observes:
[Mlergers have the potential to generate significant efficiencies by permitting a
better utilization of existing assets, enabling the combined firm to achieve lower
costs in producing a given quantity and quality than either firm could have
achieved without the proposed transaction. Indeed, the primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate such efficiencies.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.
42 The commentary certainly recognizes the relevance of efficiencies in both cost and
innovation, but the great majority of the discussion and examples deals with cost effects.
See Federal Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines 49-59 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/Commentaryonthe
HorizontaIMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf.
43 See Muris, supra note 38; Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 34.
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options-and, thus, it recognizes only those financial savings that are
likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. 44
Finally, the choice model values marketplace options in a way that is
uniquely simple, transparent, and understandable. The term "efficiency"
is vague, and to most people it simply means cost savings. It can be
translated into a concern with price only through a careful explanation
of the difficult concept of the allocative efficiency effects of supracompetitive pricing. It can be further translated into product variety and
choice only through additional manipulations. Again, however, rather
than attempting the difficult explanation of how "efficiency" really means
"choice," we propose using a much simpler vocabulary that takes account
of choice directly.

D.

CONSISTENCY WITH ANTITRUST POLICY AND CASE LAW

The proposed choice paradigm fits squarely within the existing policy
categories and case law of the field. Thus, it can be adopted without
greatly straining the vocabulary or consensus of antitrust law.
1. Consistency with Antitrust Policy
The choice model fits within the existing set of antitrust policy concerns. The familiar categories of antitrust violations all involve conduct
that restricts consumer choice: price fixing diminishes the number of
distinct price (or price/qualitY) points; mergers diminish the potential
sources of supply in the market; resale price maintenance limits price
options; and nonprice vertical restraints can limit the way in which a
product can be marketed. In short, each antitrust violation is of concern
because it artificially and substantially diminishes the range of options
that would otherwise have been present in the marketplace. A choice
model is, thus, broadly consistent with accumulated antitrust policy.

2. Consistency with Antitrust Case Law
The consumer choice model is also consistent with the existing body
of case law. In many cases the court's language has been quite explicit
in referring to "choice." This term may be found in contexts ranging
across the antitrust field from horizontal agreements, to mergers, to
boycotts. 45 Typical of these decisions is Dentsply, where the court noted
... For an analysis of which cost savings are likely to be passed to consumers, see Fisher,
Johnson & Lande, supra note 34.
45 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (horizontal agreements
among competitors may be desirable when the actions "widen consumer choice-not only
the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes"); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 368 (1963) (merger might harm nonprice
characteristics of bank, such as "variety of credit arrangements, convenience of location,
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that an "additional anticompetitive effect is seen in the exclusionary
practice here that limits the choices of products open to dental laboratories."46 Some other decisions are less explicit, but their outcomes are
still best explained in terms of choice as well. Where the conduct involved
is price fixing, for example, the court's decision may speak only of effects
on "price," but even there the courts are implicitly treating the conduct
as harmful because it eliminated the competing, perhaps less expensive,
price choices that would otherwise have existedY A highly visible recent
matter in which choice was important is the Microsoft case, a monopolization matter that was not so much about the price of software as it was
about protecting characteristics like innovation, reliability, and suitability
for various purposes. 48 The consumer choice model presented in this
attractiveness of physical surroundings, credit information, investment advice ... ."); Full
Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 182 F.3d 745,755 (10th Cir. 1999) (boycott eliminated
a competitor, "thereby limiting consumer choice to the other source of output"); Roy B.
Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1994) (tie-in likely to
be illegal per se if it involves "a foreclosure of choice to an ultimate consumer"); Gowan
Car Care Ctr. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 99-5775. 2000 WL 1477789, at *8 (6th Cir.
Sept. 26, 2000) (unpublished) (monopolization claim unfounded when plaintiffs "failed
to suggest how [defendant's] pricing practices have hindered consumer choices. In fact,
it seems quite clear that consumers have benefited ... ."); see generally Lande, Choice as
Ultimate Goal, supra note 12, at 50S-1l.
46 United States v. Dentsply, 399 F.3d 181, 194 (3d Cir. 2005).
47 This is well illustrated by Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 348
(1982). An agreement to limit maximum prices was improper, the Court held, because
even high prices provide consumers with valuable points of variety, which can facilitate
innovative service packages or provide incentives for practitioners to develop an unusually
high level of skill.
48 The goals of the case were described in terms of choice by all parties and at all stages
of the litigation. The trial judge found that Microsoft had iIIegally maintained its monopoly
power in the Windows operating systems by stifling competition that "would have conduced
to consumer choice and nurtured innovation." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp.
2d 9, 112 (D.D.C. 1999). The appellate briefs of the parties supported and assailed these
findings in light of the standard of consumer choice. See Microsoft Brief at 12 (the firm
was an innovator, and consumers "have greatly benefited from Microsoft's efforts to offer
improved products at attractive prices"), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ msdoj/
ms-appeal.html; Government Brief at 121 (Microsoft's exclusionary conduct "restricted
consumer choice and deterred innovation"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f7400j7425.htm. The liability decision of the D.C. Circuit also is written in terms of choice,
not price or efficiency: "Microsoft ... violated Section 2 by engaging in a variety of
exclusionary acts ... to maintain its monopoly by preventing the effective distribution
and use of products that might threaten that monopoly." United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). On the remedy issue the circuit court held that there
should have been an evidentiary hearing, thus prompting a remand, but there, too, one
key issue would be choice. See id. at 101-02. Microsoft Chairman BiII Gates had testified
that the government's originally proposed remedy would harm choice. "[Dividing Microsoft] along the arbitrary lines proposed by the Government" would limit the availability
of products "that users could access from a wide range of devices." [d. at 99. Finally, the
government's overall view of its case, set out in the Competitive Impact Statement, discussed
how the remedy would improve consumer choice by "requiring Microsoft to provide the
ability for computer manufacturers and consumers to customize, without interference or
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article, therefore, does not require any fundamental rethinking of the
case law. It instead is a compact, intuitive way of explaining, interpreting,
and applying a long line of precedents.

E. CONCLUSION ON BACKGROUND ISSUES
Our argument that antitrust analysis should explicitly shift to consumer choice is more than just an academic suggestion based on the
apparent utility of the new paradigm. It is also descriptive. There is
reason to believe that the law is already evolving toward the choice model,
as revealed through the underlying rationale of many decisions and the
explicit methodology of the Microsoft litigation.
The next step is to explore how to take these theoretical insights and
translate them into practical operational terms, including identifying
where the new theory will be important and how it might be applied.

II. THE ECONOMICS OF OPTIMAL CONSUMER CHOICE
If antitrust is about protecting consumer choice, what level of choices
or options should our enforcement principles aim to preserve? We have
seen that choice theory tries to preserve the number of options that the
competitive market would have provided, but how do we estimate that
optimal number when the market may have already been distorted by
improper conduct? Economic analysis provides some initial answers to
these questions. Four principles emerge: (1) consumers benefit from a
reasonable range of choice; (2) there are nonetheless diminishing
returns to variety, as there are to almost everything else; (3) we should
take account of long-term variety in innovation as well as short-term
variety in immediate consumption; and (4) because of uncertainties
about the general relationship between concentration and beneficial
variety, it will be fruitful for antitrust policy to identify particular industries in which lower concentration and greater variety are especially
important to consumers. Taken together, these principles suggest the
optimal amount of choice should be determined on an industry-byindustry basis, through the methodology that will be described later
in Part IV.
reversal, their personal computers as to the middleware they install, use and feature, and
by .... [eJnsuring that software and hardware developers are free to develop, distribute,
or write to software that competes with Microsoft middleware or operating system
software .... " Competitive Impact Statement 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 981232 & 98-1233 (D.D.C. Nov. 15,2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9500/
9549.pdf. For a further discussion, see Lande, Choice as Ultimate Goal, supra note 12,
at 511-14.
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THE GENERAL BENEFITS OF VARIETY

Consumer tastes vary widely. As a result, variety of supply is generally
beneficial, and competitive markets typically offer this variety in response
to consumer demands. Consumers are able to satisfy their desires more
closely to the extent the market contains different types, prices, locations,
and qualities of products and services. 49
B. DIMINISHING RETURNS TO VARIETY

This does not mean simply that more choices are better, however. At
least three other factors limit the benefits of increasing variety. First, to
the extent that goods are differentiated, there is less room for economies
of scale, so product differentiation tends to lead to higher prices. 50
Second, to the extent that products are highly differentiated, there is
an increased possibility that each maker will have some degree of market
power, with the accompanying ability to raise prices. 51 At some extremes
this might give rise to problems of monopolistic competition. 52 Third,
although it might seem counterintuitive, there is evidence that too much
choice can be detrimental to consumers. 53 Research shows that additional
choice tends to lead to increased satisfaction only up to a point. Beyond
that point, choice overload can lead to stress, decision-making paralysis,
and "buyers' remorse," in the sense that consumers become concerned
that they did not find the one perfect choice among the fully stocked
range of options. 54
For all these reasons there is an optimal level of consumer choice.
This is identified through a complex tradeoff that seeks to achieve most of
the benefits of choice while not sacrificing economies of scale, producing
market power, or causing excessive consumer confusion. This tradeoff
is best performed by the free market, with antitrust being limited to
49 See DENNIS W. CARLTON &JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
201 (4th ed. 2005).
50 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTUKE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 601 (3d ed. 1990); CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 49, at 201 ("Which would you
prefer: a choice of three different-flavored soft drinks at 50 cents per drink or only
one flavor at 25 cents? The answers to such questions determine the optimal varietyprice combination.").
51 SCHEKER & Ross, supra note 50, at 601.
52 See id. at 32-34, 575-76.
53 See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004); see also Kirstin Downey, Buried
in Choices, WASH. POST, June 4, 2005, at Fl (quoting Schwartz's example that home buyers
"find it harder to choose when many options are available, and after they do, they are
apt to second-guess themselves ... ").
54 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 86; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000).
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ensuring that anticompetitive activity does not interfere with the market's
ability to make these calculations.
C. SHORT- TERM VARIETY AND LONG-TERM INNOVATION

Optimal consumer choice has two components: a short-term aspect
that focuses on removing immediate restrictions on marketplace variety,
and a long-term aspect that focuses on removing impediments to future
innovation. Both are important. Consumers desire not only a competitive
range of options, but also an optimal amourit of innovation because
only innovation will lead to new choices. 55 Again, the market will normally
find the equilibrium point for the various desires, but here too antitrust
has a role in ensuring that mergers and other actions do not distort the
market's ability to do so.
How to take account of innovation in antitrust analysis is a difficult
issue. There is much disagreement about how to reach the optimal
leve1. 56 Some argue that innovation is typically spurred by competition
55 This may actually be more important than short-term variety. Professor Michael Porter
puts the point this way:
While protecting short-run consumer welfare measured by price cost margins is
undeniably important, the benefits of healthy competition are in fact broader
and more essential to consumers and to society. The fundamental benefit of
competition is to drive productivity growth through innovation, where innovation
is defined broadly to include not only products, but also processes and methods
of management. Productivity growth is central because it is the single most
important determinant of long-term consumer welfare and a nation's standard
of living.
Porter, Competition and Antitrust, supra note 36, at 922-23; see also Interoiew with Professor
Porter, ANTITRUST, Spring 1991, at 5 ("I believe that a merger that improves static efficiency
but that threatens dynamism is a poor tradeoff."). These principles apply to the global
economy as well as in local markets:
International competitiveness increasingly depends on innovation. With continued operational improvement in education and infrastructure now a given, and
with local companies able to rapidly acquire and deploy technology from around
the word, producing standard products using standard methods no longer sustains
competitiveness. Among high income countries, differences in prosperity are
closely related to differences in the intensity of innovation. For developing
nations, low-cost inputs by themselves are no longer sufficient to maintain competitiveness. Companies must increasingly be able to access and ultimately develop
global technology.
Michael Porter & Scott Stem, Ranking National Innovative Capacity, in UNIQUE VALUE:
COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION CREATING UNIQUE VALUE III (Charles Weller
ed., 2004).
56 Here too the optimal level is not the simple maximum. No one suggests that all of
society's resources should be devoted to innovation; consumers also should be able to
enjoy the fruits of past innovations. Similarly, it is not always desirable to have a huge
number of attempts to achieve each specific innovation. It might sometimes be enough
to have a small number of attempts; any more would not be significantly more likely to be
successful and would be likely to waste resources that could have been employed elsewhere.
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in general,57 and specifically by races to innovate. 58 Others assert that
innovation is instead often or normally accomplished by "large and often
monopolistic enterprises" that have more resources. 59 Still others believe
that the weight of economic theory shows that there is a non-linear,
inverted-U-shaped relationship between concentration and innovation,
with innovation being greatest at moderate levels of concentration and
tending to diminish at very high and very low levels. 60
Important innovations are not limited to the technological sphere.
Innovation also includes new developments in formulating and delivering services. These service innovations may flourish in different market
conditions from technical ones. They may not require high levels of
concentration to achieve because they often require only attentiveness to
one's customers, rather than more investment-heavy R&D in underlying
technologies. Service innovation may, therefore, sometimes call for keeping markets at ordinary levels of competitive concentration, rather than
providing an efficiency rationale that would permit them to consolidate
further to achieve vital scale economies.
The one possible point of consensus to emerge from these models is
that exceptionally high concentration is probably not good for innovation and future options: "[V] ery high concentration has a positive effect
only in rare cases, and more often it is apt to retard progress by restricting
the number of independent sources of initiative and by dampening
firms' incentives to gain market position through accelerated R & D."61
57 "Competition can stimulate innovation. Competition among firms can spur the invention of new or better products or more efficient processes." FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND
POLICY 1 (2003) [hereinafter To PROMOTE INNOVATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
58 Id. at 10. See also Philip Nelson et aI., The Economics of Innovation: A Survey, ABA Section
of Antitrust Law Task Force Report 25-26 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/ at-comments/2002/ reports/economicssurvey. pdf [hereinafter ABA Reportl.
59 To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 57, at 12 (quoting JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942)).
60 Id. at 13 (quoting SCHERER & Ross, supra note 50, at 660). This last school of thought
holds that "innovation increases with concentration up to some point and then declines."
ABA Report, supra note 58, at 34.
61 SCHERER & Ross, supra note 50, at 660. The Department of Defense conducted a
study of the nation's defense industrial base and concluded that 35-45% of the critical
new technology was being supplied by firms with fewer than 100 employees. See Suzanne
Patrick, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Options for Maintaining
a Robust, Adequate and Efficient Industrial Base, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation 8
(Feb. 23, 2005). An FTC study has reached a similar conclusion: "What is needed for
rapid technical progress is a subtle blend of competition and monopoly, with more
emphasis in general on the former than the latter .... " To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra
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Uncertainties remain, however. There is no uniform correlation
between market structure and innovation, and "industries probably vary
too much for one theory to fit all." 62 Even the widely accepted inverted-U
relationship between industry concentration and innovation depends
upon a multitude of industry characteristics. 63 Because optimal overall
consumer choice depends upon short-term considerations (involving
the current array of choices on the market) as well as long-term goals
(involving the optimal level of innovation), the task of formulating a
single antitrust rule for all circumstances would be difficult indeed.
D.

NEED TO

Focus

ON PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES

Given these difficulties in formulating a single general antitrust rule,
it makes sense to proceed instead on an industry-by-industry basis. This
approach would gain insight from the general studies, but its focus would
be on particular markets. Antitrust practitioners will seek to understand
in which industries variety is particularly important to consumers; in
which ones the necessary variety must be created by independent competitors; and what particular number of competitors are required. 54 These
are complex questions,65 but the profession's long experience with
merger analysis shows that it is possible to consider even quite complex
economic questions effectively when they are presented by the empirical
facts of a specific market. 66
note 57, at 34 (quoting SCHERER & Ross, supra note 50, at 660). The ABA Report notes
that well-funded corporate research is not necessarily the key to discovery: 'Jewkes, Sawyers,
and Stillennan (1969) reviews seventy important Twentieth Century innovations and finds
that only 24 had their origins in industrial research laboratories." ABA Report, supra note
58, at 31.
62Id. at 14 (quoting Dennis Carlton & Robert Gertner, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and
Strategic Behavior 14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8976, 2002));
accord id. at 35.
63 See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 34. The report lists among the relevant variables the
characteristics of demand for the products, the institutional framework, and the firms'
strategic interaction. See id. at 34-35 (economists "have recognized that both concentration
and R&D efforts may be simultaneously determined by other market characteristics").
64 These are all questions of degree, of course, as is the extent of the market failure
that is the prerequisite to any real antitrust problem. But antitrust necessarily deals with
questions of degree.
65 Even for particular industries the relationship is likely to be complex. See Dror BenAsher, In Need of Treatment? Merger Control, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Consumer Welfare,
21 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 305 (2000) ("In summary, the rapid growth of the biomedical
R&D sector suggests that scientific creativity in drug development is likely, perhaps even
more likely, to be found in proportionally smaller and more informal organizations."
(citation omitted)).
66 See Robert Lande &James Langenfeld, From Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution of Fecleral
Merger Policy, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 5.
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III. CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE CHOICE APPROACH

WOULD BE SUPERIOR
The next step is to identify the specific places where a choice-oriented
antitrust theory would be most useful. The broad conclusions are simple:
The areas better assessed under a choice paradigm all involve markets
in which nonprice competition is particularly important, or situations
with other important nonprice issues. Three such areas are particularly
significant: (1) where there is little or no price competition as a result of
regulation, industrywide joint ventures, or third-party payors; (2) where
market-specific conduct has increased consumers' search costs or
impaired their decision-making ability, thus impeding the effectiveness
of price competition; or (3) where independent decision making and
creativity, rather than price, are the main forms of competition.
A.

MARKETS WITH LITTLE OR

No

PRICE COMPETITION

There is no good way for a price or efficiency model to analyze antitrust
issues in markets that do not have price competition to start with. The
choice model is, therefore, superior in dealing with markets, like certain
regulated industries, that lack such competition. In these circumstances
the price paradigm is essentially useless unless we resort to the awkward
notion of quality- and variety-adjusted price, which is analytically sound
but not very practical. Framing the issue in terms of efficiency is no
better. To the extent that prices in these markets are regulated, there
is little risk of allocative inefficiency, and the kinds of qualitative inefficiencies that might arise (such as subpar design or service) involve valueladen consumer preferences that are hard to quantify. The best way to
take account of qualitative factors is through a direct focus on consumer choice.
Industries with regulated or quasi-regulated prices occur (1) in markets
where prices are explicitly regulated; (2) in markets dominated by legal
joint ventures; and (3) in markets dominated by third-party payors, where
consumers might not be price-sensitive.

1. Markets Where Prices Are Explicitly Regulated
Price competition can be completely absent in markets where the
government simply sets the rates. Competition itself has not been lost in
such markets, however, but has merely taken other forms. It is particularly
important to protect that non price competition when regulation has
closed the other paths of rivalry.
Recent history provides several instances of this transformed competition. In the years before deregulation, for example, airlines all charged

2007]

CONSUMER CHOICE APPROACH

197

the same regulated prices. 67 Nonetheless, antitrust policy quite properly
prevented them from merging because keeping them separate ensured
that they would engage in competition to provide higher service. 68 This
led to such phenomena as the "piano bars" aT!d other indicia of luxury
service designed to attract customers to certain American Airlines
flights. 69 In this way consumers continued to receive the benefits of at
least some limited competition.

2. Cases Involving Industrywide joint Ventures
Price competition may be similarly attenuated in markets dominated
by a single joint venture embracing most or all of the market participants.
There too it becomes important to preserve nonprice competition among
the venture partners. A case of this sort was Aspen Skiing,7o which involved
a joint venture encompassing the entirety of what the Supreme Court
accepted as a relevant market-downhill skiing on the four mountains
of Aspen, Colorado.71 The two firms owning these mountains formed a
joint venture to offer consumers a lift ticket good at all four areas.
Although the two firms were, thus, no longer competing on the basis
of price in this particular respect, the Court found the joint venture
permissible because it offered the important efficiency of a combined
product that a large percentage of consumers valued highly.72 Important
for our present purposes, the arrangement was structured in a way that
fostered continued nonprice competition because the joint venture partners shared the revenue from the four-mountain tickets on the basis
of how often skiers used each area. This arrangement, thus, "allowed
consumers to make their own choice on ... matters of quality" 73 and it
gave each partner a strong incentive to make its facilities attractive in
order to maximize its share of the joint revenue.

67 Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1976, codified as amended at 49 U.S.c.
§ 41713(b) (1) (Supp. 2005), the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) specified ticket prices,
discouraged competition, and restricted entry into the airline market. Jonathan Ogur, The
Deregulated Airline Industry: A Review of the Evidence, ECON. ISSUES, Jan. 1988, at 3-5.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 511 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(refusing to allow CAB approval of a multilateral capacity reduction agreement on the
grounds that it would have anticompetitive effects).
69 See Richard A. Posner, The Effects of Deregulation on Competition: The Experience of the
United States, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 7, 17 (2000).
70 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
71 The Court referred to ajury verdict that the relevant market was "[d]ownhill skiing
at destination ski resorts," id. at n.20, and that the "Aspen area" was a relevant geographic
market. We express no view on the correctness of these markets.
72 The firms also continued to offer tickets for their own mountains only. See id. at 591.
73Id. at 610.
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In other words, the continuing presence of non price competItIon
among the joint venture partners was an important factor in making the
venture itself permissible. 74 Antitrust law should be alert to this kind of
nonprice competition when judging other marketwide joint ventures. 75

3. Cases Involving Third-Party Payors
Finally, price competition will exist in only an attenuated form in
markets dominated by third-party payors. This situation can arise whenever a consumer's bills are paid by someone else,76 such as in the case
of students who choose a college while being supported by their parents,
or business travelers on expense accounts. The most familiar example,
however, is insurance coverage. If a person knows that the insurance
company will pay medical or car repair bills, he or she is not likely to
be price sensitive. The customer will instead choose on the basis of a
nonprice attribute, such as quality, service, or 10cation. 77
Insurance company programs have reduced, but not eliminated, this
price indifference. Because insurers and government payors are aware
of the incentive problem, they often impose requirements that force
consumers to engage in some price comparisons. These may include a
requirement that the consumer obtain multiple estimates, a threat of rate
increases if excessive claims are made, or a requirement of a consumer copayment. These mechanisms are only partial solutions, however, because
they seldom reimpose all the costs on the consumer. 78 Other insurance
74 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), involved similar facts. There two joint
ventures encompassed the music-licensing industry. Owners of copyrighted music formed
the ventures to sell blanket licensing agreements to media outlets. The outlets compiled
data on the number of times individual songs were played and paid royalties accordingly.
This joint venture, with its price-fixing aspects, was permitted because it was necessary for
the very existence of the product. Without it, songwriters could not, as a practical matter,
be compensated for their music because individual transactions between composers and
users would be unduly expensive. Yet, within this price-fixed venture, the songwriters
continued to compete with one another on what was probably the more important aspect
of their work-the quality and variety of their songs.
75 For a recent example of such ajoint venture, see Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n,
FTC Intervenes in Formation of ULA [United Launch Alliance] Joint Venture by Boeing
and Lockheed Martin (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter ULA Press Release], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/ula.htm. discussed infra note 165.
76 Price competition may still exist in the form of competition to obtain business from
those actually paying the bill. Our focus here, however, is on the competition to make
the sale to the ultimate consumer.
77 Still more specialized non price considerations may sometimes be controlling. Among
business travelers, flyers may select particular airlines in order to maximize their frequentflyer benefits, rather than to obtain the least-expensive flight.
78 If they did, they could hardly be called insurance plans. The effectiveness of such
claim-limiting arrangements is further limited by the fact that they may sometimes be
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companies may designate a panel of preferred suppliers who promise
to charge no more than a certain price and require all their customers
to use those suppliers. Once consumers are steered to that panel, however, their bills are still paid by the insurance company and they again
become likely to choose among the designated suppliers on the basis of
nonprice factors. Thus, regardless of the payors' efforts to introduce
partial market mechanisms in these situations, non price competition
will continue to be important, and a choice model will be particularly
useful in safeguarding that competition.
These observations suggest that antitrust should pay close attention
to the role of nonprice competition in specific industries dominated by
insurance payors. These include auto-glass repair, replacement auto
parts, medical services in general, and hospital services in particular.
B. CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE CONSUMERS HAVE BEEN LED TO
PURCHASE AN UNSUITABLE PRODUCT

A second broad area in which the choice paradigm confers significant
advantages involves search costs. Increased search costs have the effect
of degrading consumers' ability to make effective judgments in some
particular market, causing them to become less-effective shoppers. One
consequence of such conduct is a rise in prices-an anticompetitive
effect that can be and is captured by a price model. Another consequence,
however, is that consumers can end up choosing products that suit their
needs less well than they otherwise would. Because only the choice
paradigm provides a suitable means of accoun ting for this second adverse
effect, the choice model should be employed for all cases involving
harm to consumer decision-making abilities. This approach is useful in
assessing advertising-restraint cases in particular and restrictions that
increase consumer search costs in general.

1. Advertising Restrictions
Impaired consumer decision-making ability is an important part of
the rule of reason analysis in antitrust cases involving restrictions on
advertising. The price consequences of this impairment have been

subject to antitrust charges themselves. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (involving maximum fees that physicians could claim as part of certain
health care plans); O'Halloran, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 22,543 (1988) (consent order
against obstetricians alleged to be colluding to obtain additional Medicare revenue).
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important in assessing bans adopted by lawyers,79 dentists,80 and optometrists. sl Restricted advertising will lead not only to price increases, however, but also, in some cases, to the selection of a doctor, lawyer, or
other professional who may not optimally suit the client's preferences.
Under these circumstances, for example, the patient may not locate the
doctor who specializes in the particular condition the patient has, or
the one that emphasizes gentler or reassuring treatment approaches that
may be important to a particular individual. The ultimate assessment of
a particular advertising ban may be different depending on whether
these nonprice harms to choice are also considered. s2
2. Other Practices that Impede Consumer Decision Making

Beyond advertising restraints, the case law records efforts to impede
consumer decision making in a number of other ways. In many of these
cases the firms inhibited comparison shopping by making it harder for
customers to obtain competing bids. This was the effect of the agreement
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,83 where the rules
of a professional association explicitly restricted upfront competitive
bidding for engineering services. The conduct in Detroit Auto Dealers-

79 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (rule forbidding most attorney
advertising overturned on First Amendment grounds). For more detailed descriptions of
the cases discussed in this subsection, see Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three
Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 941; 953-84 (2000).
80 California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (ethical rule against misleading ads was applied to prohibit many truthful ads involving discounts and quality;
case returned to appellate court to assess whether there was a sufficient basis for this
application) .
81 Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988) (board regulations impeding advertising by corporate providers, and prohibiting advertising of discounts,
were unauthorized by statute, and condemned as antitrust violations).
82 The Supreme Court's decision in California Dental Association suggests that it is not
merely permissible but mandatory to conduct a rule of reason analysis that considers all
the relevant non price effects. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). In
that case the FTC had condemned advertising restraints under both the per se and the
"quick look" or abbreviated rule of reason approach. The Supreme Court was concerned,
however, that in a professional advertising context the restrictions may have had significant
benefits in preventing consumer confusion, and it held that the FTC should have used a
more extended rule of reason analysis to be sure of considering these potentially important
factors. See id. at 781 (Breyer, j., concurring) (situation did not necessarily call for the
fullest market analysis, but at least "an enquiry meet for the case"; put differently, "a less
quick look was required"). [d. at 758. An extended rule of reason analysis is particularly
inclusive in the context of professional advertising. It requires consideration of cost savings,
prevention of deception, and other consumer benefits on one side, and price increases
and impaired substantive selection of the desired product or service on the other side.
83 435 U.S. 679, 681 (1978).
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an agreement among competing car dealers to restrict their hours of
operation-also made competitive offers harder to find. 84
A complete rule of reason analysis in such cases needs to take account
of all the harms that flow from this conduct, including the adverse effects
on choice and suitability. In the Detroit Auto Dealers case, for example,
the restricted hours may not have left consumers with enough time to
locate the car best suited to their needs in terms of styling, size, horsepower, accessories, and mechanical features. 85 These are bona fide economic costs, which should be identified and included in the analysis. 86
Even more serious non price consequences were threatened in Indiana
Federation of Dentists, which involved an agreement among dentists to
restrict insurance companies' access to diagnostic x-raysP This agreement did not merely raise prices by impeding the insurance companies'
ability to conduct a cost-containing review of proposed treatments; it
also may have physically harmed consumers by impeding their access to
independent advice from their insurers and subjecting them to increased
risk of unnecessary or fraudulent dental work. 88
C. MARKETS IN WHICH INDEPENDENT DECISION MAKING OR
CREA TIVITY ARE CRUCIAL

Finally, the consumer choice paradigm will produce superior results
when assessing markets where creativity or innovation-not price-are
84

Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, III F.T.C. 417, 681 (1989). For additional cases, see Lande

& Marvel, supra note 79.
85 Detroit Auto Dealers, III F.T.C. 417.
86 Potential purchasers commonly see and test drive a number of cars before choosing
one. If consumers must shop at times they find undesirable, the added costs of this
inconvenience should be counted as a real loss for them. Other real losses are those due
to settling for the suboptimal selection. For example, if a consumer pays $20,000 for a
particular car, but would have been willing to pay $22,000 for a mechanically comparable
car available for the same price at another dealer, which would have been a better choice
in terms of styling and adaptation to small children, and if the consumer would have
reached that dealer if not for the agreement to restrict hours of operation, then the
losses need to include this unrealized $2,000 in potential consumer surplus, less whatever
additional search costs would have been incurred.
87 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 448-49 (1986).
88 /d. at 462. Of course, if the more familiar price-related antitrust factors are sufficiently
clear, a particular case might still be decided without reaching choice factors. For. example,
if a court finds that the efficiencies are strong while the price increases are trivial or highly
speculative, it might resolve the case on that basis alone. See, e.g., Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of
Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1984). Conversely, if the court finds that the
proffered efficiency claims are pretextual and that prices increased significantly, it might
also not need to reach the practices' effects on choice.
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the most important tools of competition. For example, people usually
choose a movie based on whether they think they will enjoy it; they
choose a newspaper based on whether they find it entertaining and
informative; they value particular vaccines based on whether they are
likely to be effective. 89 In these situations the decision is made with much
less attention to price than is normally the case;90 indeed, it may be that
prices are uniform and that there is no price competition at all. 91 If
creative qualities are the dominant means for competing in such a market, however, and if market failures 92 result in a situation where these
creative qualities can flourish only in an atmosphere of organizational
independence, then more than the usual, price-determined number of
firms may be required to ensure a sufficient range of consumer choice.
Creativity and innovation are, of course, important to some degree in
every market. The matter of degree is crucial, however. Markets naturally
fall along a continuum, with one end being products that are sold
primarily on the basis of price and the other end being products that
are sold primarily on their nonprice attributes. Creativity will rise to the
level of special antitrust relevance only for products on the latter end
of the spectrum.
Indeed, special antitrust concern is appropriate for only one subset
of the products at the creative end of the spectrum-products for which
the necessary level of creativity and variety can only be achieved in an
environment of organizational independence. Such products will be
limited in number because they are a subset of a subset. But they do

See Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of Antitrust in the New Millenium, 68
LJ. 545, 555 (2000) ("Attention to individual tastes will become more and
more important as exploding technology provides the means to sa tis/}' them in ways
heretofore unknown.").
90 Price might count in an extreme case, of course, but it is unlikely that many people
would attend one movie rather than another just to save a dollar. Illustrating this, a recent
edition of the Washington Post entertainment section contained a seven-page listing of the
movies currently playing, with capsule reviews of each. Nowhere in this comparative
shopping guide was there any mention of price.
91 Movies all tend to have similar prices citywide. Even where they do not, the owner of
a multiplex theater complex will typically price all of its own films identically. The multiplex
might compete against other theater chains on the basis of price, but, from the consumer's
perspective, the different movies in the complex compete with one another only on a
non price basis. Similarly, all over-the-air television is free and so may be said to have
identical prices of zero (or of the viewers' opportunity costs, which are also identical
across different programs).
92 For a discussion of the relationship between market failure and organizational independence, see infra notes 95-98. Graham Allison has explored some of the organizational
characteristics that may contribute to these problems. See discussion infra note 96.
89
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exist and are important. This can be illustrated through a contrast of
two familiar industries: cookie baking and book publishing.
In many industries, such as cookie baking, the price model will work
reasonably well, even for assessing effects on choice as well as on prices.
This is true because firms that are engaged in effective price competition
are usually also competing vigorously in terms of variety, service, quality,
and other elements of nonprice competition. For example, suppose that
there are four bakeries making cookies, but three would be enough for
effective price competition. 93 Two of these firms could then merge without any harmful effect. Being competitive, as measured by price competition, each of the three surviving firms will still have an incentive to make
every type of cookie for which there is a significant demand. And being
competent bakers, each of the firms will be able to act on that incentive;
a new line of cookies would not require a separate corporation. In this
situation, there is no advantage to using a choice standard over a price
or efficiency standard. Price competition would be the proxy for all the
other issues that concern us.
In other industries, however, the price model is clearly less satisfactory.
Consider book publishing. There too, let us assume, three firms are
sufficient to ensure price competition, and those three firms are motivated to compete intensely in the non price arenas of creativity, variety,
and willingness to bring forward promising new authors. Does this mean
that the publishing industry should be allowed to consolidate to three
firms with no harmful consumer effects?94 Not at all. Even if the publishing firms are motivated to supply a full range of consumer options, and
they compete in the most perfect good faith, they may simply be unable
to do so. A bakery may be able to make every kind of cookie, but a
publisher is not necessarily able to publish every kind of book. The
options brought out by a particular publisher may be constrained by
subconscious habits of mind or by an imperfect connection with popular
tastes. In this industry the price model is not necessarily an adequate
surrogate for effects on consumer choices. Those issues can be captured
only by a model that focuses explicitly on choice.

93 This is, of course, a stylized example. We are not asserting that three firms are
always enough for effective price competition. This hypothetical requires the existence
of substantial barriers to new entry into a well-defined cookie market and other factors.
We are further supposing that three firms could make cookies as efficiently as four and
that each firm can make all different kinds of cookies.
94 Here, too, we assume a market with entry barriers, so that we can focus just on the
mechanisms of competition among the firms already in the market.
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Some kind of market failure must be present before an industry will
fail to respond to the full range of consumer demand in this way.95
However, there are a particularly wide range of information-based market
failures that may affect the creative industries. Some failures are due to
imperfect information on the part of suppliers. It is hard to know just
what a fickle public will demand or to know just which research avenues
will result in popular products. And in the absence of objective performance measures on these points, firms in the creative industries may
have a particular tendency to follow intellectual and cultural fashions
that will narrow the range of marketplace options. 96 Some other market
failures are due to imperfect information on the part of customers.
Buyers of books and newspapers, for example, may not recognize that
their options have been distorted and, therefore, may not demand corrections. Similarly, purchasers of high-tech products, such as pharmaceuticals and defense equipment, may not easily recognize situations
where innovations could have been made but were not. 97 Some suppliers
95 The existence of any real competition problem requires a market failure of some
sort. See Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 12, at 722-33.
96 This can lead to risk-avoiding consensus views on the kinds of news stories to cover,
the kinds of television shows to produce, or the proper height of hemlines. Personal
incentives, in other words, can sometimes prevail over corporate purposes. See generally
GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).
Allison postulated that many complex government decisions could be classified as following
one of three models. Model I decisions are made by the classical "rational actor" and seek
to advance the organization's logical goals rationally achieved. To understand this method
of decision making, an outside observer can simply understand the organization's goals
and resources and does not need to look inside the entity for its particular decisionmaking characteristics. By contrast, Model II decisions are determined by the organization's
internal process. They are caused by (or influenced by) such factors as standard operating
procedures, factored problems, fractionated power within the organization, parochial
interests of different divisions, and the pursuit of sequential goals. Model III decisions
emerge as a result of the personalities of the individual decision makers, who may have
individualized goals, stands, stakes, interests, and attitudes towards risk that can heavily
affect outcomes. Although Allison developed his insights to explain governmental decision
making, others have applied these or similar ideas to business decisions as well. See, e.g.,
F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 225-27
(2d ed. 1980). The presence of "irrational" Model II and Model III decision making means
that business conduct cannot always be predicted by a "black box" analysis of what a profitmaking firm would be likely to do. Of course, if a business does not earn a sufficient
profit it will go bankrupt. But within some range of sufficient profitability, organizational
and personality-driven issues can affect decision making and outcomes. Economists have
developed these insights into a number of proposed qualifications to the theory of the
firm. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral
Science, 49 AM. ECON. REv. 253, 263 (1959) (firms with target rates of return will try to
reach "satisfactory" profits rather than maximum profits).
97 Departures from perfect market conditions are of course ubiquitous. Determining
when a particular shortfall results in a cognizable market failure is a matter of degreebut matters of degree are relevant and recur throughout the antitrust field. See Averitt &
Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 12, at 722-33.
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may antlCIpate these kinds of market failures and, in the absence of
antitrust enforcement, may make anticompetitive acquisitions in the
hopes of enjoying sufficient profits combined with a quiet life of limited innovation. 98
Even casual observation of the world suggests that there are industries
that act more like our hypothetical book publisher example than like
our bakery example. When General Motors was a member of the "Big
Three" and imports were not a major factor in the marketplace, GM
had every incentive to extend its product line to cover the full range of
consumer demand and, apparently, it had a deliberate corporate strategy
of doing SO.99 But somehow all its products ended up looking like "GM
cars" nonetheless. The product line did not include economy cars, small
sports cars, or true luxury cars. This may have been due to a number
of reasons: a desire to economize on design resources, a hope of discouraging the movement of consumers into a market segment with
traditionally smaller markups,IOO a failure to anticipate future consumer
preferences correctly,IOI or simply the numbing hand of corporate orthodoxy as to what a car "should" look like. But for whatever reason, GM
did not act like our theoretical cookie company, and it did not extend
its product line to satisfy the full range of consumer demand that it
could reasonably have served.
The stunning success of small imports in the 1960s and 1970s showed
how deficient the domestic carmakers had become at creating diverse
vehicle types. 102 If in 1959 the auto industry had experienced a merger
wave in which the Big Three had been allowed to purchase every other
carmaker in the world on the grounds that the industry still would be
98 Enforcement actions, therefore, do not necessarily involve the government agencies
in second-guessing good-faith determinations about the best innovation strategy to pursue
in the companies' own areas of expertise. In the situation posited in the text, the company
is aware of its market power. Even where there is an element of good-faith disagreement,
moreover, it occurs in circumstances of market failure that keep either party from perfect
knowledge. And as we will discuss below, any enforcement policy will be developed to
reflect the consensus from a broad and prolonged experience and not just the views of
any single official.
99 In the 1920s, "General Motors ... decided to provide cars to satisfy the tastes of every
consumer and ... offered variety in styling, as well as comfort, accessories, and power."
Mira Wilkins, Multinational Automobile Enterprises and Regulation: An Historical Overoiew, in
GOVERNMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 227 (Douglas Ginsburg
& William Abernathy eds., 1980).
100 See LAWRENCE WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945 (1971).
101 See JEFFREY O'CONNELL & ARTHUR B. MYERS, SAFETY LAST 155 (1966) (reporting
on an industry consensus in 1950s and 1960s that "safety doesn't sell").
102 See Michael Pearce, International Competition in the World Automotive Industry, in GOVERNMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE, supra note 99, at 259-60.
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sufficiently price competitive, these imports might have never entered
the market and the current variety in the automobile marketplace might
never have come into being, or might have been significantly delayed.
It was far better for consumer welfare that the market remained unconcentra ted enough for innovation to flourish.
There are at least three industries in which effective competition may
require the kind of organizational independence that can only flourish in a
relatively unconcentrated market: (1) communications media; (2) hospitals; and (3) certain types of innovative high-technology businesses.

1. Media
The media industry provides the most familiar example of the need
for nonprice competition. A healthy democracy benefits from having a
range of opinions in the marketplace for ideas.103 Congruent with that
social need, the marketplace .also demands a range of opinion to satisfy
the diverse preferences of individual readers and listeners. It is possible,
however, for mergers among media firms to threaten that beneficial
competition. Acquisition by a single parent corporation may tend to
result in uniformity of views within the various parts of the conglomerate,
and special antitrust rules calling for more than the usual number of
firms in media markets, therefore, seem to be appropriate.
First of all, ownership by a single parent corporation can threaten
the diversity of content presented by the individual firms within that
103 Public policy has always recognized the value of diverse voices in a democracy. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of free political communications, noting the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 264-65, 270 (1964) (ability to publish a national newspaper without undue
concern for local libel actions). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,14 (1976) ("Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our Constitution .... "); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (First Amendment gives broad protection to political expression
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."). The Court has gone on to protect diversity in
this respect by protecting the right of outsiders to use various suitable forms of communications. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (statements
of substantive views in judicial elections); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334,357 (1995) (anonymous leaflets on issues); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982) (boycott of town merchants for civil rights purposes); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Political scientists have concurred on the benefits
of diverse sources of information. See Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Comm'n,
Proceedings of the Symposium on Media Concentration (Dec. 1978). New information
technologies may have displaced some of the ones involved above. The underlying principle
expressed in these cases, however, that the nation benefits from variety and diversity in
its media, surely remains valid. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Crunes, Antitrust and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 249, 270 (2001).
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corporate family. Newspapers within a publishing family sometimes pursue a similar editorial policy;104 insiders with media firms have admitted
to the existence of such a thing as a corporate viewpoint;105 and op-ed
columnists familiar with the phenomenon of increasing concentration
have expressed concern about it. 106
A particular market failure contributes to this problem. Newspapers,
and other types of information-heavy media, are what consumer protection specialists refer to as "credence goods." 107 Their actual quality is
difficult to determine even after they have been bought and consumed,
and it must to some degree be taken on faith. A newspaper claims that
it is fair and balanced, but a consumer is not well equipped to check on
that fact and generally does not know what things have not been reported.
This means that, within limits, an editor has some range of discretion
to spin stories or coverage. This, in turn, means that the editor of a
subsidiary publication will have the latitude to track the editorial policies
of its corporate parent, with only limited concern about corrective pressures from the market.
Some may argue that special antitrust rules are not needed to deal
with this situation because a media conglomerate has ample incentives
104 This kind offamily uniformity can occur regardless of whether the parent organization
leans left or right, of course. On the one hand, the Washington Post and The New York
Times are both basically liberal papers, and their corporate affiliates, Newsweek and the
Boston Globe, respectively, do not pursue observably different editorial policies. On the
other hand, a former political reporter at the newspaper The Australian recounted how
all of the Murdoch-owned papers in that country were ordered to support a particular
conservative candidate for prime minister. See Frontline: Who's Afraid of Rupert Murdoch?
(PBS television broadcast, Nov. 7, 1995) (remarks of Mungo MacCallum) (Journalists
"were given specific instructions on what they could write and what they couldn't write.
And where the instructions weren't specific, they learnt pretty bloody quickly because
nothing appeared in the paper if it didn't follow the line."), available at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/transcripts/1404.html. Another journalist has said
that Murdoch "put all his newspapers behind Mrs. Thatcher ... " ld. (remarks of Michael
Grade, Chief Executive, Channel 4, U.K.).
105 For example, the "Public Editor" or ombudsman at The New York Times posed the
question, "Is the New York Times a Liberal Newspaper?" and then answered the question
with the topic sentence, "Of course it is." Daniel Okrent, The Public Editor: Is the New York
Times a Liberal Newspaper?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2004, § 4, at 2, available at http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DOIE7D8173DF936AI5754COA9629C8B63.
106 See, e.g., William Safire, The Five Sisters, N.V. TIMES, Feb. 16,2004, at A19 ("You don't
have to be a populist to want to stop this rush by ever-fewer entities to dominate both the
content and the conduit of what we see and hear and write and say.").
107 Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the optimal Amount of Fraud, 16
J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973) ("Credence qualities are those which, although worthwhile,
cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead the assessment of their value requires additional
costly information .... The line between experience and credence qualities of a good
may not always be sharp, particularly if the quality will be discerned in use, but only after
the lapse of a considerable period of time.").
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to encourage internal diversity, as this is the path to serving the greatest
number of customers and maximizing profits. lOS While this point is worth
considering seriously, there seem to be three persuasive responses to it.
First, a media conglomerate may squeeze out diversity accidentally, even
if not as a deliberate policy. No monopolist monopolizes unconscious
of what it is doing,l09 and presumably no firm unconsciously fixes prices
either, but a firm may easily diminish editorial competition through the
unconscious process of promoting those people who have demonstrated
sound judgment by sharing the basic worldview of the promoting executives. IlO Second, some media owners may have causes to advance and
may value that power more than the marginal revenue that they might
lose. III Third, the merger laws are intended to prevent the creation of
potential market power, and enforcers are not swayed by the argument
that a particular acquirer will not exercise that power. It is no defense
to an otherwise anticompetitive conventional merger that the parent
lOS See, e.g., Peter O. Steiner, Program Pattems and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 QJ. ECON. 194, 212-17 (1952) (arguing that a monopolist

is more likely to offer a broad array of programming than independently owned outlets
because it can afford to develop more specialized material for its broader base of outlets).
The Benton Foundation has produced empirical studies arguing the contrary, reporting
that radio groups at or above the FCC's local ownership cap actually have less variety in
programming formats than station groups that are under the cap. The studies are available
at http://www.benton.org/index.php?q=node/3800.
109 Cf United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945)
(L. Hand,].).
110 The ombudsman at The Ne:w York Times has noted the paper's consistently left-leaning
treatment of social issues like gay marriage and gun control: "I don't think it's intentional
when The Times does this. But negligence doesn't have to be intentional." He went on
to note, "This has not occurred because of management fiat, but because getting outside
one's own value system takes a great deal of self-questioning." Okrent, supra note 105. See
Ted Turner, My Beef with Big Media, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug 2004, available at http://
www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0407.turner.html(salaried local managers
of a media conglomerate are unlikely to be the kinds of people who will take risks
and innovate).
III The causes they pursue can, again, be either of a liberal or a conservative bent. On
the one hand, some critics charged that the Sinclair Broadcast Group was pursuing explicitly non-economic goals when it planned to air an anti-Kerry film on the eve of the 2004
Presidential election, even though doing so appeared likely to have a negative effect on
advertising revenue and stock prices. See Bill Carter, Broadcaster's Stock Picks up After Change
on Kerry Film, N.V. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A27. On the other hand, other critics charged
that CBS News had similar motives in planning to break the story of missing ammunition
stocks in Iraq, embarrassing to the Administration, just on the eve of the same election.
See Howard Kurtz, Leaks Hastened Report on Missing Explosives, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2004,
at A7. Some recent economic analysis has proceded from the premise that media outlet
owners may be "willing to sacrifice some profit in order to engage in ideological persuasion." See generally David Balan, Patrick DeGraba & Abraham Wickelgren, Media Mergers
and the Ideological Content of Programming (preliminary draft) (Feb. 2004) (copy on
file with authors).
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company promises to let its subsidiaries price independently. 112 It should,
therefore, be no defense to an otherwise anticompetitive media merger
that the parent promises to let its outlets frame their editorial policies
independently. 113
Some media markets are already sufficiently concentrated to make this
additional uniformity a problem. This is not true of all markets, of course.
Some, like book and magazine publishing, are still very diverse. However,
other markets are already relatively concentrated as a result of high capital
costs (cable systems) or the need for proprietary content (Internet gateways, such as Yahoo and Google), or status as niche markets serving a limited audience. The concentration levels in some of these markets are
already problematic even in a conven tional price analysis, and the addition
of choice analysis might be enough to raise real questions about recent
mergers. Forexample, the mergers ofthe three main supermarket tabloids
might raise concern as impairing the range of consumer choices in that
specialized market. 114 Or one might have been concerned about the $3
billion transaction to bring together the largest Spanish-language television network and the largest Hispanic-audience radio chain. 115 Where such
1\2 See, e.g., Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., FTC Docket No. 9315, Initial
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 204 (Oct. 21, 2005) (hospital merger), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051021idtextversion.pdf.
I\~ Cf Turner, supra note 110 ("Naturally, corporations say they would never suppress
speech. But it's not their intentions that matter; it's their capabilities. Consolidation gives
them more power to tilt the news and cut important issues out of the public debate. And
it's precisely that power that the rules should prevent.").
1\4 See Paul Farhi, ThretrHeaded Baby? Rival TabloidsJoined in Corporate Deal, WASH. POST,
Nov. 3, 1999, at Cl. Rather than continuing to compete with one another, each publication
reportedly will specialize in one niche of the tabloid market. The National Enquirer reportedly will focus on Hollywood news; the Sun will use health and religious stories to appeal
to the 55-plus audience; and the Weekly World News will concentrate on paranormal stories
involving aliens, UFOs, and Elvis. See C. Eugene Emery, Sensationalism Six Pack: One Company Owns All the U.S. Supennarket Tabloids, SKEPTICAL ENQUlRER,Jan./Feb. 2001, at 8 (quoting the American Journalism Review), available at http://www.findarticies.com/p/articies/
mi_ffi2843/is_l_25/ai_68966510. One might be forgiven for asking whether it is possible
for headlines to become any more varied in a world with even more tabloid choices, but
the market should be given the opportunity to put that to the test. One issue in any such
case would be whether supermarket tabloids in fact remain a relevant market or whether
more traditional media are now starting to overlap with it.
1\5 The parties were Univision Communications, Inc. and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation, which combined reached an estimated 97% of all Spanish-speaking households, with
as much as 80% of the television and radio audience in many top Hispanic markets. The
principal issue in antitrust review was whether there was a general Spanish media broadcast
market, combining both radio and television. See Hispanic Broadcasting Corp., Docket
No. MB 02-235, FCC File Nos. BTC-20020723ABL et aI., Memorandum Opinion and
Order 4 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch /
FCC-03-218Al.pdf
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an issue does exist, the presence of fringe media suppliers will not necessarily be sufficient to cure it. 116
With such concerns in mind, antitrust enforcement has been as vigilant
to maintain competition in the media industry as in any other. Cases
have been brought involving newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and cable networks. ll7 The problem with those cases, however, is
precisely that they did treat the media industry as any other industry.
They aimed to achieve the levels of concentration that had been shown,
in previous antitrust matters, to be sufficient to protect price competition.
It is not clear that they went beyond those levels to separately protect
editorial diversity.lls
There are some indications that antitrust is starting to change in these
respects, however. A new respect for media diversity may have been on
display in the consent order the FTC negotiated with AOL and Time
Warner. ll9 This complex merger had resulted in, among other things,
116 At first glance one might think that the presence of fringe suppliers will solve any
problems in media markets. The fringe suppliers in a conventional, price-driven market
may not be able to constrain the prices of the primary firms, and so they are largely
irrelevant. But the fringe suppliers in a media market might appear capable of supplying
whatever demand for diversity exists. The customer who wants more varied sources of
information can turn to specialty publications and Internet Web sites and fully satisi)' his
or her demand, even though these fringe suppliers may account for only a small percentage
of the market. On reflection, however, it is clear that in neither the price nor the media
cases do the fringe suppliers resolve the competitive concerns because in neither case are
they sufficiently effective substitutes for the primary suppliers. In a price-competitive
market the fringe suppliers are imperfect substitutes because of inconvenient locations,
subtle product distinctions, and similar factors. We know that such differences are important because they keep these products from constraining the prices of the dominant firms
in the first place. In the media market the fringe suppliers can be imperfect substitutes
for similar reasons. They may provide fully functional alternative sources of information
but fall short in collateral respects that are important to consumers: the alternative newspapers may not offer home delivery; the magazines may not offer advertisements for familiar
products; the information source of whatever kind may not offer the social reassurance
of having a large circulation. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on
Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REv. 839, 889 (2002) (arguing that fringe operators, and even nonfringe market actors, do not provide substitutes for consumers seeking a particular type
of news source, such as a mainstream paper or a local paper). Hence, a merger that brings
too many of the "respectable mainstream" publications under common control will not
be cured by the availability of alternative publications on the margins.
117 See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1951) (newspaper
required exclusive dealing by advertisers in effort to injure competing radio station);
United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334, 336, 351 (1959) (possible antitrust violation where
network threatened to cancel affiliation unless a firm agreed to exchange of stations).
liB Cf Stucke & Crunes, supra note 103, at 271 (antitrust courts have protected editorial
competition among newspapers as a form of economic competition, but not necessarily
one requiring additional actors).
119 America Online and Time Warner, FTC Docket No. C-3989. See Federal Trade
Comm'n, Press Release, FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions (Dec.
14,2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/aol.htm.
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a vertical integration of the Time Warner cable systems, which served
about 20 percent of U.S. cable households, and AOL, which was the
nation's largest Internet service provider (ISP). To address the resulting
concerns about vertical exclusion, the order required that for five years
the merged firm offer three other non-affiliated cable broadband ISP
services to its subscribers. 120 The order, thus, protected a four-firm market
structure. The order and the accompanying analysis do not refer explicitly to special standards for a media context, and litigation to protect a
four-firm market in other contexts is not unprecedented. Nonetheless,
it is relatively uncommon for the Commission to challenge four-to-three
mergers,121 and the individual comments of the Commissioners indicate
that considerations of variety and diversity were much on their minds. 122
The case might, therefore, be understood as a first attempt to make
some special allowances for a media context.
It is worth emphasizing that our proposed analysis of media competition is framed solely in conventional antitrust terms and not in terms
of the Constitution. Some have argued that consideration of First
Amendment values should persuade antitrust law to seek a higher than
usual level of competition in media markets. 123 We are not making that
120 One of these ISP alternatives had to be offered before AOL itself began offering
service, and the other two within 90 days thereafter. Various other provisions of the order
kept Time Warner from interfering with or discriminating against the content of these
independent services.
121 The FTC reports only about three enforcement actions per year involving challenges
to four-to-three mergers or in less concentrated markets, out of an average total of 16
merger challenges per year. See Federal Trade Comm'n, Staff Report, Horizontal Merger
Investigation Data, Fiscal Years 1996-2003 at 1, 25-26, Tables 6.1-6.2 (2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/horizmerger.htm. Interpreting these statistics involves
some implicit questions about the definitions of "challenges" and the treatment of market
definition over time, but it is clear that four-to-three merger cases are relatively uncommon
under any measure.
122 See, e.g., FTC Backs AOL-Time Warner Merger, JOURNAL RECORD, Dec. 15,2000, available
at 2000 WL 14300520 (quoting Chairman Robert Pitofsky) ("Our concern here was with
access, that these two powerful companies would create barriers that would injure competitors"); Alec Klein, AOL Merger Clears Last Big Hurdle, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2000, at Al
(quoting Commissioner Leary saying: "I had and I continue to have concerns about
these content issues."); AOL/Time Warner, supra note 119 (concurring statement of
Commissioner Thompson) (the consent agreement will "send an important message to
the market that high speed internet should continue to provide consumers with choice
of service and diversity of content"). While suggestive, however, these quotes are not
conclusive. They show that the Commissioners recognized that finns in this industry
compete in large part through innovation and variety. They do not necessarily show that
. the Commissioners believed that this variety required lower concentration levels here than
in other industries.
123 See, e.g., Wilfrid C. Rumble, Comment, The FCC's Reliance on Market incentives to Provide
Diverse Viewpoints on Critical issues of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment Right to
Receive Critical Information, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 793 (1994). For a general review of such
argumen ts, see Federal Trade Comm' n, Proceedings of the Symposium on Media Concentration,
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argument. We believe that it is appropriate-and sufficient-to frame
the analysis in terms of the ordinary level of competition that antitrust
works to protect in any market. We are arguing that, in order to achieve
this ordinary level of nonprice competition in the particular factual
circumstances of a media market-where jointly owned producers are
likely to encounter special obstacles to the production of genuinely
diverse product lines-it may be necessary to have more than the usual
number of producing firms.124

2. Hospitals
Diverse sources of supply would also be valuable in the hospital industry. Hospitals, like media, are an industry in which consumers desire a
wide diversity in types of service but are hindered by various market
failures in their ability to demand it. As a result, it may be appropriate
to call for the preservation of a few more firms in antitrust markets here
than in most others.
The need for variety in hospital services arises from several sources.
One factor is the widely varied preferences of particular local communities. These may call for specialized innovations, such as operation of
storefront clinics, or accommodation of nontraditional medical assistants, or research into locally important industrial diseases. Another
factor involves the wide variety in patients' personal values. The hospital
industry is associated with many events that raise what are fundamentally
values questions: Should fathers be present for the birth of their children?
Should spouses be present for treatment of potentially critical conditions
in their husbands or wives? Should adult children be present for efforts
to resuscitate elderly parents? Individual preferences on such basic questions will surely vary widely-both as a result of personal disposition
and as a consequence of cultural norms-and will tend to be relatively
inelastic. All these factors suggest that there will be a strong demand for
Dec. 14-15, 1978, at 22 et seq. (remarks of Professor Monroe Price, UCLA Law School).
See alsoJames N. Dertouzos & William B. Trautman, Economic Effects of Media Concentration:
Estimates from a Model of the Newspaper Firm, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 1, 13 (1990) (FCC rules
restricting newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership do not have an economic basis, although
they may make sense if one is concerned about media diversity).
124 The fashion industries provide an additional, related example of a sector where
independent centers of innovation and creativity are crucial. Many of their products
compete primarily through the excitement and imagination of new styles, and price
can be distinctly secondary. The importance of this nonprice competition makes an
unconcentrated structure important in these markets as well. The market failure of imperfect information-the imperfect ability to predict the future-would make it difficult for
any small number of firms to anticipate the full range of consumer demand. Nevertheless,
these industries have not been a traditional subject for antitrust attention because they
are generally unconcentrated and have low barriers to entry. However, choice and variety
are important and should be considered if they appear in jeopardy in any particular market.

2007]

CONSUMER CHOICE APPROACH

213

diversity both in the substance of hospital services and in the ways of
providing them. 125
Numerous market failures, however, hinder consumers' ability to assert
these preferences. One set of failures is intrinsic to the patient population. Hospital patients tend to be old, very sick, and worried. They
purchase hospital services only occasionally and under unexpected or
trying circumstances, none of which is conducive to effective bargaining. 126 Moreover, they are represented in some respects by their doctors,
Medicare, or insurance carriers, who may not be perfect agents for their
interests. Another set of market distortions can be found on the hospital
side of the equation. Hospitals deal in some respects with insurance
carriers rather than with patients; they produce uniform industrywide
"standards of care"; and they are regulated by government agencies that
may have been wholly or partially captured by the nominal subjects of
this oversight. Custom, inertia, and the unfortunately short distance
between caring and paternalism may be factors as well. For all these
reasons the hospital industry may not fully respond to consumer desire
for choice and creative innovations in the delivery of care. 127
Hospitals' limited responsiveness shows up in historical ways, such as
the uniform ban on husbands in delivery rooms until a new generation
of parents-to-be forced the issue. 128 It shows up today in forms, such as
undignified gowns, that are trivial in themselves but suggest more deepseated issues. 129 And it shows up in some larger ways, suggesting that
125 Cf Hosp. Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 478-79 (1985) (nonprice or quality competition in health care has historically been more important than price), affd, 807 F.2d 381
(7th Cir. 1986).
126 Hospitals may sometimes contribute to these market failures by withholding important
information from consumers. For example, hospitals frequently offer surgical patients a
premedication called Versed, explaining in their background materials that it is a sedative
that will help them relax, which it does. Often unmentioned, however, is the fact that
this drug also produces amnesia. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL FORMULARY SERVICE, DRUG
INFORMATION 2478 (2006) (drug "provides sedation ... and anterograde amnesia of
perioperative events").
127 Hospitals are perhaps the only place in the economy where someone can set out to
make a semi-discretionary purchase of several tens of thousands of dollars worth of services
and not find a supplier willing, and even eager, to meet a variety of desires. It is true that
hospital services must sometimes be purchased on an emergency basis from the nearest
facility and that insurance plans also restrict hospital selection. Most often, however,
patients and their doctors have some discretion over where and when the services are
bought.
128 The swift changeover to admitting husbands suggests that a latent consumer demand
for their presence was there to some degree in earlier years and was simply not known
because the marketplace provided no ready avenue for expressing it.
129 That practical alternative gowns exist is suggested by the fact that at least a few
institutions make a point of offering them. See Lindy Washburn, Hospital Adds Stylish Touch
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there are other demands, like that for husbands in delivery rooms,
that are still latent. For example, parents generally cannot accompany
children into the operating room, even though this is routinely done in
a few institutions without ill effect,130 and even though "practically all"
parents elect to use this procedure when it is offered.l3l Parents are
present at fewer than 5 percent of pediatric anesthesia inductions in the
United States, but they are present at 75 percent of cases in Great
Britain. 132 Family members are similarly excluded from resuscitation
efforts in most emergency rooms, even though, when it is offered, they
almost always value the experience and the psychological closure it provides,133 and the Emergency Nurses Association has taken the position
that this procedure is workable and should be a right of patients and
their families. 134
Any tendency toward rigid procedures in these respects is undoubtedly
reinforced by other, unrelated factors. These include doctors' fear of
tort exposure,135 or quality of care standards that may be written with
to Help Its Patients Recover, THE RECORD (NORTHERN NEW JERSEY), June 30, 1999, at AI.
The obvious question is why all institutions do not offer them.
130 See Mary Fennell, Parents in the OR? You Bet!, RN MAGAZINE, Dec. 1999, at 38; Jitka
Zobal-Ratner et aI., Parents in the operating Room and Post Anesthesia Care Unit, Conference
Poster, American Association for Pediatric Ophthalmology and Strabismus (1996). For a
statement by a hospital using the procedure, see, e.g., the Web site of Children's Hospital
Boston, available at http://www.childrenshospital.org/C\inicalservices/SiteI864/main
pageSl864Pl7.html.
131 Michael W. Gauderer et aI., Is There a Place for Parents in the operating Room?, 24
J. PEDIATRIC SURG. 705, 705-06 (1989). See also Ellen Kavee, Parents in the operating Room,
MONITOR: NEWSL. OF THE N.Y. STATE SOC'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, Fall 2000, available
at http://www.nyssa-pga.org/fall-2000.html ("98% of parents questioned said they would
like to be present if their child ever needed surgery in the future"); Josephine McGann,
Parental Presence During Induction: The Role Parents Play: Is It Valid?, CANADIAN NURSING J.,
Mar.! Apr. 1999 (parental presence "can help decrease the stress and anxiety of both the
patient and parents"); Patricia A. LaRosa-Nash & Jane M. Murphy, A Clinical Case Study:
Parent-Present Induction of Anesthesia in Children, PEDIATRIC NURSING, Mar. 1996, at 109 (in
one survey of parents, "99% who chose to be present at induction believed that their
presence helped their child").
132 See Jerrold Lerman, Anxiolysis-By the Parent or for the Parent?, 92 ANESTHESIOLOGY,
Apr. 2000, at 925.
133 See Theresa Meyers et aI., Family Presence During Invasive Procedures and Resuscitation,
AM.J. NURSING, Feb. 2000, at 32. Within the universe of family members that were offered
and accepted the visitation option, 97.5% thought they had a right to be present, and
100% thought that it was important and helpful to them to be with their loved one at a
time of crisis. Id. at 36.
134 See Ben Harder, opening the Curtain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept. 10,2001, at 64.
135 See Meyers, supra note 133, at 39 (29% of ER providers worried that family members
might initiate litigation); Fennell, supra note 130, at 40 ("Liability is ... probably the
strongest and most widely heard argument against having a parent present .... Administrators and providers alike may worry about being sued if a parent observes an adverse event
involving the patient or is injured while observing his or her child in the OR.").
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the doctors' convenience in mind and may be more restrictive than
warranted. 136 But the lessening in the number of competitors surely
contributes to any problem that exists. To ensure a sufficient level of
competition in these respects it may be helpful to maintain an industry
structure that is slightly less concentrated than would be needed for
purely price competition.

3. High Technology
Imagination and creativity are also important in high technology,
where leaps of science are the stuff of new products. To preserve future
competition in such products it can be important to protect a variety
of different research approaches. In markets using truly cutting-edge
technology, manufacturers do not necessarily know which research avenues are going to work out, and they, therefore, do not know what
particular products consumers are going to demand. To maintain competition in the face of this potential market failure it may again be useful
to keep a larger number of independent firms in the market. 137
This is obviously a proposition in need of a limiting principle. We do
not intend to suggest that any industry that uses technology in a form
more advanced than an ox cart is subject to special choice-based antitrust
rules. Rather, we should focus on the particular subset of high-tech
industries in which innovation is particularly important. 13S In order to
136 Doctors advocating the conventional practices acknowledge that the majority of parents prefer to accompany their children, "[wlhen asked their opinion," but suggest using
pre-operative sedative drugs to keep young patients calm. Lerman, supra note 132, at 925.
This piece went on to make the decidedly non-market suggestion that doctors are under
no obligation to respect the preferences of the people who hire them. Parental presence
"is not an inalienable right but a therapeutic option to be used at the discretion of the
anesthesiologist, not the parent, to facilitate induction of anesthesia." [d. at 926. There is
a marked occupational and sociological split on this issue, with nurses supporting more
open access to procedures and doctors opposing it:
137 Antitrust already considers some aspects of future competition under the heading
of "innovation markets." All commentators agree on the general importance of innovation,
see the discussion in Porter, supra note 36, but have reached no consensus on whether
the concept of innovation markets will help frame useful antitrust rules for dealing with
it in the high-tech context. Some may also argue that the concept of the innovation market
does not really address the issues of variety and choice at all. It provides a legal basis for
considering, as a presently existing area of competition (the innovation market) the state
of future competition in the industry. It does not necessarily provide a substantive analytical
tool for assessing whether greater than normal numbers of firms should be required for
satisfactory competitive results. That task can be pursued, however, through the more
focused, market-specific methodology we discuss in this article.
138 In appropriate cases courts have recognized the use of high-technology manufacturing
techniques as a factor defining a distinctive market. See, e.g., FTC v. PPG Industries, 798
F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (approving district court's definition of the
relevant product market as "one of aircraft transparencies requiring, for want of a better
term, 'high technology' to produce, without regard to the materials of which they are
fabricated") .
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keep this set reasonably limited, industries would be included only if
they satisfy three conditions: (1) the industry must have a history of
continuous innovation; (2) the innovation must be cutting-edge; and
(3) any successful innovation must have strong positive externalities for
the public as a whole, in the sense of providing indirect benefits for
those who were neither sellers nor users of the product.
Each of the three limiting principles is important. First, an established
history of innovation is relevant because it provides an empirical basis
for believing that innovation will be the main method of competing in
the future. Second, the use of cutting-edge technology is a key marker
because it identifies situations in which additional centers of innovation
are especially needed. The defining characteristic of cutting-edge technology is that no one knows even approximately what the successful
research avenues will be. It seems particularly useful to preserve a variety
of institutionally independent approaches in that circumstance to ensure
that avenues are not prematurely closed of£. 139 And third, positive externalities deserve emphasis because they establish that the general public
has a major stake in successful innovation, beyond just the participants'
economic stakes, and there is a strong reason to avoid unnecessary delays
in achieving it. Together, these three factors will mark out just a few
industries in which innovation is so important that it is properly protected
by special antitrust principles.
There are at least two industries that call for consideration under
these criteria: pharmaceuticals and advanced defense products.
a. High-Technology: Pharmaceuticals
The pharmaceutical industry seems to meet all three of our limiting
principles. First, it has a long history of innovation and of competition
through new products. l40 Second, the relevant innovations are frequently
cutting-edge, in the sense that the right avenues of inquiry are not known
beforehand. Suggestions have been variously made, for example, that
cancer might be attacked by inhibiting the cancer cells' ability to divide,
or the creation of blood vessels to supply nutrients to them, or by bolstering the body's own defenses against them.141 No one knows for sure.
IS9 Corporate culture may unduly inhibit the range of different research avenues that
are tried within a single firm-certain avenues are thought to be uneconomical, to have
been sufficiently explored before, or to be "obviously" wrong.
140 The pharmaceutical product is actually a package consisting of the pharmaceutical
itself plus information about how to dispense and use it most effectively. This provides
an additional non price dimension in which suppliers can exercise innovation-in the
techniques of dosage and use that are independently valuable to patients and their doctors.
l41 See David Hamilton, Gentmtech Wins FDA Approval for Cancer Drug, WALL ST. j., Feb.
27,2004, at BI. Similar uncertainty exists for many other ailments, of course. For example,
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Only by providing a reasonable variety of these avenues can consumers
be assured of the benefits of meaningful competition-that is, competition with a reasonable likelihood of producing effective productsamong the research firms. 142 Third, successful innovation in this industry
has a high public externality. The benefits include not just better products at competitive prices, but health rather than illness, life rather
than death. It is particularly important to safeguard innovation in such
circumstances.
The relief in at least one decided matter seems to reflect an agency
conclusion that additional innovating firms may sometimes be necessary.
In 2000, the FTC approved the $182 billion merger of SmithKline
Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome, on the condition that there be divestitures in six particular markets,143 including several markets where
research and innovation appeared particularly important. In some of
these markets the firms were present only through their research efforts,
rather than through any available products, and the merger would have
resulted in higher concentration than is normally accepted. The FTCordered divestitures, thus, confirmed the general proposition that innovation programs are a proper subject for antitrust analysis. l44
Most significantly, in one specific market-that for migraine treatment
drugs-the FTC required that four independent firms be maintained,145
apparently for special reasons related to protecting innovation. The press
release accompanying the settlement noted that the single, merged entity
would have been likely to delay or eliminate the inherited SmithKline
research program because any resulting new drug would have competed
with Glaxo's own existing products: "The result would be less product
innovation, and, consequently, fewer product choices and higher prices
some researchers believe that brain plaques cause Alzheimer's Disease and others believe
that they are a symptom of the disease.
142 In theory, one company could pursue a variety of different approaches. However,
for the same behavioral reasons discussed earlier in connection with media conglomerates
and GM cars, a firm may tend to concentrate on certain favored avenues and downplay
other ones.
143 See Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, Resolving Competitive Concerns, FTC
Agreement Clears $182 Billion Merger of Smith Kline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome (Dec.
18, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/skb.htm.
144 See Complaint '1122, Glaxo Wellcome, FTC File No. 001-0088, FTC Docket No. C-3990
(Dec. 18,2000) (prophylactic herpes vaccine market). At the time of the complaint there
was no vaccine available to prevent or treat herpes vaccines, but the merging parties were
two of the few firms developing such vaccines, and the other research programs were not
as far advanced.
145 Glaxo already was marketing two drugs of the triptan class for treating migraines;
SmithKline had an interest in a competing triptan drug that was in its late development
stages; and Merck and Astra Zeneca were selling the other approved drugs in the class.
See Glaxo Wellcome, Analysis to Aid Public Comment.
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for consumers."146 To resolve this problem, the merging firms agreed to
assign all of SmithKline's rights to its independent development partner,
allowing that firm to pursue a fully separate effort. This stipulation was
particularly suggestive because of the FTC's record of not commonly
challenging four-to-three mergers. 147 The outcome here, thus, suggests
that more than the usual number of firms may be appropriate in the
case of innovation-dependent pharmaceutical markets. 148 In a similar
vein, former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris noted the existence of two
cases from his tenure as Chairman that also resulted in pharmaceutical
development programs being protected by ensuring a relatively large
number of market participants. 149
b. High-Technology: Advanced Defense Industries
The field of advanced defense technology also appears to meet the
three-part test for special solicitude. This part of the defense industry
has been marked by continuous innovation involving cutting-edge technology, such as wholly new computer technologies or high-performance
military aircraft. lso And there is a strong external public benefit from
Press Release, supra note 143.
See Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal Year.s 1996-2003, supra note 121, attbl. 4.l.
148 See Ben-Asher, supra note 65, at 348-49 (arguing that federal antitrust officials should
investigate mergers in the pharmaceutical sector falling outside the premerger notification
threshold in order to preserve competition in R&D).
149 See Amgen, Inc., FIC Docket No. C-4053 (consent order) (Sept. 3, 2002) (R&D into
cytokines that promote tissue inflammation and involving a 4-to-3 merger in one market,
in which one of the merging parties was present only through a research program),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/amgendo.pdf; Cytyc Corp., FIC File No. 0210098 (June 24, 2002) (staff authorized to seek preliminary injunction) (merger involving
tests used to screen women for cervical cancer) (involving 5-to-4 merger in one market,
with most firms present only through research programs or in FDA approval process).
For a contrasting outcome see Genzyme/Novazyme, in which the Commission, on casespecific grounds, declined to challenge a merger to monopoly in research programs for
the cure to a rare genetic disorder. Genzyme, FIC File No. 021-0026 (Jan. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/genzyme.htm .• discussed infra Part IV.B.
Chairman Muris noted that an important feature of all these cases was the presence of
the regularized FDA approval process, which made it possible for the FIC to identify
potential entrants, determine how many years away from market entry they were, and to
conclude that other substitutable R&D programs could not enter without having to start
at the beginning of the approval process. See Muris Statement, Genzyme, id. at 4 n.ll. Muris
did not specify whether the number of actors protected in the first two cases was greater
than would have been called for under the usual antitrust principles, although it appears
probable that it was.
150 Here again there are likely to be technical problems whose solutions are not even
approximately known. For example, is an economical, low-cost path to orbital flight best
achieved through the Space Shuttle, air launches, single-stage-to-orbit technology, or by
something else? We simply do not know. See, e.g., Graham Warwick, Reusable Reality, FLIGHT
INT'L, July 8, 2003 at 29(examining the technical hurdles to reusable spaceflight and the
increase in costs and complexity since the Columbia crash).
146
147
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successful innovation-not just a more cost-effective product, but more
successful national military operations. For all these reasons, one expert
in government contracts and antitrust has expressed concern that conventional analysis might permit excessive consolidation: "Distributing
R&D funds to a wider range of firms, each with a different design
philosophy and distinct technical strengths, may yield a superior range
of options." 151
The Department of Defense (DoD) has found the subject of competition and innovation so important that it made this topic the principal
focus of the Defense Industrial Base Capabilities Study.152 This study
reviewed the technology areas that were important to the military and
identified particular markets in which innovation is especially crucial. I53

151 William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the Postconsolidation Defense Industry, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 421, 433 (1999). The FTC has taken a similar institutional view. Although
then-Chairman Pitofsky favored some defense consolidation to reduce expensive overhead,
he also noted that it was important to preserve competition in quality and innovation: "In
the defense industry, these nonprice indicators may be as important as, or even more
important than, price." Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business
Rights, and Competition (july 24, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/07/
defense4.htm.
152 See generally Suzanne Patrick, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Indus. Policy,
U.S. Dep't of Defense, Defense Industrial Base Capabilities Study (DIBCS) Series, Presentation to the FTC Staff by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (2005)
[hereinafter Industrial Base Presentation] (copy on file with the authors). This presentation
introduced the FTC antitrust lawyers to the content and methodology of the DoD's fivevolume study of the nation's defense-related industrial base.
153 The 000 identified the critical areas of diversity fairly systematically. The Industrial
Base Capabilities Study is a series of five reports, each one assessing a broad area of military
activity-battlespace awareness, command and control, logistics, force application, and
force protection. The five reports can be found on the 000 Web site at http://
www.acq.osd.mil!ip/ip_products.htmI.A typical example is U.S. Dep't of Defense, Defense
Industrial Base Capabilities Study: Force Application (Oct. 2004), available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil!ip/docs/dibcsja_1O-29-04.pdf [hereinafter Force Application Study]. Each
of these reports first identifies the most theoretically promising military capabilities, then
breaks those down to the component technologies involved, and then reasons backward
from the technologies to identifY the kind and number of industrial facilities needed to
perform the tasks of inventing and manufacturing them. Id. at 9. However, attaining the
optimal level of performance is more important in some areas of innovation than in
others. The 000, therefore, identifies certain technological fields where it is desirable for
the United States to be ahead of other countries by a technology generation or by an order
of magnitude in performance-such as locating underground structures or recovering a
signal from background noise. Suzanne Patrick, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Indus. Policy, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Defense Industrial Base Capabilities Study: Relevance
to Antitrust Reviews, Presentation to the FTC Staff by the Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Industrial Policy 7-8 (May 3,2005) (copy on file with the authors) [hereinafter
Antitrust Presentation]. It also identifies still more critical fields where we want to be way
ahead of rivals by several cycles of technology-such as the means of integrating various
sensor inputs to depict the electromagnetic battlespace. [d. These fields are the ones in
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The study concluded that the DoD should make a point of maintaining
independent suppliers in some of those markets in order to ensure
diverse approaches to emerging technologies. The DoD has said that it
will sometimes seek to do so "even in face of apparent competitive
sufficiency" 154-meaning even if the market would still be price competitive after further consolidation.
The Industrial Base Study gave several examples to illustrate possible
applications of this policy. Oxygen-iodine lasers, which can be developed
for high-power weapons uses, are currently produced at two-to-five U.S.
firms, and additional R&D is being conducted at other companies. Nonetheless, the DoD indicates that any further consolidation would face
the strong possibility of Department of Defense objection. 155 A similar
situation prevails in supercavitating/supersonic projectiles, which can
penetrate long distances into water. There are presently three domestic
sources, and one can speculate that consolidation among them might
bring cost savings. 156 The DoD still suggests that there is a strong possibility
that it will oppose joint ventures and mergers "that limit competition"
in this market, and it has established a goal to "sustain sufficient
suppliers." 157
In cases where the technology is so truly cutting-edge that even the
right general avenues of research cannot be known in advance, the
DoD has explicitly called for the preservation of numerous suppliers.
"Swarming control tools," for example, which are still at the R&D stage,
would be used for the futuristic task of enabling a group of unmanned
vehicles, such as pilotless aircraft, to coordinate and conduct autonomous
attacks, without need for ground control. The DoD says there are "many"
firms working on this technology.15s The Department is nonetheless
worried about acquisitions among them and has cited its sensitivity to
this issue as one of the major insights coming out of the Industrial
Base Study.159
which it is most important to have diverse suppliers. For a more extensive breakout of
fields in these terms see Force Application Study, supra, at app. A.
154 Antitrust Presentation, supra note 153, at 18.
155 See Industrial Base Presentation, supra note 152, at 17; see also Force Application Study,
supra note 153, at 55 ("Deny teaming that limits innovation; maintain present number of
sources at minimum.").
156 The 000 is not indifferent to the cost of maintaining alternative approaches, particularly when that requires expensive production facilities. See Force Application Study, supra
note 153, at 26 (the limited market for hypersonic weapon propulsion systems is "not
likely able to support more than one supplier at this time").
157 Industrial Base Presentation, supra note 152, at 18.
158 Id. at 16.
159Id. at 16, 21. Other insights include beliefs that (1) important breakthroughs commonly come from small suppliers with fewer than 100 employees; (2) variety is often more
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Case law suggests that the antitrust enforcers have accepted these
principles,160 at least as a general proposition. One example is the Justice
Department's successful opposition to the merger between Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman,161 which would have reduced from four
to three (along with Boeing and Raytheon Hughes) the number of prime
contractors with "broad-based capability to design, develop, and produce
complex weapons systems." 162 More importantly, the merger would have
reduced the suppliers in the critical market for high-performance fixedwing military aircraft from three to twO. 163 These are high levels of
concentration, but in many other markets the DoD had already permitted
mergers to such levels, suggesting it believes that two firms are ordinarily
enough to secure price competition in the major products it buYS.I64 A
year after the Lockheed challenge there were only two suppliers of such
important weapons systems as nonreusable space launch vehicles (Boeing
and Lockheed Martin); 165 certain kinds of surface combat ships, such as
destroyers and cruisers (General Dynamics and Litton); and tracked
vehicles (General Dynamics and United Defense Systems) .166 It is likely
important in early R&D than in later development; (3) separate companies may be useful
in applying new technology to different fields; and (4) acquisition of a small innovator
by a large parent is likely to trigger a round of defensive sales of other companies. For
these reasons, the DoD has expressed concern about further consolidation in certain
relatively unconcentrated markets, such as those involving active hyperspectral imagers,
which are used for assessing the composition of debris clouds, where there are presently
four domestic R&D programs; and infantrymen's helmet-mounted displays, where there
are presently five programs. Id.
160 For practical purposes, the "enforcers" in the defense field include the Pentagon
officials who decide whether to recommend a challenge to a merger. The DoD has
substantial influence over antitrust decisions because it would be very difficult for the
antitrust agencies to win cases without its supporting testimony as the sole purchaser of
these products and as the primary voice for national security considerations.
161 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Goes to Court to Block
Lockheed Martin's Purchase of Northrop Grumman (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Lockheed Press Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressJeleases/1998/
212681.htm; see generally Complaint, United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 6 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 45,098 (D.D.C. Mar 23,1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f212600/212680.pdf.
162 Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 151, at 422.
163 See Lockheed Complaint, supra note 161, 'iJ2. The merger would also have reduced
from two to one the suppliers of directed infrared countermeasures systems and of airborne
early warning radar. These seem like more specialized areas of concern, however.
164 The DoD might have several reasons for accepting two suppliers rather than seeking
to preserve the more common number of three. It might believe that the minimum
efficient scale for producing complex products will permit only two producers. It might
also have confidence-perhaps undue confidence-in its own powers as a large and sole
institutional buyer.
165 The market for medium- to heavy-lift government vehicles was subsequently allowed
to consolidate to a single joint venture. This caused concern, but was ultimately thought
to be justified by qualitative efficiencies in reliability. See ULA Press Release, supra note 75.
166 See Kovacic, supra note 151, at 423.
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that the different result in Lockheed/Northrop-the antitrust
challenge-was due to concern for maintaining innovation in the more
rapidly evolving, less mature aerospace sector. The complaint and the
press release both highlighted this factor. The complaint noted that
increased interdependence among the remaining firms "may lead to
reduced competition among aircraft platforms, less price competition,
and reduced innovation in the high-performance fixed-wing military
aircraft market." 167 Because it appears that similar concentration levels
had been accepted in other defense industries, the decision here seems
to reflect a judgment that protecting innovation in more cutting-edge
technological applications calls for somewhat more diversity-perhaps
one additional effective center of innovation-than antitrust would ordinarily require. 16S

D.

CONCLUSION ON THE AREAS OF ADVANTAGE
FOR CHOICE THEORY

Further study may identify additional industries that call for more
than the usual number of competitors. Such industries are not likely
to be numerous, however. The three limiting principles that we have
proposed should allow the exclusion of most candidates from consideration fairly promptly. For example, the introduction of shelf-stable
canned foods was a striking innovation, but the grocery industry does
not have a recent history of competing primarily through such innovations. The development of video games and other electronic consumer
entertainment may involve cutting-edge technology, but it does not
involve public externalities that greatly exceed the price of the products
themselves. Devices to increase automobile safety may involve that kind
of broad externality benefit to public health and welfare, but many of
the available techniques seem to be generally known and certainly do
not depend entirely on cutting-edge technology. The few industries that
167 See Lockheed Complaint, supra note 161, ~ 4. In this respectthe complaint was expressing
the views of the DoD management, if not necessarily those of the individual services. See
id. ~ 7 (quoting letter from William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, to Janet Reno, Attorney
General (Mar. 23,1998». The press release quoted Janet Reno as saying that the merger,
unless blocked, "would cost the taxpayer and take the competitive wind out of the sails
of innovation in the production of many critical systems .... " Lockheed Press Release, supra
note 161.
168 In order to be a truly effective center of innovation, however, several specific things
are required. These include staff, research facilities, patents, and institutional culture.
That, in tum, leads to a series of practical questions about minimum efficienncale: How
many such centers are possible; how many are necessary; and how does that number
compare with the result expected from the proposed actions? These questions call for
careful industry-specific inquiry. See, e.g.,JoHN BIRKLER ET AL., COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN THE U.S. FIXED-WING MILITARY AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (RAND 2003).
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satisfy all three tests should, therefore, be ones in which there is a truly
strong case for drawing on choice theory.
We have identified some choice-sensitive industries in this section. But
it is important to be clear about what this fact implies: It is not that
antitrust should automatically require a larger number of market participants in those industries than it now does, but simply that antitrust
should be attuned to the possibility that such a result is necessary. Making
that determination in an individual case will call for a careful marketspecific analysis. We now turn to some concrete examples of how that
process could have worked.
IV. EIGHT RECENT CASES THAT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE
COME OUT DIFFERENTLY UNDER A CHOICE ANALYSIS
A more vigorous use of consumer choice principles in antitrust
enforcement will involve more than just a change of vocabulary or methods. It will also make a practical difference in outcomes. This can be
seen from a review of eight recent matters that would probably have
come out differently. We draw these examples from most of the major
areas of advantage discussed in the previous section: defense, pharmaceuticals, two hospital matters, a vertical restraint case, a regulated industry,
a media joint venture, and real estate brokerage practices.
A. RAYTHEON/HuGHES AIRCRAFT

This was a merger to monopoly, narrowly and controversially justified
by price considerations, in the market for supplying air-to-air missiles to
the Defense Department. Between the two of them, Raytheon and
Hughes manufactured virtually all the air-to-air missiles used by the U.S.
military, including the AMRAAM, a medium-range missile that was the
Department's most advanced. Raytheon was a longtime leader in this
field, supplying the AMRAAM, Sidewinder, and Sparrow}69 Hughes competed with Raytheon to supply the AMRAAM. The competition between
the firms had reportedly been beneficial to the government, both improving the product and reducing its cost.170
169 See http://www.af.mil/factsheets (links to AMRAAM, Sparrow, and Sidewinder systems
can be found under the "Weapons" tab).
170 See Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief No. 97-D 87 (june 24,1997) (the DoD
deliberately invested to ensure that two firms could produce the AMRAAM missile; the
competition between them "has saved taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars") (attributing this view to Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition), available
at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/indexJsp?section=papers&code=97-D_87; Lawrence Korb, Defense Mega-Mergers Weaken the U.S., NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 1998, at A33 (competition had brought "improvement in the technology" and a 20% drop in unit cost).
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In approving a merger that would eliminate this competition, the DoD
and the Department of Justice were swayed-perhaps too much-by
the prospect of short-term price benefits. Some consideration of scale
economies was inescapable, because production runs were shrinking in
the post-Cold War environment.l7I However, the Department of Justice
also used the merger negotiations as a price-bargaining chip, announcing
that it would hold up filing an agreed-upon settlement involving other
aspects of the merger so that it could "continue to monitor negotiations"
between Raytheon and the DoD "regarding the benefits that will be
passed along to the government because of the substantial efficiencies
the parties expect to achieve by combining the production of their
AMRAAM missiles."172 Two weeks later, when those negotiations were
completed, the DOJ emphasized the price effects of the merger: "Raytheon and Hughes have been competing bidders for the AMRAAM
missile and, although the acquisition eliminates further competition
between the two, the setting of a firm price will save the Air Force $180
million over the next four years." 173
Those reviewing the merger were also aware of the importance of
innovation, but they thought they could protect it by encouraging
new or potential entry into the air-to-air missile market. 174 The DoD
concluded that the technology used in all anti-aircraft missiles was
fundamentally similar, so that manufacturers of sea- or land-based
missiles could enter the air-to-air market if need be. li5 Other industry

See Force Application Study, supra note 153, at 36.
m "Although the Department expects that these [AMRAAM price] negotiations will be
concluded successfully, it will not file its complaint and proposed settlement with the
court until that happens." Raytheon Press Release, supra note 9 (provisionally announcing
agreement that required sale of two electronics businesses and construction of a firewall
involving an anti-tank missile).
mId. Other divestitures were required as part of the contemporaneous purchase of
Texas Instruments.
174 A second factor might also have eased the DoD's concerns. Some important sources
of innovation can be found not in the missile manufacturer, but rather in the subcontractors who make critical components, such as sensors and guidance systems. These firms
were not involved in the merger and their ability to innovate was unimpaired. This does
not necessarily remove all concerns, however, because any prime contractor still needs to
be competitively motivated to encourage, seek out, use, and pay for innovative technology.
175 "The review found that the components and characteristics of these missiles are
shared by all air-intercept missiles and that the strengths of other companies in this market
will ensure robust competition for any future programs." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Defense, DoD Completes Review of Raytheon-Hughes (Oct. 2, 1997), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/releases/I997/bI0021997_bt527-97.htmI.Itis not clear if the DoD
study specifically assessed whether such entry would be induced by a 5% price rise, the
usual merger methodology. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.11; see also
infra note 244.
171
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observers suggested that foreign manufacturers could license designs
here as well."6
While the possibility of new entry is always helpful, impediments and
barriers may significantly limit its impact in this particular market. It is not
clear how transferrable the skills are between air-launched and groundlaunched products; nor is it clear that the Pentagon would be comfortable
relying on foreign designs for this crucial technology. Raytheon apparently remains the sole supplier of air-to-air missiles to the U.S. government today. Presumably for these reasons, the Raytheon/Hughes merger
was strongly questioned at the time. 177
While the decision to permit the merger on price and cost grounds
may have been defensible, a choice model of antitrust law would have
placed greater emphasis on maintaining diversity and innovation in this
key technology. Given that the transaction was problematic even when
viewed in price terms alone-recall the beneficial price effects of the
earlier competition-the addition of choice considerations might well
have tipped the DoD and the DO] in the direction of challenging it.
B.GENZYME/NoVAZYME

A second matter that might have come out differently under the choice
approach is the FTC's 2004 decision to close its investigation of Genzyme
Corporation's acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals. 178
The two firms had the world's only two known research programs
aimed at finding a cure for Pompe disease, a rare and often fatal genetic
disorder that affects about 10,000 people, mainly infants and children.
In the years between 1998 and 2001, Genzyme had made acquisitions or
176 See DEFENSE MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS NEWSL., Nov. 2001 ("the 'monopoly' which
Raytheon gained in the air-to-missile market was of short duration, as both Lockheed
Martin and Boeing scrambled to bring home foreign designs for the Pentagon's
consideration") .
I77 Lawrence Korb was Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration and,
more recently, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He noted that Washington
was "correct" to question the Lockheed-Northrop merger, but "it should have used the
same criteria to halt ... Hughes-Raytheon .... " Korb, supra note 170, at A33. William
Kovacic noted soon after the merger was announced that the combined Raytheon-Hughes
would be "truly dominant" in air-to-air missiles, and that "[t]heir challenge is to argue to
antitrust officials that there's another plausible company the government can turn to ...
One potential danger in the deal is losing the benefit of different corporations' different
technological solutions." See John Mintz, Raytheon Deals Raise Antitrust Concerns, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 1997, at Cl (quoting Kovacic).
178 FTC File No. 021-0026 (jan. 13,2004). The Commission vote was 3-1-1. The closing
letter, statement of Chairman Muris, dissenting statement of Commissioner Thompson,
and separate statement of Commissioner Harbour are available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2004/01/genzyme.htm.
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joint ventures that gave it control over two other Pompe R&D programs, 179
which were subsequently closed due to anticipated manufacturing difficulties. lso The market was, thus, already narrowed. The Commission
nonetheless decided not to challenge the final merger to monopoly
between Genzyme and Novazyme, reasoning that the merger would
accelerate the pace of research and might increase its probability of
success through the combination of the two research programs. lSI The
agency also noted that the combined firm would still have ample incentives to bring both its products to market, to serve differentiated patient
requirements, and to respond to various contractual incentives. ls2 The
argument of the FTC majority, thus, focused on the benign research
synergies and economic incentives facing the firm.
What the majority did not seem to consider was the possibility that
the merged firms, although still having the means and motivation to
engage in vigorous innovation, might have a diminished managerial
ability actually to do so. The majority assumed that both the Genzyme
and Novazyme approaches could continue to be pursued effectively.
However, after the merger Genzyme could name the people to head the
Novazyme program. Although the longstanding head of that program
remained for a time,IS3 he left after a year, in frustration, some have
suggested, over his inability to control the new owner's research
agenda. ls4 The manager's departure raises concerns about whether the
emergence of a single corporate viewpoint could cause a merged program not to pursue all the research avenues theoretically open to it.IS5
In short, this merger presented enforcers with a mix of good and troublesome features-efficiencies in the conduct of research versus a potential
lessening of research diversity.
In balancing these factors, the FTC majority chose to emphasize the
provable, short-term economic benefits and accept the merger. By conSee Thompson Genzyme Statement, supra note 178, at 4.
See Muris Genzyme Statement, supra note 178, at 6-7.
181 See id. at 17.
182 See id. at 14.
183 See id. at 16.
184 See Thompson Genzyme Statement, supra note 178, at 10. See generally Geeta Anand,
Far His Sick Kids, a Father Struggled to Droelop a Cure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at AI. The
1;9
180

dispute between Genzyme and the manager appears to have involved a personal divergence
of interest rather than a dispute over research strategy. The manager wanted to enroll
his own children-who suffered from the disease themselves-in early clinical trials. But
the underlying point illustrated here is that corporate control over personnel implies
control over policy.
185 There was also evidence that, after the merger, the schedule for the introduction of
Novazyme products was delayed by several years, although the reasons for this delay are
unclear. See Muris Genzyme Statement, supra note 178, at 17.
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trast, people employing a choice theory would emphasize the loss of
diversity and long-term innovative potential and would view the transaction with more concern. 186 Under either a conventional or a choice
approach, the individual facts have to be carefully studied. The facts and
special circumstances of this case-including the fact that the merger was
already consummated-might still have counseled against a complaint
here. 187 But under a choice theory the investigation would at least have
included a more detailed inquiry into the practical ability of the merged
firm to maintain competing research programs, and it would have led
to an antitrust challenge if this revealed real risks that could be avoided
by keeping the firms separate.
C. DOMINICAN SANTA CRUZ/COMMUNITY HOSPITALS

This merger resulted in church-affiliated organizations controlling
approximately three-quarters of local hospital capacity in Santa Cruz,
California. 188 On religious grounds, the hospitals were reluctant to provide tubal ligations because these were a form of voluntary sterilization. 189
The range of consumer choice was, therefore, significantly threatened
in an important nonprice dimension, which should have been considered
in the consent decree as carefully as the price considerations.
The merger brought together Dominican Santa Cruz Hospital and
the AMI-Community Hospital, both located in Santa Cruz. There was
only one other hospital in the county, located in a more rural area 15

186 Michael Porter appears to be such a person. Speaking about mergers generally, he
concluded that if there is a probability "greater than ... 0.2" that a merger will lead to a
"bad outcome" - by which he means a loss of future innovative potential-then he would
block the merger absent "a pretty compelling counterargument in terms of the [short
term cost savings]." Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should Concentration Be Dropped
from the Merger Guidelines?, 33 UWlA L. REv. 3, 15 (2001) (quoting Porter's comments from
an ABA Roundtable Conference). See also SCHERER & Ross, supra note 50, at 32-34,575-76.
187 Several other special factors also weighed against a complaint. The Commission had
two years of post-acquisition evidence that tended to show continuing robust research. In
addition, a post-acquisition divestiture might have been especially disruptive to the ongOing
combined research efforts in a way that would ultimately have harmed the public interest.
Finally, the small size of the potential market here meant that any treatment would be
subject to the terms of the Orphan Drug Act. See Muris Genzyme Statement, supra note
178, at 11. That act gives the initial therapy a seven-year period of exclusivity, unless a
later drug can affirmatively demonstrate that it is superior. These provisions tended to
affect the likelihood of having two therapies available even if an antitrust action were taken.
188 Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., 118 F.T.C. 382 (1994).
189 The separate and difficult subject of abortions was not a significant issue in this case.
In this county, as in many areas, abortions were generally performed in freestanding clinics
and were, therefore, not directly affected by the hospital merger.
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miles away.190 Mter the merger, the combined firm had 76 percent of
an alleged county market as measured by patient days, and 73 percent
as measured by beds. The surviving hospital-Dominican-was run by
an order of nuns, and, at the time the acquisition was first planned, it
apparently had a policy of not performing tuballigations. 191 Dominican
initially indicated that this restriction would be extended to the acquired
hospital, and the range of important marketplace options, thus, appeared
at risk. The merged hospital subsequently ameliorated that policy and
may have taken steps to offer the procedure in some circumstances. 192
There remained some grounds for concern, however, that the continued
availability of the procedure was uncertain. Antitrust concern under the
choice framework would therefore have been warranted. 193
The FfC's consent decree addressed the main price effects of the
merger, but it was relatively limited and its chief provision was simply a
requirement that the respondents notify the agency before acquiring
any additional hospitals. 194 Some of the FTC's restraint was inevitable.
190 That hospital may not have been a fully effective substitute for the others because
some insurance plans might not have included it and some doctors might not have had
privileges there.
191 An article in the area newspaper quoted doctors expressing concern that the procedure would no longer be available when it needed to take place in a hospital setting. See
Bob Levy, Hospital Offer Raises Concerns, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 28, 1990.
192 At the time the acquisition was actually consummated, Dominican informed obstetricians that it would allow completion of some tubal ligations that had already been scheduled, although no further procedures of this kind would be booked. Thereafter the
procedure apparently would be unavailable at the Dominican hospitals. See Lee
Quarnstrom, Sterilization Services Limited but Santa Cruz Clinics Closed fur Tubal Ligations, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 5, 1991, at lB. Two years later, however, at the time the consent
decree was becoming final, the hospital had obtained authorization from the local bishop
to perform ligations under some defined circumstances. See Lee Quarnstrom, Birth Control
Ban Is Eased at Dominican, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 11, 1992, at lB.
193 The hospital might have made two arguments against an enforcement action. Each
has some merit, but neither should have prevented a successful challenge. First, Dominican
might have argued that it would have been legal if Community Hospital had been bought
by an unrelated out-of-state Catholic hospital, and tubal ligations would have been equally
eliminated under that merger. Thus, it could not be said that the loss of this service flowed
uniquely from the acquisition by Dominican. This observation, however, even if it could
be proven factually correct, is legally irrelevant. The antitrust laws may not reach every
loss of consumer options that flows from an acquisition, but that does not mean they
cannot reach those losses that are the consequence of a legally relevant horizontal merger.
Second, the hospital might have argued that any remedy here would involve the government in requiring the hospital to offer a service that is contrary to its religious values,
and this would violate its freedom of religion under the First Amendment. This argument
is also unpersuasive because any remedy is imposed as a result of a voluntary act by the
hospital and, thus, is easily avoidable. If the hospital cannot make an acquisition without
violating the antitrust laws, if it is not willing to be subject to an order that violates its
religious beliefs, and if a satisfactory compromise cannot be negotiated, then it can simply
forgo that particular transaction.
194 See Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., 118 F.T.C. 382, 389 (1994).
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Because this acquisition had not been reporta,ble under the HSR Act,
the agency's ability to obtain complete relief was necessarily limited. 195
It would have been better, however, to recognize that the nonprice
option of tubal ligations would not necessarily be preserved by measures
aimed at protecting marketwide price competition and to have instead
included an order provision specifically designed to protect it. 196

D.

BUTTERWORTH/BLODGETT HOSPITALS

Another hospital case that might have come out differently under
choice analysis is the Butterworth/Blodgett merger, which a district judge
declined to enjoin in spite of the high concentration that resulted. 197
The judge carefully examined the probable price effects in hospital
services, and perhaps implicitly considered some non price competition,
but failed to consider the possible need for additional competitors to
respond to the full range of consumer preferences implicit in the selection of medical treatments.
Butterworth and Blodgett were the two largest of the four hospitals
in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and between them accounted for 65-70
percent of the city's capacity.198 Concentration was clearly high by any
measure, and the judge acknowledged that this made out a prima facie
case for the government. He nonetheless held that the defendants had
successfully rebutted that case by showing that a price increase was
unlikely: nonprofit hospitals charge lower prices than for-profit ones
in concentrated markets; the hospital board members represented the
195 The acquisition was consummated before the staff could open an investigation or
consider seeking an injunction against it. By the time the consent order was negotiated,
the acquired hospital had been converted to a skilled nursing and rehabilitative care
facility and no longer operated as a hospital; reconversion would clearly have been difficult.
In addition, another hospital chain had announced plans to enter the market, an action that
would restore a third competitor. See Dominican Hospital, lIS F.T.C. at 390-91 (statemen t of
Chairman Steiger). Notwithstanding these considerations, Commissioners Azcuenaga and
Yao dissented and suggested that the consent order did not provide an adequate remedy.
In 1996, subsequent to this discussion, and six years after the acquisition itself, the Sutter
system opened the Sutter Maternity and Surgery Center, a small specialty hospital focusing
on women's issues. This seems to have solved most problems of access. It is still worth
considering whether antitrust policy should ordinarily be content with new entry that is
subject to this many delays and uncertainties.
196 It would be desirable to keep any such order provision as non-regulatory as possible,
perhaps by permitting delegation of the management of any specifically protected medical
service to an' independent entity.
197 FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 12S5, 1303 (W.O. Mich. 1996), affd
without opinion, 121 F.3d 70S (6th Cir. 1997).
198 When they merged, the HHIs increased by between lO64 and 2001 points, to a level
between 2767 and 5079, depending on the particular markets and units of measurement
used. See id. at 1294.
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interests of the patient community and desired competitive prices; there
were capital and operating efficiencies in the merger; and the hospitals
had issued a public "Community Commitment" statement and were
willing to sign a formal order limiting their prices and profits to specified levels. 199
It is striking how the court's analysis focused almost entirely on price
effects. 20o Nonprice competition-even on the core value of quality of
care-was mentioned only in passing. 201 Not mentioned at all were the
more subtle forms of nonprice competition, through which all hospitals
respond, more or less aggressively, to varied patient and community
preferences on issues of health care.

Nonprice preferences should be crucial to hospital competition, however. That competition needs to be able to respond to the wide range
of individual preferences that exist-and that may, in turn, require a
number of independent decision makers. Many hospital markets, however, including the Grand Rapids market, may be like the car companies
of the 1950s. The Big Three automakers may have appeared intensely
competitive in both price and design terms, but the later rise of imports
revealed that they had not in fact been anticipating and supplying the
full range of latent consumer preferences. As we discussed previously,
there is evidence suggesting the possibility of similar unsatisfied demands
for variety in the provision of hospital services. 202
Just how important consumer preferences in hospital mergers are
remains to be determined. We do not know enough about the consumer
demand for particular medical services to rely on that factor alone in
reaching an antitrust judgment. Moreover, a desire to protect overall
nonprice competition, as presented in this case, would require maintaining a market structure in which hospitals will be responsive to consumer
demand for choice in general, which is a less focused and, therefore,
more challenging remedial assessment than would have been involved
in protecting one known and particular choice, as was presented by the
Santa Cruz hospital merger. Nonetheless, when a merger is already far
over the line in terms of concentration-as it was here-then the probable consumer demand for variety should be included as part of a
199 See id. at 1295-98. The judge was apparently untroubled by the price-regulatory
features of this undertaking.
200 See id. at 1298 (hospitals' proferred price guarantee "corroborates other evidence
that nonprofit hospitals may be treated differently under the antitrust laws, and further
undermines the predictive value of the FIC's prima facie case).
201 [d. at 1297 (hospital directors "testified convincingly that the proposed merger is
motivated by a common desire to lower health care costs and improve the quality of care").
202 See supra notes 125-136 and accompanying text.
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complete analysis and should have been enough here to call for a different result.

E. J.B.D.L.

CORP. V. WYETH-AYERST LABORA TORIES

Many of the examples in this section involve acquisitions, but the
use of choice theory does not change outcomes solely by giving the
government an additional theory of liability in merger cases. It can also
change the outcomes of cases in which private corporate plaintiffs have
challenged vertical restraints. Wyeth Labs was one such matter, involving
an exclusive dealing requirement. 203
Wyeth manufactures Premarin, an estrogen product approved for a
number of uses, including primarily the treatment of symptoms associated with menopause. While there are other oral estrogen replacement
therapy drugs on the market, only one other competitor's then-recently
approved drug, Duramed's drug Cenestin, was also a conjugated estrogen
product. 204 The relevant market for antitrust purposes is uncertain, but
is dominated by Wyeth under almost any definition. Premarin's share
of the oral estrogen replacement therapy market had been approximately
70 percent during the relevant period, and Wyeth conceded for summary
judgment purposes that it had monopoly power in that market. 205 If
conjugated estrogen products were considered the relevant market
instead, Premarin's share would have been approximately 98 percent. 206
Wyeth sought to protect the dominant market position of Premarin. 207
A key part of its strategy was to prevent Duramed from entering into
contracts for its competing Cenestin product with third-party payors,
such as insurance plans, and with pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs),
which manage formularies for health plans. Wyeth made many of those
entities sign "sole conjugated estrogen" clauses if they wanted to get any
of the rebates that it paid on sales of Premarin and other Wyeth products.
A group of buyers challenged this and similar practices under both
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. They reasoned that the bundled
203 j.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 01-00704, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11676
(S.D. Ohio June 13, 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-3988 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2005). The
problematic restraints in Wyeth might be characterized as involving incentives toward de
facto exclusive dealing or, alternatively and more generally, as anticompetitive exclusionary con tracts.
204 A conjugated estrogen differs chemically from other estrogen products. There are
no generic equivalents of Premarin approved by the FDA. Id. at *4.
205Id. at *14, *32.
206 Id. at *26.
207 One goal was to hold Cenestin "to less than two percent of prescription market share
in 1999, approximately $20 million in assumed sales." [d. at *6.
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discounts were sufficiently important to amount, in practical terms, to
exclusive dealing requirements, and that the exclusive dealing improperly permitted Wyeth to maintain its monopoly in the oral estrogen
replacement market: "[T]he synergistic effects of Wyeth's sole conjugated estrogen clauses together with Wyeth's formulas for rebates to
PBMs, effectively foreclosed competition from Duramed's Cenestin."208
Moreover, Wyeth "attempted to include these sole conjugated estrogen
clauses ... in most of its PBM contracts."209
The district court nonetheless granted Wyeth's motion for summary
judgment. The judge gave a number of reasons for this: foreclosure was
not complete;2IO the "sole conjugated estrogen" clauses were only 30-60
days in duration;211 the PBMs allegedly benefited financially from Wyeth's
discounts;212 bundled discounts were said to be common in the pharmaceutical industry;213 and the court stated that it wanted to minimize the
uncertainty, which could chill beneficial conduct, that arises when such
complex issues go to jury trial,214
This summary termination of the case would be considered an error
under our proposed choice analysis. Wyeth's practices created the potential for both types of decreases in consumer choice that we have
discussed-significant short-term restrictions on the availability of the
choices that consumers might like to have, and a long-term diminution
in consumer choice due to decreased incentives to invest in innovation.
In the short term, Wyeth's use of its monopoly power to impose
bundled multi-product discounts may have deprived consumers of the
ability to make a free choice from among the products that an undistorted
market would have presented to them (i.e., their ability to choose from
among a number of oral estrogen replacement drugs). Such effects on
consumer choice commonly call for examination whenever a dominant
firm is involved in imposing them. They raise particular questions, however, when applied in the context of a pharmaceutical market. Patients
respond differently to different medicines, and individual medicines
208 Id. at *8. Financial incentives to exclusivity can sometimes limit choice as effectively
as contractual provisions do. See Willard Tom, David Balto & Neil Averitt, Anticompetitive
Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST LJ.
615 (2000).
209 Id. at *11; Wyeth's index of its PBM contracts indicates that, as of January 1, 2000,
31 out of 74 contracts contained a "sole conjugated estrogen" clause. Id.
210 Id. at *30.
211 Id. at *22.
212 Id. at *8.
213 Id. at *7.
214 Id. at *48.
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frequently give rise to different side effects in different patients. A reduction in variety may, therefore, have special weight in a rule of reason
analysis in this setting.
In the long run, moreover, this type of exclusionary conduct can
deter entry, thus making innovation more difficult, eventually hampering
consumer choice even more. As discussed in an earlier section, independent centers of innovation are especially valuable in cutting-edge technologies like pharmaceuticals. Wyeth's bundled discounts, with their
potential for significantly discouraging new entry, could have the longterm effect of inhibiting this important form of competition.

Because this case was dismissed on a summary judgment motion, and
because the record is sealed, the significance of these potential losses
in consumer choice cannot be properly evaluated. For example, we do
not know the extent to which the entities impeded by the allegedly
exclusionary distribution contracts were the true, de facto centers of
innovation in this industry.215 Nor can we evaluate Wyeth's potentially
offsetting efficiency arguments. Bundled discounts, even by firms with
monopoly power, might be justified by efficiencies or by lower prices
overall. However, the adverse effects on consumer choice here (as well
as possible adverse price effects) might also have been enough to outweigh any alleged efficiencies. To have adequately explored these issues
the court should not have granted summary judgment when it did.

F.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY TAXICAB REGULATION

This matter involved a county's decision to allow one taxicab firm to
grow to dominant status, protecting consumers from price effects
through price regulation but nonetheless leaving them vulnerable to
poor service. 216
215 On the present publicly available record it is not clear whether the effective unit of
innovation is the FDA-approved product or the broader manufacturing firm. Nor is it
clear to what degree the excluded firm here is one that competes by innovation, as distinct
from some generic firms that compete primarily on price. But the point is that these issues
should have been explored.
216 See Matthew Mosk, Taxicab Firm s Influence Flagged, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at AI.
Similar situations appear to have occurred in other cities around the country. See, e.g.,
Robert Hardaway, Taxi and Limousines: The Last Bastion of Economic Regulation, 21 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'y 319,324 (2000) (experience suggests that unregulated markets provide
better service at lower prices); Ross D. Eckert, The Los Angeles Taxi Monapoly: An Economic
Inquiry, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 407,426, n.80 (1970) ("The Board has apparently been unconcerned that the Yellow Cab Company immediately upon its consolidation of competitors
in 1934, reduced its number of operating cabs by approximately 30 per cent ... and that
the quantity of service offered has declined steadily over the past fifteen years." By 1952,
Yellow Cab operated "about 900 cabs out of a total of 975" (footnotes omitted»; see also
Edmund Kitch, Mark Isaacson & Daniel Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14
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Barwood, Inc., serves the suburban Washington jurisdiction of Montgomery County, Maryland: "Of the 580 licensed cabs in the county,
433 use the Barwood name, ... [and] 360 are [directly] owned by the
company."217 As early as 1988, Barwood came to a position of dominance,
with about 80 percent of the market,218 through purchases of five other
firms and about 40 individuallicenses. 219 Later, in 1992, Barwood bought
Silver Spring Taxi, with another 70 licenses. 22o More recent regulatory
actions have helped to maintain Barwood's position by waiving the usual
requirement that unused licenses be revoked. 221 The regulatory authority
permitted concentration to increase over the years without objection,
perhaps on the presumption that because prices were regulated there
was no significant risk of consumer harm. 222
The regulators failed to take account of the non price effects, however.
In the absence of competition, service appears to have deteriorated.
Montgomery County has about 15 times as many complaints about cab
service as neighboring Fairfax County, Virginia, which issues about the
same number of licenses. 223 A consultant's report in 2001 concluded
that "greater competition could rectify problems such as long customer
waiting times and cab no-shows. Customers dissatisfied with one company
should be able to turn to other companies for better service."224 A choice
model of competition would have anticipated these kinds of problems

J.L. &

ECON. 285, 286 (l971) (80% share of Chicago's market was held by two companies
that came to be controlled by one person).
217 See Matthew Mosk, Duncan Pushes Cab Competition, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2003, at BI.
218 See Sue Anne Pressley, Montgomery to Add 150 Cabs Over 3 Years, WASH. POST, July 6,
1988, at B3.
219 See Claudia Levy, Upper County Has Few Easy Cab Riders, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1988,
at DI.
220 E-mail from Nancy Kutz, Office of Medicaid and Taxicab Regulation, Montgomery
County, Md., to Thomas Werth man, Research Assistant, University of Baltimore School
of Law (Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with authors).
221 Mosk, Taxicab Firm's Influence Flagged, supra note 216, at AI. Until 2004, the Montgomery County Code gave regulators considerable discretion in how to treat cab operations.
See, e.g., Montgomery County, Md., Code § 53-48 (e) (provisions on transferability) ("The
director may waive any prohibition against transferability if the director is satisfied that
granting a waiver is likely to produce: (1) More effective competition; and (2) Based on
the business plan of the transferee, an improved level of taxicab seIVice for consumers
in the County").
222 Seeid. § 53-106(a) (County Executive is to set the rates for all cabs and cab companies).
223 Mosk, Taxicab Firm's Influence Flagged, supra note 216, at AI.
224 Mosk, Duncan Pushes Cab Competition, supra note 217, at B1. The county administrator
reached a similar conclusion: "Right now, you have one big player. If we can create
competition, we'll see seIVice improve." Id.
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and would not have allowed this level of concentration to arise, even in
a regulated industry.225
G. THE VOTER NEWS SERVICE JOINT VENTURE
A choice-centered approach would also have challenged the formation
of the Voter News Service (VNS) joint venture that gradually took over
the exit polling and election-prediction operations of six major television
news operations. VNS grew between 1964 and 1990 and eventually
included ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox, CNN, and the Associated Press. 226 Thereafter, while there may have appeared to be many networks forecasting
the election results, only one underlying organization provided the raw
data on which the networks relied, and, thus, consumer choice was
limited to that one firm. The consequences of this limited choice were
vividly displayed in the 2000 Presidential election. All the networks
wrongly called the Bush/Gore race in Florida, withdrew their predictions,
called it again, and only then settled on the correct assessment that it
was too close to cal1. 227 The uniform series of errors sprang from the
fact that all the networks relied on the same underlying information and
methodology from VNS.

Conventional price-oriented analysis would probably still have upheld
the formation of VNS, however, for several reasons. The venture did
result in cost savings because duplicate staffs of interviewers and analysts
were no longer maintained. It had no power to raise prices228 or to
reduce the output of election night programming. And it was apparently
225 The current taxicab code provides: "The Director must not approve the transfer of
any license if the transferee already holds, or would then hold, more than 40% of the
total of licenses then in effect." Montgomery County, Md., Code § 53-204(e), available at hup:1Iwww.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/DPWT/transit/taxLreg/testfile/
chapter53taxicabsrevisedI2.06.pdf. We believe that such a market share cap is wise in light
of the historic domination of the Montgomery County taxicab market by one company.
We also believe that the optimal level of non price competition is much more likely to
result from competition than from rate regulation and administrative oversight of a firm
with market power. The difficulties of oversight are especially worrisome in jurisdictions
where the dominant firm has historically had a strong influence over its own regulation.
226 See jeremy Gerard, TV Networks May Approve a Pool of Election Exit Polls, N.Y. TiMES,
Oct. 31, 1989, at C26;james A. Barnes, The Polling Business, 5 PUBLIC PERSP., Nov./Dec.
1993, No.1, at 17; Frank Reuven, Election Night, 75 NEW LEADER, Oct. 5, 1992, at 20; see
also Moshe Adler, Bungled Election Projection? Blame the Feds!, SAWN.COM, Dec. 7, 2000,
h up:1I archive .salon .coml tech I feature/2000 112/071 an ti trustl index.h tm!'
227 Seejames Grimaldi, Battle of the Titans, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2000, at E8; Kathy Chen,
Election 2000: Antitrust Advocacy Group Seeks Breakup of Voter News Service, Citing Florida, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 28, 2000, at A12.
228 It could have raised neither advertising rates nor the price at which it sold its information to its client networks, because it was owned by the networks.
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supported by the Supreme Court's ruling that it was proper for a number
of newspapers to combine to form and operate the Associated Press. 229
Choice analysis would have pointed the way toward distinguishing
Associated Press, however. The AP organization provided a unique efficiency in that papers could collectively carry out important tasks that
were beyond the resources of any individual paper, and it therefore
resulted in an increase in the market options available to newspaper
readers. By contrast, in the case of VNS each network had provided its
own analysis before the venture was created and could have continued
to do so. The consumer-choice benefits from creating the VNS joint
venture were, therefore, smaller or nonexistent, and the costs, in the
form of diminished competition among networks to provide accurate
and insightful analysis, were greater. The venture would therefore have
been banned under a choice version of antitrust.23o

H.

REALCOMP

II

One final matter is still in litigation, and so the facts are not yet fully
known, but it is likely to be an instance where choice theory has already
made a difference in outcome. The matter involves the alleged exclusion
of the low-price, low-service option from a real estate brokerage market. 231
On October 12, 2006, the FIC filed an administrative complaint against
a multiple listing service (MLS) used by about 2100 brokerage offices
in the metropolitan Detroit area. The complaint alleged that the MLS
discriminated against nontraditional, limited-service, discount brokers
by refusing to permit their listings to be transferred from the MLS to
Internet-based Web sites accessible to consumers. Because many househunters now begin their search on such Web sites, the disadvantage to
discount brokers is commercially important.
This case might have been difficult to bring under conventional price
theory-not impossible, but harder. The full-service brokers could then
have argued that their quality-adjusted price was no higher than that of
the discounters, so that even those consumers who were forced to use
them would still have suffered no adverse price effects. Disproving those
claims through an assessment of quality-adjusted prices would have been
complex. In choice terms, however, the complaint was easy. Customers
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
For a more detailed description of this Voter News Service matter see Lande, Choice
as Ultimate Goal, supra note 12, at 519-2l.
231 Realcomp II, FfC Docket No. 9320; FfC File No. 061-0088 (Oct. 12,2006), available
athttp://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/realestatesweep.htm. A second, similar complaint was
announced at the same time, along with five proposed consent agreements. ld.
229
230
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of the brokerage services were forced to buy a comprehensive package
of services even though they might not want all the elements in that
package. For example, some homeowners might want to conduct the
open house themselves, or to do their own price negotiations, and those
customers were forced to buy unnecessary services if they wanted any
realtor assistance at all. Thus, home sellers and buyers were both deprived
of the option of having lower-service, lower-cost brokerage. The agency
described the case primarily in these choice terms in a press release
announcing the complaint. 232
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND METHODOLOGY OF
THE CONSUMER CHOICE PARADIGM
To adopt consumer choice as a new paradigm, antitrust policy must
also find that it can be implemented in a relatively simple, objective,
and predictable manner.233 And the challenges in these respects are
certainly real enough. Choice theory is somewhat more complex than
the alternatives, and it is less tied to objective metrics, such as prices and
elasticities. Perhaps most difficult, it is something novel, so there is some
uncertainty about its application. All these factors may raise concerns
about the risks of unpredictable or overly aggressive enforcement.
The choice approach does require somewhat more analytical complexity. Fortunately, however, there are mechanisms to avoid or minimize
this problem, which are elaborated through a discussion of five main
points: (1) the Merger Guidelines could be amended to state explicitly
that these additional choice issues are relevant to its analysis; (2) there
are a variety of reasonable and practical sources of information to draw
upon in deciding the new issues; (3) the conclusions from this process
could be expressed without too much difficulty in revised HHI thresholds
for an otherwise standard merger analysis; (4) alternatively, choice considerations could be brought into the rule of reason analysis of mergers
that are above the current thresholds of the Guidelines even if the
thresholds themselves are left unchanged; and (5) various safeguards
are available to prevent any undue exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

232 See Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges Real Estate Groups with
Anticompetitive Conduct in Limiting Consumers' Choice in Real Estate Services (Oct. 12,
2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/realestatesweep.htm.
233 It is likely that the efficiency paradigm succeeded in replacing the social/political
paradigm, even though it actually has little foundation in the antitrust laws' legislative
history, because its proponents successfully argued that it was the more objective and
predictable approach. See Robert Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler
of Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429,430-38 (1988).
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Though some difficulties in the analysis of non price competition will
surely remain, the analysis must nonetheless be undertaken: "[F) acts
cannot be ignored simply because present methods do not permit them
to be described and measured with full scientific rigor."234
A.

COMPARING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE DIFFERENT PARADIGMS

In assessing the administrability of different approaches, the first thing
to consider is how complicated an analysis each will require. Here the
choice paradigm admittedly requires a more complex analysis than its
alternatives, although we will see in later sections that the resulting
problems are modest and can be surmounted. 235
Of the price, efficiency, and choice models, the price paradigm
remains the simplest to implement. It requires the least information to
apply and is the most predictable in its outcomes for many reasons. 236
Perhaps the most important reason is that the price model simply eliminates some relevant areas of inquiry altogether, such as future innovation.
It also assumes that consumer preferences with respect to nonprice values
are fully captured in the concept of "quality-adjusted price." As we have
seen above, however, although both these conventions may simplify
matters, the results are frequently inaccurate.
An efficiency model is substantially more complex. Because it begins
with a price analysis, it has the same analytical burden as a price paradigm.
The efficiency model also adds another layer of inquiry, assessing the
significance of the price changes in terms of the three basic categories
of efficiencies-allocative, productive, and innovative. 237

A choice model would, in theory, be no more complicated than an
efficiency model, but in actual practice would probably be one step more
elaborate. In theory, the elements of choice will already all be captured
in the various types of efficiency.238 In practice, however, the efficiency
model usually focuses on cost savings and shortchanges the factors of
~

Leary, supra note 89, at 556.
And, of course, we should always remember that choice analysis will make a difference
only in a limited number of cases; most will continue to be assessed as they are now.
236 See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 34, at 809-13.
237Id.
238 One important formal difference is that a choice model would count the transfer
effects of the higher prices, in addition to the inefficiency effects. See Averitt & Lande,
Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 12, at 717 n.ll. Because the transfer effects of market
power can easily be calculated if the allocative inefficiency effects are known, however,
this would not require the antitrust decision makers to obtain any additional information.
See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 34, at 809-10; Fisher & Lande, supra note 34,
at 1653-59.
235
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variety and innovation. A choice approach would always treat these as
important. Adding these elements to the analysis will necessarily make
the choice approach somewhat more complex. Nevertheless, it should
not be unduly difficult to apply, as the next sections will demonstrate.
B.

INCREASING THE EMPHASIS ON CHOICE
IN THE MERGER GUIDELINES

To provide an institutional foundation for considering the various
issues related to choice, it may be useful, first of all, to amend the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to acknowledge the importance of choice
explicitly. One can certainly construe even the current Guidelines to
support choice as a factor, and, of course, merger cases can be brought
even if they do not come within the Guidelines. However, two amendments could help remove any uncertainties.
The first change would amend the Guidelines' discussion of its "policy
assumptions," in which the "unifying theme of the Guidelines" is now
presented almost entirely in price terms. 239 The discussion focuses on
market power as it might be exercised by the seller, not on choice as
presented to the buyer, except for a single footnote. 24o Choice theory
deserves higher visibility than this. We suggest including in the text some
language along the following lines: "Sometimes reduced competition
will result in fewer short-term consumer choices in terms of product
quality, variety, or service; or in less innovation in the long term. These
harms can occur even in markets that are price competitive." Elevating
this idea to text will inform the Guidelines' users that this is a more
important concept.
Section 0.1, Purpose and Underlying Policy Assumptions, states:
The unifying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted
to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise. Market power to
a seller is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for
a significant period of time. [note 6] In some circumstances, a sole seller (a
"monopolist") of a product with no good substitutes can maintain a selling price
that is above the level that would prevail if the market were competitive. Similarly,
in some circumstances, where only a few firms account for most of the sales of
a product, those firms can exercise market power, perhaps even approximating
the performance of a monopolist, by either explicitly or implicitly coordinating
their actions. Circumstances also may permit a single firm, not a monopolist, to
exercise market power through unilateral or non-coordinated conduct-conduct
the success of which does not rely on the concurrence of other firms in the
market or on coordinated responses by those firms. In any case, the result of
the exercise of market power is a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers or a
misallocation of resources.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4.
240 [d. at n.6 ("Sellers with market power also may lessen competition on dimensions
other than price, such as product quality, service, or innovation.").
239
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It would also be useful to amend the later section of the Guidelines
that discusses particular theories of litigation. Section 2 of the Guidelines
identifies two particular adverse competitive effects that mergers can
have: the lessening of competition through coordinated interaction (Section 2.1), and the lessening of competition through unilateral effects
(section 2.2). Although it is possible to fit choice theory within one or
both of these categories,241 it does not fit easily. The harm from a choicerelated merger does not come only from collusion to raise price among
the firms in the market, but could also come from the diminished range
of options offered. Nor does a choice-related merger obviously threaten
to permit a conventional unilateral exercise of market power; the unilateral harm does not lie in a conventional price increase, but rather in
the innovations that are not made. We, therefore, propose adding a new
Section 2.3 to explain how mergers can, in the circumstances previously
identified in Part III of this article, lead to consumer harm even though
price may not necessarily be affected. 242
The analysis under the new section would not all run in the direction
of enabling the antitrust agencies to more easily show anticompetitive
effects, of course. Although choice can sometimes lead to a merger being
blocked even if it is unlikely to have detrimental price effects, it can also
lead to situations in which the merging parties show beneficial effects on
choice and innovation sufficient to outweigh the possibility of somewhat
higher prices. 243
C. WHERE TO FIND THE INFORMATION NEEDED
FOR CHOICE ANALYSIS

With or without clarifications in the Guidelines, the antitrust agencies
can begin to deal with choice cases. Some practitioners may be concerned
that suitably precise information will not be available once we move
beyond price. In fact, however, a variety of techniques are available
for gathering, organizing, and digesting the appropriate data. Some
techniques will give the agencies information needed to make decisions
in immediate cases, and others will help acquire information that will
be useful in future cases.
Antitrust has always been a common-law discipline, and a movement
into choice theory should not call for any change in that approach. In
241 This is particularly true because note 6 referred to the existence of nonprice competition, so we know that topic must be covered somewhere in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. [d.
242 Alternatively, one could make smaller additions to §§ 2.1 and 2.3.
243 In other words, there can be an efficiencies defense in the innovation context, a
possibility that we will discuss below.
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assessing individual cases, enforcers might draw upon any of several
sources. First, they can make a point of asking about choice issues in
their interviews with firm managers and other market participants. Second, they can look creatively to identify particular aspects of a case that
lend themselves to quantitative assessments in choice terms, even if the
case as a whole may still require other techniques. In some investigations,
for example, quantitative data on consumer choices may be helpful in
defining the boundaries of the relevant product or geographic market,244
even though such data may not yet be sufficiently developed to quantify
the ultimate consumer harm that results from a loss of variety. Third,
they can turn to the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection for assistance
and use some of that bureau's techniques, such as focus groups and
polling,245 to gain insight into the extent to which the consumers of a
particular product value non price options. Fourth, economists assigned
to a case can begin to develop quantitative methods for assessing the
value that consumers put on variety in that particular factual context.
These might usefully include some instances of experimental economics,
among other techniques, on the theory that the preference variables
identified in an investigation may still be so complex that a laboratory
setting will be helpful in isolating their individual effects. 246
In addition, the agencies may begin to collect information from a
number of more general, less case-specific sources, not for immediate
use, but rather to build up a base of knowledge that will help in the
assessment of future matters. There are several possible sources of this
material. First, when enforcers conduct post hoc retrospectives of consummated mergers, they should attempt to ascertain the effects of the
244 Markets are currently defined through a "thought experiment" keyed to price. We
ask whether a hypothetical monopolist could profitably raise prices by a small but significant
amount, such as 5-lO%, for a significant period of time. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
supra note 4, § 1.11. In markets where nonprice competition is the most important kind,
however, the boundary-defining test might better be conducted in nonprice terms instead.
The issue then would be whether a hypothetical monopolist could make the product less
desirable in some "significant and non-transitory" nonprice way, without prompting market
shifts that would frustrate the step. In a hospital context, for example, the question might
be whether a monopoly institution could successfully cut corners to the point where its
rate of complications rose by 5%. Giving choice considerations more emphasis might
cause the markets for certain choice-sensitive products to become defined more narrowly,
as the analysis is shifted to a new metric to which consumers are more responsive. This
will tend to show market power in a larger number of cases. We cannot, however, predict
how great any changes would be in practice.
245 Using this teChnique will take advantage of the FTC's unique asset in having both
antitrust and consumer protection expertise under one roof.
246 For example, results from economic laboratory tests show that "four firms seem to
be enough to approach a competitive equilibrium in most (but not all) experimental
markets." Paul Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 119,

207 (2003).
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merger on innovation, quality, and variety, as well as on prices. Second,
and similarly, when enforcers have encountered an industry in which
variety competition was at risk, and have obtained a corrective measure
increasing consumer information or otherwise facilitating enlargement
of the range of marketplace options,247 they can conduct retrospectives
to determine how consumers in fact responded to the new environment.
Third, they can study the business and sociological literature about
specific industries, focusing on information about the factors thought
to affect variety, creativity, and innovation in that industry, such as the
structural conditions most conducive to it.248 Fourth, they can review the
economics literature on similar issues and, with the assistance of the
antitrust agencies' economics bureaus, can work to expand that literature. 249 Fifth, they can give speeches and write articles identifying quality
and variety competition as areas of interest and inviting members of the
bar to come forward with relevant problems or examples.
Then, when (and if) the enforcers have gained enough experience
from these ad hoc, situation-specific applications, they could consider
translating these insights into more formal general rules. The agencies
have already announced one such general rule in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines; one of the two safe harbors there was declared for
situations in which there were at least four centers of innovation. 25o
Thus, there is precedent for articulating antitrust rules involving even
so difficult a topic as concentration and innovation. We discuss possible
ways of expressing more general conclusions in the choice area under
the next two headings. One approach involves changing the numerical
criteria for challenge in choice-related industries, and the second
approach involves a less structured incorporation of choice factors into
the general rule of reason analysis.
247

The FIC's R-value rule, mandating disclosures on the effectiveness of home insulation,

was, in part, an attempt to help the market provide better insulation products. See Labeling

and Advertising of Home Insulation, 16 C.F.R. pt. 460 (2005). For an interpretation, see
Averitt, Unfair Acts or Practices, supra note 12, at 260, 263. This may also have been a factor
behind the Green Guides. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
.
pt. 260 (1992).
248 Relevant topics might include such things as the degree of actual control that parent
media companies typically exercise over their subsidiaries and information about the
effects of newspaper joint operating agreements.
249 For example, the number of firms that will maximize innovation under various types
of market conditions remains in dispute. Further studies that help to resolve these issuesor even just narrow the range of disagreement-would obviously be useful for antitrust
purposes.
250 See U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, Safety Zone for Research and Development Competition Analyzed in Terms of Innovation Markets § 4.3 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. It could be argued that this rule is aimed primarily at
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INCORPORATING CHOICE CONSIDERATIONS
INTO THE HERl'INDAHLS

First of all, the accumulated conclusions of choice analysis could be
formalized as bright lines in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, with
special levels of concentration announced as the thresholds for concern
in particular markets where choice is known to be especially relevant. 251
Choice considerations might actually be expressed in the HHI in either
of two general ways: The agencies could designate choice-based lines on
an industry-by-industry basis, or they could identify a larger (although
still limited) group of industries in which choice is particularly important
and apply the alternative HHI measure to all members of that group.

1. On an Industry-by-Industry Basis
The simplest step is to designate individual industries for special standards. After having handled a number of specific cases in an industry,
the agency may develop a sense for the role of choice on competition
in that industry as a whole. For example, after looking at enough media
mergers the agency may conclude that three media firms are likely to
generate price competition as robust as the price competition that 5 or
50 firms would produce. But they might also conclude that some larger
number of media firms might, on average, be needed to produce the
level of variety that consumers require to feel that the market has provided them with a competitive range of options. When this learning
becomes sufficiently developed, the Merger Guidelines could reflect it.252
Antitrust might stop at this point and never generalize beyond the
industry level. Alternatively, one more stage of generalization may be
both possible and useful.
defending against charges of traditional collusion, but the underlying concept of critical
concentration levels may be useful in other contexts as well.
251 This new approach would have some real consequences for merger enforcement.
Admittedly, the measurement of changes in the HHI index now plays only a small role
in enforcement agency and court decisions. So many other factors are involved that,
despite what some of the language in the Guidelines appears to suggest, modem merger
analysis is close to following a full rule of reason for all cases that are not within the
Guidelines' safe harbors. "[Mlerger policy has been moving away from reliance on surrogates [such as the HHI] and towards an approach that instead tells a story of anticompetitive
harm-an approach that directly asks and answers the ultimate question: are prices to
consumers likely to increase as a result of a merger?" Lande & Langenfeld, From Surrogates
to Stmes, supra note 66. The HHI provides a starting point for the analysis, however, and
starting points often have an effect on conclusions.
252 Even when stated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, of course, this number would
merely be a presumptive starting point for analysis. It would not establish an absolute bar
to above-threshold mergers.
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2. For Choice-Valuing Industries as a Group
Over time, antitrust policymakers could develop similar assessments
for other industries. When enough of these estimates accumulate, it may
become possible to generalize from them and announce appropriate
HHI thresholds for certain choice-valuing industries as a group.
While each of these approaches may sound worrisomely imprecise,
what will make those new alternative thresholds persuasive is the variety
of experiences on which they are based-not only the variety of industries, but also the variety of inquiries and methods used in the assessment
of each industry. It is important to realize that this is exactly the same
process that led to the selection of the current HHI thresholds for price
competition. The current Guidelines state that mergers leading to HHI
increases of more than 100 can give rise to market power issues. 253 Why
did the Guidelines pick lOO as the critical number instead of 200 or
400? The economics literature shows that there is no rigorously derived,
dispositive scientific basis for any of the numbers.254 The thresholds in
the Guidelines are in some respects unproven and unprovable. They are
further complicated by the fact that the underlying definitions of product
and geographic markets-necessary for calculation of the HHIs-are
themselves riddled with uncertainties. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the Guidelines are accepted because people recognize that complete
certainty in this field is neither possible nor desirable and because the
Guidelines reflect an accumulated body of experience and wisdom from
a variety of sources.
The Guidelines have been further refined over time through their
application by Administrations of different political beliefs. As a result,
they have evolved over decades in to something very much like the "right"
answer. 255 If antitrust made a point of conducting this same kind of
inquiry in the area of nonprice competition, it could eventually arrive
at results in which we could have approximately equal confidence. 256
253 Some have argued that there is an element of imperfect communication in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in the sense that analysis actually begins with presumptions
at HHI levels different from those formally announced. We do not address that issue in
this article, however.
254 See Barry Harris & David Smith, The Merger Guidelines vs. Economics: A Survey of Economic
Studies, ANTITRUST REp., Sept. 1999, at 23; see also Paul Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and
Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 119 (2003).
255 In other words, a rough bipartisan consensus has emerged as to both the formally
announced and the actually enforced thresholds, whatever those latter might be.
256 Indeed, the outcome of cases may become more predictable than they are now
because the relevant choice considerations will have been openly identified and articulated,
rather than left to work behind the scenes as unannounced "fudge" factors.
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ACCOUNTING FOR CHOICE WITHOUT CHANGING
THE HERFINDAHLS

If amending the HHIs seems too abrupt, however, there is an alternative. Choice considerations could simply be incorporated into merger
analysis as one more enumerated factor to be considered in a rule of
reason assessment under the current HHIs. Under this approach, choice
would be treated like other important second-level factors, such as ease
of entry,257 effects on coordinated behavior,258 or efficiencies. 259
Choice considerations could be brought into the Guidelines' analysis
in any of four secondary ways: (1) as a tie-breaking factor; (2) as a guide
to when the stated thresholds of the Guidelines will be more rigorously
enforced; (3) as an explicit, equal form of harm to competition; or (4) as
an affirmative efficiencies defense.

1. Tie-Breaking Factor
Choice considerations could be used as a tie-breaking factor. If
enforcers were deciding whether to challenge a merger in a choicesensitive industry like advanced aerospace, and if they were exactly on
the margin after considering the likely effect on price, then choice
considerations could be used to nudge the decision in one direction or
the other.

2. Increasing the Probability of Challenge
Choice considerations could also be used as an implicit interpretive
factor that would increase the probability of challenge under the Guidelines. Assume that for normal industries where price competition is
most important, the enforcers challenge 20 percent of above-Guidelines
mergers. For those industries where consumer choice issues are especially
crucial, it might be appropriate for the enforcers to apply the current
elements of the Guidelines somewhat more strictly, in a way that would
lead them to challenge 40 percent of above-Guidelines mergers.

3. Express Factor in Rule of Reason Analysis
Choice could be elevated to the status of a briefly mentioned but
explicit substantive factor in the rule of reason analysis of the Guidelines. 260 Under this approach, a merger could be challenged if it were
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.
[d. § 2.
259 [d. § 4.
260 See, e.g., Memorandum from jonathan Baker, Professor of Law, American Univ. Washington Coli. of Law, to the FTC/DOj joint Workshop on Merger Enforcement, Comments
on Applying the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 18 (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://
257
258
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sufficiently likely to lead either to higher prices or to significantly fewer
consumer choices, assessing this broadened field of effects with the tools
of the existing HHI presumptions and starting points. This will lead to
a greater focus on variety and innovation because those factors will have
been identified as primary, rather than footnote, considerations.
Making the choice factor explicit will further change enforcement
results by refining our notions of which firms are the closest substitutes
for each other. This can be seen in the way that antitrust would come
to treat a merger among firms that compete in some particular nonprice
dimension-for example, in innovation. Not every company within an
industry competes in such terms. Some will compete by making existing
products less expensively, by superior marketing, or by superior service.
A choice-based analysis would distinguish the innovator and the noninnovator companies and would assign different competitive consequences to mergers between firms that compete in the same way and
those that compete in different ways.
Suppose, for example, that a market consists of five firms-A, B, C,
D, and E; that three firms are enough to have effective price competition
in this industry; and that three firms are also enough for effective choice
or innovation competition. But suppose that only firms A, B, and C have
large R&D budgets and a history of making significant innovations, and
only they compete significantly by engaging in innovation. Firms D and
E compete by making existing products less expensively instead. Suppose,
finally, that firms A and B (two of the firms that compete by innovating)
want to merge.
Under a price-centered analysis, the decision makers should permit
this merger because afterwards there will still be four firms left in the
market, which is enough for effective price competition. Under choice
analysis, however, decision makers might block the merger because it is
likely to result in only two independent sources of choice or innovation,261
while optimal choice or innovation would require three independent
suppliers. 262
www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/comments/bakeIjon.pdf (federal enforcers should "consider adding a new section making explicit their approach to analyzing innovation competition," and can do so "without altering any existing Guidelines text"). An alternative method
for explicitly considering the effects of a merger on innovation was suggested by Michael
Porter. See Porter, supra note 36, at 93~2 (using "five forces" analysis).
261 This is analogous to unilateral effects analysis, except that instead of more carefully
scrutinizing a merger between two firms that are active within the same market-space
niche of a market, choice analysis could be said to focus on a niche consisting of innovators.
It is also similar to the "innovation market" idea. See supra note 37.
262 We need not take this idea further by extending it to additional or less important
dimensions of nonprice competition. Suppose that only three of the five firms in a market
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4. Innovation as an Efficiency Defense
Just as choice considerations can lead to some mergers being blocked
even if they are unlikely to have detrimental price effects, it can also
lead to some mergers being approved even if they pose a risk of a shortterm price rise. This could happen if the mergers are likely to lead to
increased innovation sufficiently valuable to offset this risk. This is a
specialized type of efficiency defense,263 focused on innovation as the
most valuable of the relevant efficiencies. 264
Merging firms can present such a defense today, but do not commonly
do so in convincing detaiI.265 Choice analysis would more explicitly invite
such evidence. Merging firms would be encouraged to demonstrate that
their merger would lead to a greater incentive towards, and capability
and likelihood of, significant innovations that would enhance consumer
choice. The range of relevant innovation should be defined broadly for
these purposes. It should include not only technological innovations,
but also innovative new services, new service delivery techniques,266 and
higher-quality products. Just as with cost-oriented efficiencies, however,
efficiencies in innovation are much easier to claim than to demonstrate.
The burden of persuasion for a choice or innovation defense, like the
current burden for a cost-savings defense,267 should be on the merging
parties because they are most likely to have access to the relevant information. They should also have to show that the innovation could not be
accomplished in any other way, such as through a joint venture.
compete by offering high levels of sponsorship of local sports teams (or high-quality
advertising, or any other significant but secondary dimension of competition) and that
two of the sponsorship-oriented firms want to merge. Should we prevent this merger?
Not necessarily, because those other arenas are not, in most cases, as important for
consumers as choice and innovation. This proposition can be tested by imagining the
consumer response to a 5% diminution in the relevant conduct.
263 This assumes that the merger enforcement or liability decision properly permits an
efficiency defense in the first place. The Clayton Act does not contain an explicit exception
for an efficiency-enhancing merger. It prohibits mergers the effect of which "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopOly." 15 U.S.C. § 18.
However, competition could be enhanced in the long run if a merger leads to increased
innovation that helps the innovating firm challenge an established monopolist, so an
innovation defense might still be implicitly justified under the statute. For an analysis of
the relevant policy considerations see Fisher & Lande, supra note 34, at 1651-77.
264 See Porter, supra note 55.
265 See generally Malcolm Coate, Twenty Years of Federal Trade Commission Merger Enforcement
Activity (1985-2004), at 17-18 (Potomac Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005),
available at h up: / / papers. ssm. com/ sol3 / papers. cfm?abstracUd= 708503.
266 The importance of innovation in seIVices is illustrated by the growth of Internetbased shopping options.
267 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.
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PREVENTING EXCESSIVE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

Any explicit incorporation of choice considerations into antitrust analysis could lead to overbroad enforcement. The choice model is analytically more complete than the other models and, thus, provides more
avenues of attack and, thus, is more susceptible to abuse. Improper
enforcement could occur, for example, if the choice approach were
misconstrued as a quest for the maximum number of choices, rather
than as a way to preserve the number and variety of choices that competition would bring. We believe that the antitrust community and the courts
will understand the proper role of choice analysis and will enforce those
limits through the appointment of sensible enforcement officials and
through appellate review. It seems better to rely on these kinds of checks
and balances than to deliberately continue to use an incomplete legal
theory.
If one still fears the risks, however, antitrust could compensate by
formally limiting the range of prosecutorial discretion under a choice
model. Choice considerations could be permitted only as a tiebreaker
or weighting factor, for example, or as a separate analytical screen only
after a price or efficiency analysis has been completed. By following
those approaches it would be possible to achieve at least some of the
benefits of the choice model rather than forgoing it altogether.
G. CONCLUSION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

The question is not whether the choice model can be implemented
perfectly or without difficulty, but rather whether the greater relevance
of the choice theory, combined with the relatively modest incremental
complexity of its application, will allow antitrust decision makers to make
those decisions better than they currently do. We believe that it will.
Applied with care, the choice approach can do more or less as practical
a job in answering the right questions as the other models can do in
answering the wrong questions.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ADVANTAGES OF
THE CHOICE PARADIGM

Adopting the choice paradigm does not just ensure that particular
cases will be decided more correctly. It also has important practical
administrative advantages for external communication and internal case
management. The new paradigm will: (1) facilitate dialogue and convergence with foreign antitrust regimes; (2) make it easier to explain antitrust policy to non-specialists in the media and the American public;
(3) lead to greater enforcement efficiency because it draws attention to
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the right issues; (4) make it easier to identifY useful synergies between
competition and consumer protection matters; and (5) suggest a more
rational allocation of cases between the FTC and the Justice Department.

A.

FACILITATES DIALOGUE AND CONVERGENCE
WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

First, the choice paradigm will help to smooth our interactions with
the antitrust officials of foreign countries. This model may be particularly useful for presentation to the European Union as a mutuallyacceptable midpoint around which the ongoing convergence of national
policies in the industrialized nations can continue. The European Union
is less completely committed than we are to the efficiency-centered
antitrust paradigm. European laws and enforcement patterns currently
embrace a variety of values,268 and, although efficiency is high among
these values,269 it seems unlikely that the European enforcers would be
comfortable relying on efficiency alone. 27o But they might agree to rely
268 The Preamble to the EU Merger Control Regulation states that the Commission
must assess competition and market concentration "within the general framework of the
achievementof the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community .... " Council Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89, art. 3, 1989 OJ.
(L 257) '\123, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31989R4064:EN:HTML. Article 2 of the Treaty then provides:
The Community shall have as its task ... to promote ... a harmonious, balanced
and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment
and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of
economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality
of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Text) art. 2, 2002 OJ. (C 325)
8, available at http://eur-Iex.europa.eu/en/ treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN .pdf.
269 Former EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti observed that most people
commenting on proposed revisions to the merger regulations "consider that there should
be an 'efficiency defense' that could mitigate a finding of dominance." He further noted
that "I share this approach," and that only "a small minority" of commentors advocated "for the introduction of other policy considerations in the assessment of mergers,
like ... their social consequences." Mario Monti, Review of the EC Merger RegulationRoadmap for the Reform Project, Remarks Before the British Chamber of Commerce,
Brussels (June 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/02/252&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
270 The Europeans have defined their areas of concern more broadly. "Market power is
the power to influence market prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods
and services, or other parameters of competition on the market for a significant period
of time." DC Competition, Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
Exclusionary Abuses '\124 (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, EU COMPETITION POLICY AND
THE CONSUMER 8 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publica
tions/consumer_en.pdf (an anticompetitive merger "is likely to harm consumers through
higher prices, reduced choice or less innovation"); see also Mario Monti, Preface, EUROPEAN
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on a choice model. In fact, some EU statements on competition policy
are already framed in terms very similar to our proposed choice
approach. 271 If U.S. and European enforcers were able to converge on
the choice model, there would be greater prospects for international
harmonization of law, to the benefit of all participants in the world
economy.
For somewhat different reasons, the choice model may also be useful
when dealing with the governments of developing economies. The concept of choice is readily communicated across the barriers of different
language, culture, and experience. It is much more transparent and
straightforward than the language of efficiency. This makes it suitable
for presentation to the regulators and enforcers in emerging economies,
who may not have large numbers of experienced market-oriented economists to consult. 272 The vocabulary of choice may also be a useful corrective to some prior habits of mind. Especially if they have come out of a
system of price regulation, foreign competition officials might tend to
attach undue importance to price considerations at the expense of quality, innovation, or service. 273
B.

EASIER TO EXPLAIN TO CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC

It is not enough for a nation to have a sound antitrust policy that
is understood by its specialist practitioners. The policy also has to be
communicated effectively to non-specialists, such as business executives
who must comply with the law, judges and juries who enforce the law,
the senators and representatives who appropriate the enforcement budgets, the media, and ultimately the general public. The choice model is
particularly useful in this regard because there is something simple and
COMM'N, COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE CITIZEN 4 (2000), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/competition_policy_and_the_citizen/en.
pdf (merger policy ensures "a diversity of mass-market consumer goods" as well as "low
prices"). Moreover, "ensuring that consumers are able to make choices which affect the
conduct of firms" is also a means of "guaranteeing that markets function on a competitive
basis." [d. at 5.
271 See supra note 270. However, even if American and EU competition policies, as applied
in recent years, have produced "broadly convergent outcomes," particularly with respect
to cartels and horizontal mergers, Monti, supra note 269, they have not yet fully converged,
particularly with respect to other issues like abuse of dominance.
272 See, e.g., Russell Pittman, Chief, Competition Policy Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, The Heart of Antimonopoly Investigation: The Choices of Consumers,
Remarks to Staff Members of Antimonopoly Offices of Central and Eastern Europe at
FTC/DOJ Conference, Investigating Competition Cases (Mar. 7, 1994).
273 At the same time, we would not want national administrators to fall into the opposite
error by using a choice theory to systematically oppose any reduction in the number of
options, perhaps by protecting incumbent firms. A careful discussion of the limits on the
theory would also be necessary.
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intuitively obvious about the basic concept of protecting a range of
options and the ability to choose among them. 274 By contrast, an efficiency
model is exceedingly difficult to communicate to non-specialists. It leads
them to think that the law considers only simple changes in the cost of
production, or else that it considers a bewildering, impenetrable variety
of technical economic concepts, in which almost everything is relevant
and nothing is determinative. 2i5
C. GREATER ENFORCEMENT EFFICIENCY

Another administrative benefit of the new paradigm is that it will
direct enforcers' attention to the most relevant considerations in the
mass of facts that makes up an antitrust case. This will reduce the risk
of focusing on secondary facts, which can waste resources and lead to
erroneous conclusions requiring later correction.
The case of vertical restraints illustrates these benefits. The investigator
who approaches such a constraint with a price model in mind is immediately at a loss because price evidence in that context is inherently ambiguous. A price rise may be due to the harmful stifling of intrabrand
competition or to the beneficial elimination of short-term free riders, and
the observed price behavior alone will not indicate which explanation is
correct. 2i6 Nor is a shift to the more elaborate efficiency model of much
help. It simply tells the investigator to "consider all relevant considerations," which, while perfectly true, fails to provide practical guidance.
But a choice model will immediately direct the investigator to the
right question, by asking whether the net consumer options (including
both price and nonprice options) have been enriched or diminished as
a result of the vertical restraint. Thus, the choice model provides some
generally valid and useful rules of thumb-"more consumer choice is
274 See Barbara Swain, Consumer Choice: A Theme Jurors Find Compelling, ANTITRUST REp.,
Aug. 2000, at 8, 16 ("When structuring case themes, it is important to keep in mind
that jurors today are concerned about consumer choice in the marketplace. They want
assurances that consumers have price and product alternatives. Thus, it is important to
establish choice, or lack thereof, in order to prevail.").
275 On several occasions one of the authors, Professor Lande, has discussed the efficiency
approach with business journalists. He has tried to explain that under this approach the
only problem with supracompetitive pricing is that it causes allocative inefficiency, and
he also has tried to help journalists understand the underlying concept of the deadweight
loss welfare triangle. On no occasion did the reporters seem to intuitively grasp the concept
of allocative inefficiency, or to accept that the only problem efficiency adherents have
with anticompetitive mergers or cartels is that they cause such inefficiency.
276 Compare Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), with Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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probably good"-and provides a quick test that can help people avoid
gross error. 277

D. BETTER SYNERGIES BETWEEN COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION THEORIES
The choice approach will also help practitioners more readily identify
possible synergies between antitrust and consumer protection theories.
The choice model puts both those theories on the table at the same
time, as the two essential components of a market transaction. In so
doing, it makes it easier to recognize two potentially powerful synergies
between them.
The first is the synergy of coordination. If an agency, such as the FTC,
that has jurisdiction over both antitrust and consumer protection, is
contemplating a broad approach to some troublesome sector of the
economy, it might consider how its work under one of its responsibilities
can sometimes help advance its goals under the other, and take advantage
of that reinforcement wherever possible. 278 For example, the provision
of better, more transparent consumer information about health-care
providers (a consumer protection concern) might result in better and
more rational competition among them (an antitrust concern).279
The second synergy involves the possibility of substitution. Sometimes
it may turn out that a particular issue, long addressed on one side of
the line between antitrust and consumer protection, is actually better

277 If the restraint will produce more choices for consumers, it is presumably beneficial
because it probably helps overcome a free rider or other problem. By contrast, if all the
restraint does is to reduce consumers' price choices, it is likely to be anticompetitive.
Some other situations will have mixed effects that must be more carefully examined.
278 Cj Note from the FIC and the U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division to the OECD Global
Forum on Competition, The United States Experience in Competition Law Technical
Assistance: A Ten Year Perspective (Feb. 6, 2002) ~ 24, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/37/61/1833990.pdf:
A competition agency cannot function in a vacuum. For it to do its job, there
must be other institutions in place that understand the role of competition
in a market economy .... The linkages between competition and consumer
protection are well understood in the United States, and if the competition
agency does not itself handle this function (as the FIC does in the U.S.), a
competition agency should have a healthy relationship with the consumer protection agency and should be able to help it understand that consumer protection
should complement, not replace, competition in a market economy.
279 The same synergy of coordination can sometimes also be achieved on a smaller scale
by combining different categories within the single discipline of antitrust law. For example,
it may sometimes be useful to use structural remedies to cure a conduct violation. See
generally Neil W. Averitt, Structural Remedies in Competition Cases Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 40 OHIO ST. LJ. 781 (1979).

2007]

CONSUMER CHOICE APPROACH

253

suited to handling on the other side. For example, if a firm has an
exclusionary strategy that relies on misleading consumers or competitors,
this might be challenged by the FTC's Bureau of Competition, but under
a consumer protection theory that focuses on the firm's use of the
particular tactics of deception or coercion.280 There are at least three
types of antitrust matters that might sometimes be reframed in consumer
protection terms. 281 These are cases involving: (1) deception of standardsetting organizations; (2) strike suits or other forms of nuisance litigation;
and (3) exploitation of locked-in customers.

1. Deception of Standard-Setting Organizations
A choice between antitrust and consumer protection theories will be
possible in cases involving the deception of standard-setting organizations. Standardization agreements ensure that different brands of
280 The use of consumer protection laws in a business context should not be troublesome,
in principle. Business corporations can certainly be "consumers" in their role as purchasers
of inputs. See, e.g., McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1380-81, 1388 n.ll (11th Cir.
2000) (deceptive acts by telemarketers to induce businesses to pay for unordered photocopier toner); FTC v. Certified Merchant Servs., Civ. Action No. 4:02cv44, Complaint ~~ 28-31
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/cmscmplnt.pdf
(allegedly unfair to subject small businesses to unfavorable terms that had been improperly
added to credit card processing contracts after signature); Press Release, Federal Trade
Comm'n, Three California Telemarketers Banned from Telemarketing as Part of FTC
Settlement (Feb. 5, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/02/datadist.htrn
(including consent order in FTC v. National Supply & Dist. Center, Inc., No. CV-99-12828
(C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 7, 1999) involving misrepresentation of the existence of prior business
relationship when selling toner to small businesses). Management textbooks have long
recognized that businesses can be subject to the same imperfect decision-making processes
as individual consumers. See supra note 96.
281 The issues of definition and limiting principles will naturally be important when it
comes to extending consumer protection law to these new antitrust contexts. Developing
a formal list of limiting principles is outside the scope of this article, but a number
of possibilities-which at this point we neither endorse nor reject-can be identified.
Enforcement through consumer-protection theories could be limited to: (I) particular
areas of the law (such as patent infringement suits) in which there is a heightened risk
that private parties can engage in abusive litigation; (2) cases presenting objective proof
that private defenses are ineffective; (3) cases presenting objective proof that the aggressor
is not pursing bona fide economic goals; (4) cases involving conduct that deviates substantially from industry-standard methods to which purchasers have already grown accustomed;
(5) situations where at least a substantial minority of consumers have had their decisions
adversely swayed; and (6) cases involving particularly large economic harm. All these
enforcement actions could concentrate on situations affecting initial purchase decisions,
thus also excluding many forms of business torts, contract breaches, and other postpurchase opportunistic conduct. However, the list of limiting principles does not include
a notion that consumer protection theories can be used in an antitrust context only to
protect individuals and small businesses. To be sure, as a matter of resource allocation
and prosecutorial discretion, those situations may account for virtually all FTC actions.
As a matter of legal theory, however, the FTC Act covers unreasonable impairments of a
purchaser's ability to choose, regardless of the size or nature of the purchaser; the law
does not withdraw its equal protection from large entities merely because they are large.
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technical devices, such as computers or audio systems, can be operated
together and their individual components can compete with one another.
This is a clear efficiency, and such agreements generally pass antitrust
muster. Sometimes, however, one party to the agreement has secured a
patent on the intellectual property covered by a standard; misrepresented
(either expressly or by silence) to the association that no such patent
exists; waited until the industry has committed itself to the standard and
has become locked in; and then asserted its patent rights. The FTC's
case in Rambus involved essentially these facts. 282
The complaint there was framed in antitrust terms, charging "unfair
methods of competition,"283 which in that context were acts of monopolization. The Commission ultimately determined that the central act
of monopolization was the respondent'S deception. The case might
also have been brought in explicitly consumer protection terms,
however. The standard-setting group "purchased" the intellectual property needed for the joint standard, and "paid" for it with their reciprocal
agreements to follow the standard; and this purchase process was disrupted by the deceptive failure of Rambus to disclose its own patent
rights.
The consumer protection approach would be advantageous in some
circumstances. Deception of this sort can take place even without market
power-because consumers are injured through other mechanisms
instead. 284 The consumer protection approach will, therefore, be the
better theory to use in situations when market power or market defini-

282 See Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, FTC Finds Rambus Unlawfully Obtained
Monopoly Power (Aug. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Rambus Press Release], available at http://
www.ftc.gov!opa!2006!OS!rambus.htm. The Commission pursued a somewhat similar
theory against Unocal. See generally Complaint, Union Oil Co., FTC Docket No. 9305 (Mar.
4, 2003) [hereinafter Union Oil Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os!2003!03!
unocalcmp.htm. Unocal involved charges that the patent-holding firm deceived a unit of
the California state government as well as other industry participants. Unocal eventually
agreed to release the relevant patents to the public as part of a settlement with the FTC,
in the context of the firm's acquisition by Chevron. See Press Release, Federal Trade
Comm 'n, Dual Consent Orders Resolve Competitive Concerns About Chevron's $lS Billion
Purchase of Unocal, FTC's 2003 Complaint Against Unocal (June 10,2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/chevronunocal.htm.
28S Complaint at ~~ 122-124, Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (June IS, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/02061Sadmincmp.pdf.
284 Antitrust violations involve conduct that takes place "outside the head" of the consumer and so they imply the existence of market power, whereas consumer protection
violations take place "inside the head" of the consumer and so they do not require any
particular market context. See Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 12, at
730,733.
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tions are unclear, as, for example, some thought they had been in the
earlier Dell Computer case. 285

2. Strike Suits and Extortionate Litigation
A choice of competition and consumer protection approaches is also
available for dealing with strike suits and extortionate litigation. This
kind of conduct is usually approached as an antitrust matter. The aggressor firm may be engaged in an act of monopolization, such as a plan to
drive all others from the market through specious patent litigation, or
a strategy designed to raise its rivals' costs through burdensome legal
proceedings. The same facts can also be viewed in consumer protection
terms, however. The target firm in these cases is, in a sense, being coerced
by the threat of unwarranted litigation expenses into "buying" a license or
some other indulgence from the aggressor. Because consumer protection
law prohibits coerced purchases, a violation on that theory may be
present. 286 Coercion, like deception, does not necessarily require market
power. Consumer protection will, therefore, provide the more appropriate legal theory in situations where the aggressor firm does not have
a high market share, as patent predators frequently do not. 287

285 See Dell Computer Co., 121 F.T.C. 616, 632 (1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dissenting)
("the majority fails to identify the relevant market in which market power assertedly
was 'conferred'").
286 See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. ITC, 295 F.2d 302, 303 (7th Cir. 1961) (salesmen
disassembled home furnaces for inspection and then refused to reassemble them until
the customer agreed to buy additional parts or services); see also Arthur Murray Studio of
Washington, Inc. v. ITC, 458 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1972) (high-pressure, closed-door sales
pitches for dance lessons); Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (1972) (establishing a
cooling-off period out of concern for the effects on consumers who are cornered in their
own homes). See generally Averitt, Unfair Acts or Practices, supra note 12, at 252-55.
287 There is also a second advantage to use of consumer protection theories in strikesuit cases-the conduct then does not appear to be protected by the Noerr petitioning
immunity that normally shields even ill-founded litigation from antitrust challenge. Compare
Prof\, Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 64 (1993)
(setting strict test for bad-faith antitrust litigation), with Spiegel v. ITC, 540 F.2d 287, 294
(7th Cir. 1976), andJ.C. Penney Co., 109 F.T.C. 54 (1987) (consent order) (challenging
as unfair the practice of suing consumers for unpaid debts in distant or inconvenient
fora). There appears to be a principled basis for this distinction. Consumers with shallow
pockets are more readily intimidated and abused by bad-faith litigation than businesses
would be and, thus, predators' freedom to institute such litigation under the protection
of Noerr should be more restricted on the consumer protection side of the statute. This
principle might apply even where the targets of the abusive lawsuits are businesses, at
least where they are small businesses that may have many of the behavioral and resource
characteristics of an individual consumer. It is also possible that the Noerrimmunity should
be more restricted for ITC actions in general, and not just consumer protection actions
in particular. See generally Union Oil Complaint, supra note 282 (raising although not
resolving this issue).
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3. Exploitation of Locked-In Consumers
Finally, there can be a significant consumer protection component
to antitrust cases that involve the exploitation of locked-in consumers.
Such cases may first present themselves to the antitrust bar as tying
arrangements-that is, as potential competition violations. That was
the situation in the Supreme Court's Kodak case, where customers had
to buy the firm's maintenance services in order to obtain its spare
parts. 288 There are actually a great many consumer protection attributes
to this kind of case, however. What made the Kodak tie-in of concern
is not a long-announced program requiring manufacturer service, but
rather an unanticipated shift in the supplier's policy. The problem was
a breach of the implicit (or explicit) understanding that users would
be allowed to handle maintenance in a certain way over the lifetime
of the product, thus making the initial, unfulfilled promise a deceptive
one. The FTC has brought a number of consumer protection cases
involving post-hoc contract breaches. 289 Pursuing a tie-in matter in these
terms will be appropriate in cases where consumers have been injured
by the faulty information about policy changes rather than by an
exercise of market power.

E.

BETTER ALLOCATION OF CASES BETWEEN FTC
AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Finally, the consumer choice paradigm can help to allocate antitrust
cases more appropriately between the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice. 290 Choice theory implies that antitrust should
288 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458 (1992).
Kodak had changed its photocopier service policies around 1985, in a effort to limit the
growth of independent service organizations. Customers who had bought copiers before
the policy change were forced against their expectations to pay higher prices as a result
of this new tie-in because they were already locked in to using Kodak machines. See Averitt
& Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 12, at 738-40. For a more detailed discussion
of this case, see Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could
Playa Crucial IWle in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 193 (1993).
289 See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 347, 368 (1986) (company breached
"lifetime" service contract by raising annual renewal fees when it had promised not to do
so); if. FTC v. Certified Merchant SeIVices, Civ. Action No. 4:02cv44, Complaint ~~ 2831 (E.D. Tex.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/cmscmplnt.pdf (unfairness
authority invoked to keep small businesses from being held subject to contracts for credit
card processing services on unfavorable terms, when the adverse terms had been improperly
added to the contracts after signature). Of course, if there is merely a policy change, but
no reasonable understanding of any promise that the policy would not be changed, then
there is no violation at all.
290 This has long been a concern. See Ernest Gellhorn, Two's a Crowd: The FTC's Redundant
Antitrust Powers, 5 REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1981, at 32; Miles W. Kirkpatrick et aI., Report
of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the IWle of
the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 43, 113-24 (1989).
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always be construed with an awareness of how it will mesh with consumer
protection. The FTC's special expertise in consumer protection means
that it will be uniquely suited to handle those antitrust cases in which
consumer protection considerations are particularly important. Because
this division would more fully take advantage of each agency's methodological expertise, it is likely to produce better results than the current
allocation criteria that look to industry experience only. This change is
probably also modest enough to be instituted without disruption. It
would affect the allocation of only about 5 percent of antitrust cases, an
impact sufficiently large to distinguish the agencies' missions but still
small enough to let most cases proceed routinely. Moreover, the division
of authority would be only a presumption that could be set aside in favor
of compelling industry experience in any particular case.
Competition matters range from those that should presumptively go
to the FTC, to those (the great majority) that can be handled equally
well by either agency, to those that should presumptively go to DO], and
they include some others that are specifically allocated by statute.

1. Cases that Should Presumptively Go to the FTC
Antitrust cases that would usually go to the FTC are those in which
the most important and complex element in the antitrust theory is the
assessment of the effects of certain conduct on consumers' decisionmaking abilities. At least four general types of antitrust cases can present
this circumstance: (1) where a firm monopolizes through consumer
protection-type offenses like deception;291 (2) where market power is
achieved by deception of a standard-setting group;292 (3) where tying
arrangements may harm consumer decision making;293 and (4) where
291 See Allied Tube & Conduit v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499, 51I (1988) (abuse
of standard-setting process in way that effectively misrepresented the state of professional
opinion on safety issues); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 775-76 (6th
Cir. 2002) (among other acts of monopolization in market for moist snuff, U.S. Tobacco
misrepresented its sales figures to retail purchasers).
292 See Rambus Press Release, supra note 282 and accompanying text; cf Dell Computer
Co., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
293 Tying arrangements frequently present this situation. A tie can be a technical antitrust
violation because it restricts the choices available to consumers. See Lande, Choice as Ultimate
Goal, supra note 12, at 510 n.33. What often makes a tie of actual enforcement concern,
however, is that it can also enable a firm to harm consumers' decision-making abilities,
perhaps through some exploitation of particular vulnerabilities. For example, a tie between
two related products may make it more difficult for consumers to determine the price of
either of the products in the package, thus making price competition less effective. See
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 1I5 F.T.C. 625 (1992) (consent order) (tie between drug and
services to monitor for adverse reactions). Or a tie between a product and a service can
take advantage of those consumers who have difficulty calculating lifetime service costs.
Cf Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 475-76 (1992)
(presenting, but not deciding, these issues). Conversely, other ties can be justified on
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the main effect of a horizontal agreement is to restrict advertising or
otherwise raise consumer search costs.294
Two additional groups of cases have consumer protection elements
that, although not the single most important issue in the theory of
violation, are sufficiently important that there are benefits to using consumer protection expertise and that justify adding them to the list of
matters that should usually go to the FTC. These are: (5) cases in which
a harm to consumer decision-making ability must be considered as one
part of a full rule of reason analysis;295 and (6) merger cases where
consumer preferences for creativity and variety require a relatively wide
range of independent suppliers. A key question in this last group of
cases is ascertainingjust how many suppliers of newspaper and television
services, for example, are needed for individual consumers to feel that
they have a satisfactory range of options. 296

2. Matters that Can Be Handled by Either Agency
At the center of the spectrum are the great majority of antitrust
matters, which can be handled with equal facility by either the FfC or
the DO]. These include the familiar mix of merger, horizontal agreement, and vertical restraints matters. To be sure, handling such matters
may sometimes benefit from a careful assessment of consumer behavior.
A merger is best judged, for example, when one has a sense of how
readily consumers will substitute away from the affected products in
response to a price increase, or how quickly consumers will find out
consumer protection grounds, as when they assign responsibility for the performance of
multi-part systems to a single visible party. Cf. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Similarly, some
other non price vertical restraints might be justified on consumer protection grounds
because they preclude a certain mode of doing business-that is, a certain marketplace
option-that presents an exceptionally high risk of consumer abuse. See Bd. of Trade of
City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,240 (1918) (upholding restrictions on afterhours commodity trading because such trading could lead to abuse of less-well-informed
parties). Whatever the specifics of these varied tying cases, they all involve an integral
balancing of competition and consumer protection goals and thus should go to the FTC.
294 What makes such a horizontal agreement either bad or good is its underlying consumer protection impact. The standards may burden advertising with so many disclosures
that the firms can no longer communicate effectively to potential customers, which would
make the standards impermissibly anticompetitive. Or the standards could actually protect
consumers from false or misleading information, in which case the defendants would
have an efficiency defense. See, e.g., Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 603-04
(7th Cir. 1984).
295 See supra Part III.B, notes 79-88.
296 To answer this question the agency will have to draw, in part, on consumer protection
methodologies, using polling, focus groups, opinion surveys, advertising studies, and other
techniques to understand the consumer demand for variety. See supra Part lV.C, notes
244-49.
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about a new product or price discount. 297 Nonetheless, the consumer
behavior involved in these mid-range cases is relatively straightforward
and familiar, does not call for specialized agency expertise, and would
not call for any specialized consumer protection input. For this reason
these cases are traditionally and properly allocated between the FTC and
DOJ on the basis of an agency's familiarity with particular industries,2g8
rather than on its ability to handle particular legal theories. 299

3. Matters that Should Presumptively go to the Department ofJustice
Some matters should presumptively go to the Department of Justice.
The most important of these are cases involving price fixing and other
per se horizontal violations.
Department of Justice matters will also include one subset in a larger
class of cases that ordinarily go to the FTC. The FTC will normally handle
cases in which impaired consumer decision making must be included
in a full rule of reason analysis. These cases typically involve horizontal
agreements on non price matters, such as restrictions on advertising that,
in turn, diminish the useful information available to consumers. In some
cases, however, the horizontal agreements on marketing arrangements
may also include more hard-core agreements on price, or divisions of
customers or territories. Even those agreements are not automatically
improper, because the total package may still include enough efficiencies
to put it into the realm of rule of reason analysis. Where this price-fixing
component is an important part of the equation, however-as it was in
cases like Broadcast Music-the matter should presumptively go to the
297 This is, of course, the basis for the market definition section of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, which ask the likely effect on supply and demand in response to a small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra
note 4, § l.ll.
298 See FTC-DOJ Clearance Agreement (1993, as amended 1995), summarized at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F95/h-s-r-reform.htm. The result of this process is that certain
industries are generally handled by the FTC (e.g., supermarkets, pharmaceuticals, petroleum); others are generally handled by the Antitrust Division (e.g., steel, beer, telecommunications); and still others are handled by both agencies (e.g., computers, defense,
hospitals) .
299 Another group that can be handled by either agency involves cases in which creativity
and organizational independence may be important to institutional buyers, such as corporations and governments. These cases involve purchases in such fields as pharmaceuticals,
defense contracting, and other high-tech areas. The FTC may be particularly well suited
to identifYing the necessary number of competitors in markets serving individual consumers, such as media and fashion, since it has tools for assessing individual consumer preferences. (Just how many news sources does it take to make people feel comfortably well
informed?) The DOJ would not have any disadvantage in assessing how many suppliers
are needed to satisfY business organizations seeking to buy technical innovation, however,
because that task is more likely to involve stated organizational policy rather than halfhidden individual preferences.
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DOJ for decision. 3°O Price fixing, in other words, with the associated need
to consider criminal prosecution, something that only the DOJ can
undertake, should be a more important consideration in allocating cases
than FTC-type burdens on decision making would be.

4. Matters Allocated by Statute
Some other matters are allocated between the agencies by statute and
are, as a result, outside this scheme of allocation on the basis of choice
theory. They can instead be thought of as anchoring the two ends of
the spectrum-matters that should always be allocated to the FTC at
one end of the spectrum and to the Department of Justice at the other.
At the FTC end, that agency should handle all those matters that are
outside the letter of the Sherman Act but are nonetheless within the
"gap-filling" purposes of the FTC ACt. 30l These specialized cases include
such things as invitations to collude302 and noncollusive but potentially
anticompetitive conduct of the sort considered in Ethyl.303 At the DOl's
end of the spectrum, that agency should handle all matters involving
industries specially committed to its jurisdiction304 and all per se offenses
sufficiently serious that they are best pursued criminally. On a related
although somewhat discretionary note, the DOJ should also handle most
matters in which it is appropriate to pave the way for private trebledamage actions.

300 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. I (1979), composers had agreed on prices
as part of the process of packaging and marketing blanket licenses for musical compositions. Under prior law, this conduct might have been challenged on a per se theory.
However, the Court held that a full analysis should entertain the argument that the
restraints were essential if the product were to be marketed at all. Id. at 24-25.
301 For a discussion of those purposes, see Averitt, Unfair Methods oj Competition, supra
note 12, at 251-71.
302 The Sherman Act reaches attempts to monopolize but not attempts to collude,
unless that collusion would result in a monopoly if successful. For FTC Act cases in these
circumstances, see Valassis Communications, FTC File No. 051-0008 (Mar. 14, 2006)
(consent order); Stone Container Corp., 125 F.T.C. 853 (1998) (consent order); Precision
Moulding Co., 122 F.T.C. 104 (1996) (consent order); YKK (U.S.A.), Inc., 116 F.T.C. 628
(1993) (consent order); AE Clevite, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 389 (1993) (consent order); Trailer
Prods. Corp., ll5 F.T.C. 944 (1992) (consent order).
303 See E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 1984). In that
opinion the Second Circuit rejected an FTC attempt to establish such a violation. That
outcome appears to have been due to a failure to prove actual anticompetitive effects,
however, rather than to any fatal flaw in the theory itself.
304 Airline mergers, for example, are handled by the DO]. See Anne Bingaman, Ass't
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Consolidation and Code Sharing: Antitrust Enforcement
in the Airline Industry, Address Before the ABA Forum on Air and Space Law (Jan.
25, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech.akb.htm.CfI5
U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (FTC lacks jurisdiction over banks and common carriers).
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5. Conclusion on Allocation Between Agencies
The two agencies divide their work in an atmosphere marked by a
high volume of cases, tight deadlines on merger matters, legitimate
differences of opinion as to which agency should handle a particular
matter, and many other demands on their leaders' time. The allocation
of cases, therefore, needs to be tempered by a sensitivity to the practical
needs of day-to-day administration. Two further principles may help
attain this goal. First, the rules relating to the recognition of consumer
protection-type factors should become progressively streamlined over
time, trading off some subtlety in the characterization of legal theories
for the sake of establishing a few clear general categories of cases that
should be assigned to the FTC. This would parallel the streamlined way
in which per se horizontal restraints are normally assigned to the DO].
Second, the principles of allocation should be applied so as to leave
each agency with roughly the same workload it now has, avoiding any
suggestion of a winner or a loser in the process. 305
We do not want to overstate the weight that choice theory should have
in case allocation. It is a significant factor, but only one factor among
many. Other factors include the specialized statutes, DO] criminal
authority, and a sense that novel or complex matters are better suited
to the FTC's administrative process. 306 Most important, the two agencies
historically have agreed to allocate cases among themselves on the basis
of which agency is most familiar with the particular industry involved. 307
This usually remains the most compelling consideration. The choice
paradigm should, therefore, be relevant in allocating only about 5 percent of cases, and, even there, it should be seen as creating only a
presumptive inclination, not an irrebuttable rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are
its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give. 30B
305 Although we have written at greater length about cases that should go to the FTC,
this does not imply that the FTC's cases should be more numerous or more important.
It is instead an attempt to provide an introduction to some relatively unfamiliar consumer
protection theory.
3Q6 The FTC conducts its proceedings before a specialized and expert body; there is no
private right of action; and remedies are prospective and injunctive only, rather than
involving damages, and they do not automatically give rise to private treble damages
actions. But cf FTC v. Mylan Labs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1999) (supporting
redress remedy). For these reasons many commentators have suggested that unfamiliar
theories might, in fairness, be preferentially tried before the FTC.
307 See FTC-DO] Clearance Agreement, supra note 298.
308 ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50 (1978).
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Any attempt to improve the overall course of antitrust must begin by
asking the right question. Even if we cannot answer it perfectly today,
focusing the attention and formidable analytic powers of the legal community in the right direction will cause the right answer to emerge
through a process of evolution here, as it has in so many other areas
of antitrust. 309 Doing this is especially necessary now in light of the
overwhelming importance to our economy of innovation and the consumer choices it brings.
The consumer choice model of antitrust is being used with increasing
frequency because, fundamentally, it asks the right questions and identifies the right goals. It explains accurately, simply, and intuitively, better
than the price or efficiency models can, why antitrust is good for consumer welfare. It is more transparent and provides a better initial rule
of thumb for what antitrust is all about. It should lead to a better final
analysis of several important types of antitrust situations and should
not lead to an inferior analysis of any type of situation. And it can be
implemented in at least as administrable and predictable a manner as
other models.
By contrast, the price and efficiency models of antitrust should be
restricted for the same reasons that we have restricted the flat-earth
model of geography. It is not that the older models lack utility; they will
produce the correct result under most day-to-day working conditions.
The problem is that their underlying premises are seriously flawed. The
flat-earth model is off by only about eight inches per mile, so an architect
surveying a building, for example, can assume the earth is flat and usually
experience no problems. But under some important conditions-say,
when planning a long journey-the small errors inherent in the flatearth model add up and lead to wrong conclusions. The price or efficiency models can lead to similar errors.
On its face, the notion of shifting to a new paradigm sounds alarming
and disruptive, a leap into the unknown at the very least, and perhaps
something fraught with the dangers of erroneous decisions in an area
of the economy where it is important to avoid mistakes. The actual facts
are much more nearly routine, however. The paradigm shift proposed
309 Sometimes antitrust cannot as a practical matter grapple with the right questions and
so must use surrogates, at least for a while. For example, some 25 years ago Landes and
Posner argued that the only things we need to know to make correct enforcement decisions
in merger cases are elasticity of demand and elasticity of supply. They then conceded that
because we can rarely measure these things reliably in a merger context we should instead
continue to use the surrogates of market definition, market share, etc. See William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937,938,
944 (1981). Since then, however, merger analysis has been moving closer to an approach
that ignores the surrogates and instead tries to ascertain the relevant elasticity questions
directly. For a discussion, see Lande & Langenfeld, supra note 66, at 6--8.
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here is intended to make antitrust law easier to understand and apply,
and to bring about some useful changes in outcome on the margins,310
but it is also meant to preserve the basic methodology and outcomes in
the vast majority of cases. Price and efficiency would remain the centerpiece of analysis in most matters. The substantive changes would affect
less than 5 percent of cases.
Antitrust jurisprudence is easily capable of absorbing a paradigm shift
of this magnitude. The law has never been fixed, but rather has redefined
the statement of its fundamental mission every few decades for over 100
years,311 in response to accumulating practical experience and changes
in the nature of the problems that it addresses. In the years before World
War I, the main point of antitrust was literally an opposition to trustsan attack on the industrywide price-fixing cartels that were organized
through trusts of voting stock. In the 1930s, in a world shaken by depression and the rise of fascism, the role of antitrust was redefined to include
a strong element of protecting social stability by protecting small businesses.3J2 In the 1960s and 1970s, antitrust expressed a fear of corporate
bigness and sought to advance a variety of social and political goals
associated with deconcentration, as well as purely economic goals. 3J3 In
the 1980s, with the elections of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George
H.W. Bush, antitrust took up the only alternative that was available, the
one used by the economists, and it came to be dominated by a sensitivity
to economic efficiencies of all kinds. 314 From the mid-1990s and until
510 Since 1890, most changes in antitrust have been slight and gradual. Naked price
fixing is prosecuted in any administration, and most mergers will be evaluated in a similar
fashion (in light of the general acceptance of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines) under
any view of antitrust. Many of the other core issues within antitrust enforcement show
stability and usually do not involve wide pendulum swings from one administration to
the next. See Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Comm'n, How History Informs
Practice-Understanding the Development of Modem U.S. Competition Policy, Remarks
to the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 19,2003), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisfallaba.pdf; William Kovacic, The Modem Evolution of
u.s. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST LJ. 377 (2003).
5lI Although antitrust existed in limited form at common law, its modem incarnation
started with the Sherman Act of 1890.
m The Robinson-Patman Act, for example, can be understood as a response of independent grocery stores to the rise of the more efficient A&P chain supermarkets. See Richard C.
Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Idealogy, and the Remnants of the Progressive
Constitution, 1920-1940,90 IOWA L. REv. 1011 (2005).
m The field was not blind to issues of productivity, however, and tried to balance
social and political concerns with other concerns for consumer welfare and corporate
productivity. See John J. Flynn, Introduction, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A SympOSium on the
Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977).
514 The efficiency revolution can be traced to a single article. See Robert Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966). For the history of the
ascendancy of the efficiency perspective, see Lande, Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, supra
note 233.
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the present time, under both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush,
antitrust enforcement has become more nuanced, with efficiency goals
being tempered by a concern for prices to ultimate consumers and,
increasingly, with a nascent purpose of using antitrust as a way of ensuring
optimal levels of consumer choice. 315 The full shift to a choice and options
framework would, therefore, be neither a large nor unprecedented step.
This limited paradigm shift is still important and worth making. Even
if the shift does not greatly affect the numbers of cases brought, it will
affect the vocabulary of the enterprise and the kind of analysis that is
brought to bear, and will introduce analytical pathways that are more
nearly predisposed toward reaching accurate conclusions. We believe
that the choice model asks the right questions and assigns antitrust to
its proper context in the larger mission of protecting consumer choice,
and so is likely to begin the process in an understandable, readily implemented way.

315 See, e.g., Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Comm'n, The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection, Remarks at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute's 29th
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy 3-4 (Oct. 31, 2002) ("Competition presses producers to offer the most attractive array of price and quality options. In
competitive industries, the imperative to gain new sales by satisfYing consumer needs
increases the spectrum of choices available .... competition does more than simply increase
the choices available to consumers, however."). The growing role of choice analysis is
illustrated by such varied and important matters as Microsoft, supra note 48; AOL/Time
Warner, supra note 119; and Lockheed/Northrop, supra note 161.

